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
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
SEPTEMBER, 1939

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THE MARINE CORPS GAZETTE

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Vol. 23

SEPTEMBER, 1939

No. 3

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Vol. 23

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No. 3

The Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Teams and the National Matches, 1939

MAJOR M. A. EDSON, *U.S.M.C.*

ONCE again, the firing of the National Rifle Team Match at Camp Perry, Ohio, on September eighth and ninth brought to a close another year of competitive marksmanship within the Marine Corps, and for the second consecutive year, the "Dogs of War" slipped through our grasp and failed to return to their old billet at Marine Corps Headquarters.

Following the completion of the Eastern Division Rifle and Pistol Competitions, the Marine Corps competitions, and the Elliott Trophy Matches, held at the Rifle

Range, Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia, during the period 8-27 May, 1939, the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Team Detachment, consisting of 10 officer and 63 enlisted competitors, was assembled at Wakefield, Massachusetts, on the fourth of June for its summer training season. The Detachment was commanded by Major William J. Whaling, who has been closely identified with marksmanship in the Marine Corps since his debut in the A.E.F. competitions at Le Mans, France, when he won the individual pistol match. He was a firing member of



The U. S. Marine Corps National Rifle Team, 1939. Third Place. Score: 2751

the Marine Corps National Pistol Teams of 1920, '21, '22, '23, '24, '29, '30, '35 and '37; coach of the Rifle and Pistol Teams of 1935 and '36; and team captain of the winning Rifle Team of 1937. His coaching staff consisted of Captain August Larson, team coach; Chief Marine Gunner Calvin A. Lloyd, assistant coach (rifle); and Marine Gunner James R. Tucker, assistant coach (pistol). During the season, Sergeant Major Nolan Tillman, 1st Sergeant Kenneth E. Harker, and Platoon Sergeant Broox E. Clements acted as assistant coaches both at Wakefield and at Camp Perry. All together, it looked like a winning combination and, except for the breaks of the game, should have brought in the trophy when the last shot went down the range in the big team match.

Nine members of the pistol team attended the National Rifle Association Eastern Regional Pistol Tournament at Camp Ritchie, Maryland, from the first to the fourth of July. This tournament draws the best pistol shooters in the eastern part of the United States, including representatives of the Infantry and Cavalry Teams, and such well known organizations as the Detroit Police Pistol Team. The tournament was used as a testing ground for our untried pistol team candidates. They competed in seventeen individual and three team matches. Private First Class W. E. Fletcher was the only winner, scoring 178x200 in the .45 caliber slow-fire match (50 yards). In the team matches, the Marines took second place in two of the three fired. Although these results do not appear impressive, the experience gained at this tournament was of inestimable value later on and it is hoped that it may be a regular feature in our training season in future years.

Eliminations from the squad began by the middle of June and by the end of July, the detachment had been reduced to a total of 45 rifle shooters and 12 pistol competitors, some of whom were also included in the rifle list.

The United Services of New England Rifle and Pistol Tournament was held from 29 July to 6 August, 1939. These matches were the largest and best of recent years, with approximately 150 entries in all individual matches and 22 teams entered in the Hayden Team Match. Besides the Marine Corps Team, the U. S. Infantry, U. S. Cavalry, U. S. Coast Guard, U. S. Marine Corps Reserve, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island National Guard and civilian teams were all represented.

The Marine Corps squad fired in fourteen individual rifle matches, winning eleven of them, and five team matches, of which it won four. This compared very favorably with the fourteen wins out of sixteen matches fired in 1938. Outstanding among the winning scores was that made by Corporal C. W. Rawlings in the 2nd Battalion Match, 200 yards, slow fire, in which he established a new world's record of twenty-one consecutive bull's-eyes before going out for a four. The 1000-yard stage of the Hayden Trophy Team Match was fired in a high wind and heavy rain, which actually interrupted the firing for a period of about one hour, and which largely accounts for the fifty-point difference between this year's winning score and last year's record of 2897.


Friday morning broke clear and comparatively cool, but with a twenty-five to thirty-mile puffy wind blowing from one o'clock, which meant plenty of trouble in the

off-hand stage and materially lower scores as compared with previous years. This was a distinct disadvantage for the Marine Corps and Coast Guard Teams who, in their training at Wakefield, had not fired a shot at 200 yards slow fire in anything stronger than a ten-mile breeze, whereas the three Army teams, who had trained at Camp Perry, were considerably more familiar with these conditions. In spite of this handicap, our first pair led the field with a one-point margin over the Engineer Team, and our second pair increased the margin by three more. It was not until our last two pairs ran into tough sledding that we relinquished the lead, never to regain it throughout the match. At the end of the first stage we were in fourth place with 407, nine points behind the Infantry's 416, five points behind the Engineers and three behind the Cavalry. The Coast Guard had even heavier weather than we and finished with a 388, from which they never recovered.

At the 200-yard rapid fire stage, the Marine Team was not only handicapped by the high wind but also by the two key-holed shots which had been lost in the Enlisted Men's Team Match of a few days before. Their groups were bigger than usual and the team total of 475 for the stage was at least ten points below their average for the season. Here, also, was an example of the "breaks of the game" which one so often hears and so often discounts as an alibi. The Infantry team had two alibi strings caused by men on an adjoining target firing on the Infantry target. In the refiring, one man picked up one point and the other two over the scores as spotted from the firing line in their original strings. When the smoke finally cleared away at the end of the morning's firing, the Infantry was in the lead with 895, thirteen points ahead of the Marine Team, and the Cavalry and Engineers were tied for second place with 891 each, nine points up from us.

By the time firing was resumed in the afternoon, the wind had dropped off to about ten miles an hour and had shifted around to six o'clock, fish-tailing slightly, with a fairly heavy mirage. At 300 yards rapid-fire, the Marines came through with a 474, still in fourth place for the match, but having closed the gap between the Infantry to nine points, six points behind the Engineers and three points in rear of the Cavalry. Here again the Infantry profited by an alibi string, caused by a shot being fired on their target by an adjacent team. In the original string, the Infantry team coach spotted the score as 43; in the shoot-off, the competitor came through with a 49. At the end of the match, these points were a deciding factor. Our hopes that we would decrease the lead still further at 600 yards were not realized and we finished the first day's firing nineteen points back of the Infantry, sixteen behind the Cavalry and one point down from the Engineers.

At the 1000-yard stage on Saturday morning there was only a slight breeze blowing from the right and the light was exceptionally good for Camp Perry. It was the sort of day we had hoped to get for the short ranges. All four leading teams had strong lead-off pairs. The Infantry picked up one more point to increase its lead to 20, which was its maximum during the match. The Cavalry gained three points, for a nineteen-point lead



The Marine Corps "Herrick Trophy" Team—1939. Winners—New Record Score: 800 x 800 (123 Vs.)

over the Marine Team and only one point behind the Infantry. The Engineers had a pair total of 182 as compared to the Marine 183 and dropped into fourth place. From then on they continually lost ground until they finished the match thirty-eight points behind the Marine Team.

When the second pairs came off the line, the Cavalry had moved into the leading position, two points ahead of the Infantry. We had gained ground, too, and were but one point below the Infantry in the Match totals. Our third pair came through with a fine score to carry us to second place, two points ahead of the Infantry but eight points below the Cavalry. However, our advantage could not be held and at the end of the match, the Marine Team total of 2751 was six points behind the Infantry's winning score of 2757 and two points below the Cavalry's second place 2753. If the Cavalry Team had fired a little faster, they probably would have won the match by a comfortable margin. When their fourth pair finished at 1000 yards their team was fourteen points in the lead counting even pairs. Their fifth and last pair did not go onto the line, however, until after both the Infantry and Marine Teams had completed the match, with the result that it was caught in a murderous fish-tail wind with changes from a point right to a point left and back again even while a man was trying to get off a single shot. Their anchor pair really fired an excellent string and practically every point of the twenty-seven which they dropped was lost for wind and not for elevation. A big gallery gathered in rear of their target to watch their string and it was not until the left man of the pair had fired his sixteenth shot that the match was lost with a score below that of the Infantry Team even if the remaining six shots had been fives.

The Marine Corps Reserve Team, under the able

and efficient leadership of Major Joseph F. Hankins, U.S.M.C.R., maintained its usual high standard of marksmanship throughout the matches. It placed sixth in the National Rifle Team Match with a score of 2702 and, for the second consecutive year, won the "Rattlesnake Trophy" donated in 1938 by the National Board for the Promotion of Rifle Practice for high team in the reserve class. I have already mentioned the record score made by the Reserve Team in the Roumanian Trophy Match. In the individual matches, also, the Reserves were always serious contenders for top places, consistently outshooting National Guardsmen and other reservists with whom they were classed for medals and prize money. Outstanding in the Reserve squad with both rifle and pistol was 1st Lieutenant Walter R. Walsh, who made a score of 286 in the National Rifle Team Match, fired on the International Pistol Team representing the United States, and won the DuPont All-Around Trophy Match with a new record score of 1058, four points above the previous record.


This article would not be complete without mention of the operating staff which makes the National Matches possible. The Executive Officer for 1939 was Colonel Oliver S. Wood, U. S. Infantry, who was with the Fleet Marine Force at Culebra last spring as an observer. It was due to his able direction that the matches this year were the best conducted and smoothest operated of any ever held. Over three hundred commissioned officers, some eighteen hundred Army troops and three hundred enlisted Marines were assembled under his command as the operating force. His immediate staff and part of the working troops reported at Camp Perry on August second; the final increment of about sixty-five National Guard and Reserve officers did not arrive until the twenty-third of the month. During the period from the

second until the nineteenth of August, a tremendous amount of work was required in preparation for the matches. A canvas city capable of housing some seven thousand people had to be erected, screened and wired for electricity. Every article of range material had to be removed from storage, overhauled and installed, including the building and pasting of over 2600 rifle target frames and targets alone. The Small Arms Firing School staff had to be organized and their schedule of instruction prepared to handle the two thousand registrants in that school. A statistical section had to be assembled for the purpose of squadding the eight thousand entries in a single day's firing, and checking and publishing the results at the completion of each match. The Range Director was responsible for the instruction of two hundred range officers, sixteen hundred target operators and over five hundred scorers in the performance of their duties,

the Thompson Sub-Machine Gun for the police school, and all of the instructors for the Junior Small Arms Firing School. Lieutenant Hittle was detailed to the Publicity Section and supervised the news coverage for the thirty caliber ranges. One of the big events each year is the "Blues" parade of this battalion in honor of the Executive Officer, and this year was no exception. All of the duties assigned them were performed in an excellent manner and received favorable comments from staff and competitors alike.

For the first time in over a decade, a Marine Officer* was detailed to the staff of the Executive Officer and was present at Camp Perry from the Second of August until the tenth of September. It is believed that this should become an established policy in the future.

Some one has remarked that Camp Perry and the National Matches is the biggest show on earth. In one




General View of the Competitors' Area, Camp Perry, Ohio

and for the conduct and operation of the ranges as a whole throughout the matches. The activities of these and other departments too numerous to mention had to be coordinated if the ranges were to function properly during the matches.

The Marine contingent was the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, FMF, under command of Lieutenant Colonel A. H. Noble. Besides the normal scoring and target operating duties, this battalion furnished ten clerks for the Statistical Office, twenty men for the small bore statistical work, twenty telephone operators, ten instructors in

respect, at least, it resembles every other show which travels under canvas. Even while the big team match is still in progress, tents are being torn down and the camp is in the process of disintegration. By nightfall, half the canvas is down and stored away. The great majority of competitors and operating troops alike are on their way to homes and new stations, and the teeming city of the day before is only a deserted village. It is then, indeed, that one realizes that another shooting season has ended.

*ED. NOTE: Maj. Edson, the author of this article, was the officer on the staff.



General View, Camp Perry, Ohio. Firing Line and Camp Area

It is a pleasure to win the big team match and a big disappointment to lose it, especially when, as I believe, we had a team which was capable of coming out on top. It was a good team, properly led and properly handled, and every officer and man, from the team captain to the lowest ranking messman, deserves the praise and congratulations of the Corps as a whole for the excellent work they did this year. But in the pay-off we ran up against better teams than ours and we salute them; the Infantry, the winner; and the Cavalry, the runner-up.

After the match was over, an official of another team said to me, "I tell my men that the Marines are the team to beat. If we can beat them, we will win the match. And I also tell them this—they fight hard to the last shot; they play the game square; and win or lose, the Marines are the best sportsmen on the range." This is a reputation built up through years of competition. It is a reputation worth fighting for. If we can maintain it, more often than not, we will come home the winner.


The Marine Corps Pistol Team entered five individual pistol matches and four pistol team matches at Wake-

field, winning three in each class, against strong service and police team competition. This was the best showing that our pistol team has made at Wakefield for several years.

Following the completion of the New England United Services competitions, the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Team Detachment was transferred to Camp Perry, Ohio, on August 9th in preparation for their participation in the National Rifle Association and National Trophy Matches held at that place between August twentieth and September ninth. At this time a definite split was made between the rifle and pistol teams and the squad further reduced to forty rifle competitors and nine pistol competitors, including Marine Gunner Tucker.

The National Rifle Association Matches were fired during the period August 26th to September 1st. The weather during this week was exceptionally good for Camp Perry, with generally clear light, temperature in the eighties, and light winds except for the first day on which the Navy Match was fired in a twenty-mile wind.

First Lieutenant Edwin L. Hamilton of the Marine



General View, Camp Perry, Ohio. Firing Line Targets, Ranges "A," "B," "C," and "D."

Corps Team started the ball rolling by winning the first match—the Member's Trophy Match—against a field of 2000 competitors with a new record score of fourteen consecutive "V" fives. This was a ten shot match, fired at 600 yards, with the service rifle. Later in the morning of August 26th, the Crowell Trophy Match was fired with 1982 entries; a ten-shot match at 600 yards with any rifle and metallic sights. Mr. William F. Johnson, a New York civilian, and Sergeant Hansford H. Wagner, of the U. S. Infantry squad, tied for first place with ten "V" possibles, each getting a five on his eleventh shot. In the shoot-off on Monday morning, Johnson's first shot was a five against Wagner's four, thereby winning the match and the trophy. The top Marine was Sergeant Victor F. Brown with a nine "V" possible.

The Navy Cup Match, twenty shots off-hand at 200 yards, was fired in the afternoon of August 26th, with 1977 entries. An eighteen to twenty-mile wind was blowing, which materially reduced the chances of setting any new record. All of the high scores were made on the "A" Range—the 96-target, 200-yard range on the south end of the mile-long firing line (there are 378 standard targets on the Camp Perry range, besides the 200-target small-bore range, the 140-target pistol range, and Hogan's Alley, the Police range)—where the closeness of the firing points and the location of trees and buildings acted as an effective windbreak. Sergeant R. D. Chaney and Corporal C. W. Rawlings were the top Marines, with scores of 94 each, two points below the winning 96. Early in the afternoon, Sergeant Berrien of the Infantry Team finished his string with a 96, the last shot being a four. An hour and a half later, Mr. John W. Aitken, North Dakota civilian, came off the line to find a score of 96 credited to him on both the score board and his score card. He immediately protested that his sixteenth shot was a four instead of a five as shown on the score card, and that his total score should be 95. This protest was over-ruled on the grounds that the regulations governing the matches provide that the value of any shot may not be changed after a succeeding shot has been fired and marked, and that it was as impossible to reduce the value of a shot under this rule as it would be to increase it after the string was completed. This gave Mr. Atkins the match and trophy, as his last shot for record was a five, thus out-ranking the score made by Sergeant Berrien.

The Marine Corps Cup Match, ten shots each at 600 and 1000 yards, with 1982 entries, and the Coast Guard Trophy Match, ten shots each at 200 and 300 yards rapid fire, with 1927 entries, were fired on Monday, August 28th. For the first time in several years, the Marine Corps Trophy came back to its donor, being won by Private First Class Claud L. Floyd with a score of 100 (13 V's), a new record. Sergeant Coats Brown of the Infantry Team won the Coast Guard Trophy with a score of 49-50. Major W. W. Davidson, U.S.M.C., shooting as an individual, and Lieutenant R. D. Moser of the Marine Corps Team placed third and fourth respectively, with scores of 50-49.

On Tuesday, August 29th, the Leech Cup Match—seven shots each at 800, 900 and 1000 yards—was won by Corporal C. A. Barger of the Infantry squad with a

score of 105 (19 V's), a new record for the course. There were 1773 entries in this match. Lieutenant Hamilton, Master Gunnery Sergeant Jones, and Sergeant Major Tillman placed fifth, sixth and seventh, respectively, with scores of 104.

Fired concurrently with the Leech Cup Match was the Camp Perry Instructor's Trophy Match, a ten-shot surprise fire match at 200 yards off-hand. This was won by Mr. George A. Patterson of the American Legion Team. There were no medal winners in the Marine squad, although Major J. F. Hankins, team captain of the Reserve Team, took eighth place.

Private First Class Alfred L. Wolters was squadded in the first relay in the Wimbledon Cup Match, and fired at 0730 Wednesday morning, August 30th. Due to a misunderstanding as to the range on which he was squadded, Wolters did not report to his firing point until five minutes after the command to commence firing had been given. He was told that he had twenty-five minutes to complete his string of twenty shots. Twenty-two minutes later, his twentieth shot went down the range to complete a perfect score—all in the "V" ring—and he continued to fire until he had established a new record of twenty-seven consecutive "V" fives. Conditions remained ideal throughout the day, as evidenced by the fact that tenth place required a 17 "V" possible, so that there was no assurance that the record would stand. Every Marine at Camp Perry breathed a sigh of relief when the last shot had been fired in the match, with Platoon Sergeant Clements of the Marine squad the runner-up with a nineteen "V" possible.

The President's Match is always the big drawing card of the National Rifle Association Matches. This year was no exception, with a record entry of 2032 competitors as compared with last year's 1971. It consists of ten shots at each range: 200 yards standing, 600 yards prone, and 1000 yards prone. The first two stages were fired on Wednesday, August 30th. At the completion of firing that day, the Marine Corps Team had only two serious contenders—Master Gunnery Sergeant Thomas J. Jones and Corporal C. R. Guilbeau, two and three points down respectively. There were three members of the Coast Guard Team and several other competitors right at the top of the field who had lost only two points during the day. Lockett, of the Coast Guard Team, fired his 1000-yard score early Thursday morning and finished with a total of 147 (7 V's). Guilbeau was out of the match with a 46 at the long range, and one by one the other contenders slipped below Lockett's total. Goulet and Meekins, Coast Guardsmen, each two down, were squadded in the last relay late in the morning because of conflicting pistol matches and were caught in a bad fish-tail wind which carried them well down the President's Hundred. Jones fired his string at about ten o'clock. When he came off the line, he was confronted with the same situation that had faced Aitken in the Navy Match the week before. The score board gave him a total of 49 for the 1000-yard stage, whereas Jones was positive that his seventh shot was a four instead of the five credited by the scorer. He immediately protested to the Chief Range Officer, but both the scorer and the Range Officer on his target insisted that the shot in



The U. S. Marine Corps National Pistol Team. 1939 Winners. Score: 1315

question was a five and that the total of 49 was correct. Written protests were filed by both Jones and Major Whaling which were referred to the Range Director for decision. After a thorough investigation, the same ruling was made as in the previous case and Jones, with a total score of 147 (10 V's), was declared the winner of the match.

There is every reason to believe, from the testimony taken during the investigation of the protests, that the scores as recorded on the score board for both Aitken and Jones were correct, and that in each case the competitors had evidently spotted fours on adjoining targets as their own. There were a few isolated instances of incorrect marking from the pits due to the fact that a considerable number of pit operators came from Field Artillery units who, prior to their arrival at Camp Perry, had never fired a rifle or been on a rifle range during qualification marksmanship. In two known instances, competitors put up a dollar to challenge shots which had been marked as fives in order to get the correct value of fours marked and recorded in their scores. These examples are typical of the spirit of fair-play which pervaded the matches this year.

In the Scott Trophy Match (300 yards rapid fire) there were eleven competitors tied for first place with possibles. In the shoot-off, Sergeant Yeszerski of the Cavalry

Team came through with another 50 to win the match. Wolters and Compton of the Marines were again tied with 1st Sergeant Keiek, Hawaii National Guard, and Captain Myers, team captain of the Engineer Team, for second place. Wolters fired a second possible to take the silver medal, and Compton placed fifth.

This completed the National Rifle Association individual matches, with the exception of the Wright Memorial Grand Aggregate, which is composed of the total scores made in the Navy Cup, Leech Cup, Coast Guard Trophy, Marine Corps Cup, Wimbledon Cup and President's Matches. Master Gunnery Sergeant Jones, who had been shooting consistently well up in all the matches, was the winner of the aggregate with 636 x 655.

The A.E.F. Roumanian Trophy Team Match—a six-man team firing ten shots each at 600 and 1000 yards—was fired on Thursday afternoon, August 31st. The Marine Corps team got off to a bad start and it was up to the Marine Corps Reserve Team to win this match for the third consecutive year with a new record score of 585, nine points above their previous record of last year.

The Enlisted Men's Trophy Team Match—another six-man team match with ten shots each at 200 yards slow fire, 200 and 300 yards rapid fire—was fired Friday morning, September 1st. The team got away to a good start, one point above a 47 average for the six men at the



1st Lieut. Edwin L. Hamilton, U.S.M.C. Winner the Members' Trophy Match. New Record Score, 14 Vs.

off-hand stage. At the 200 yard rapid fire stage, they ran into some of those bad breaks which cannot help but affect the best of shooters. Rawlings and Jordan each shot exceptionally close groups and each were given misses for key-holed shots. I personally examined the target after the match was over. Although the shots could be discerned with the use of a magnifying glass, it was practically impossible to pick out the doubles with the naked eye. At this stage, also, both the Infantry and Cavalry teams lost five points each in the same way. Even though the team made one point above a 48 average at 300 yards rapid fire, the team total of 851 for the match was six points behind the leading Coast Guard Team with its 857, and two points behind the Cavalry's 853.

The Herrick Trophy 8-man Team Match was fired that afternoon, 20 shots each at 1000 yards, with free rifle and any sights. Conditions were almost ideal, with a light steady breeze from the right, very little mirage, and a clear light. It was soon evident that the Infantry, Cavalry and Marine Corps teams were the contenders for the match. The left man of the leading pair of the Cavalry team lost two points on his first two shots; except for that, the team went clean until one of the firers in the third pair scored a "V" five on an adjoining target to give them a total of 793 for the match. On the In-

fantry Team, the first pair lost one point each; the second pair scored a possible; and the third and fourth pairs dropped one point each; four points down for a total score of 796. Harris and Harker, the first pair of the Marine Team, each finished with 18 "V" possibles. Tillman and Pulver, the second pair, and Castle and Hamilton, the third pair, each scored a hundred. The Infantry had finished shortly after Bunn and Kravitz went on the line as our last pair. They knew that just one bad pull would spoil a perfect score for the team, and a shot on a wrong target meant losing the match. A large gallery also collected in rear of the firing point, which did not lessen the pressure. They also each scored a hundred and a new record was established of 800 x 800, with 123 "V" fives out of 160 shots fired. It was an example of beautiful holding and excellent coaching which warranted the congratulations which the team received.

The National Rifle Association Pistol and Revolver Matches were fired concurrently with the rifle schedule. Although members of the Marine Team won but three of the matches in which they were entered, they stood well up in all of them. Sergeant Heath won the Center Fire Rapid Fire Match with 197 x 200; Private First Class Fletcher, the .45 caliber Rapid-Fire Match with 192 x 200; and Major Whaling, the Orton Memorial Trophy .45 caliber pistol match with a score of 279 over the National Match Course. In the .45 caliber Military Service Pistol Match, five of the ten medals went to members of the Marine Team.

The National Trophy Matches opened Saturday morning, September second, with the National Individual Pistol Match, which was won by Mr. P. M. Chapman of the U. S. Treasury Team, with a score of 280. Lieutenant Philip C. Metzger was high Marine, with a score of 275. Of the 108 medal winners, members of the Marine squad took seven gold, five silver and three bronze.

It was raining Monday morning, September 4th, when the National Pistol Team Match was scheduled to begin. By nine-thirty it began to clear and the word was passed for all teams to report to the firing line. The match was fired in a strong six o'clock wind. At the end of the 50-yard slow-fire stage, the Marine Team was in fourth place, twenty-four points behind the leading U. S. Treasury Team. This was the team which, some three weeks previously, had made a new world's record of 1380 and two weeks before had defeated the Marine Team at the Pre-Perry shoot at Detroit by four points with a team total of 1367. The match was somewhat disappointing to the spectators after leaving the fifty-yard firing point in that each competitor fired both his timed and rapid fire stages while on the 25-yard firing point, and neither stage was complete in itself. It was evident, however, that each Marine was picking up points on his corresponding competitor on the other teams and, when the preliminary bulletin was posted, we had a total of 1313 against 1307 for the Treasury Team and 1304 for the Infantry. On a recheck of the targets, our team total was increased to 1315, the Infantry moved into second place with 1306, tying and out-ranking the Treasury Team with the same total score. It was the first

time that we have had possession of the Gold Cup since 1935.

The Infantry Match was fired that afternoon, being interrupted for an hour and a half by a heavy downpour. This is a musketry problem with teams of eight men organized as a squad, and in which the scoring is determined by the value of hits on the target and by fire distribution. The National Guard Team from Washington won the match with a score of 530, the Marine Team placing sixth with 494.

The National Individual Rifle Match was fired on Tuesday and Wednesday, September 5th and 6th. It was won by Sergeant Coats Brown of the Infantry team with a score of 288. Gunnery Sergeant Claude N. Harris, U.S.M.C., who won the match in 1935, took second place with a corresponding score, being outranked at 1000 yards. Of the 179 medal places, the Marine Corps squad won 4 gold, 6 silver and 14 bronze.

All of the previous matches were in the nature of preliminaries to the big event of the year, the National Rifle Team Match, which was fired on September eighth and ninth. There were 127 teams entered this year, including two from Hawaii and one from Alaska. Thursday, September seventh, was devoted to team practice, and the late afternoon to the delivery of National Rifle Association and National Trophies won in the preceding events.

A National Rifle Team consists of a maximum of fourteen men: a team captain, a team coach, ten firers and two alternates. Upon arrival at Camp Perry (assumed to be the first day of the scheduled Small Arms Firing School, August 20th this year) each team captain is required to submit to the Executive Officer a list of fourteen names from which his team will finally be selected. On the day before the match begins, another list is turned in designating the two team officials, the firing principals and the alternates. An alternate may be substituted for a principal at any time prior to the firing of the first shot in the match by the tenth man, after which no changes may be made except upon a certified statement of a medical officer that the principal is too ill to continue firing. At all slow fire stages each team fires in pairs; that is, two men are on the line at the same time and fire alternate shots at the target, the man on the right firing first. At the rapid-fire stages, each relay consists of one man per team.

The course of fire consists of ten shots, standing, at 200 yards, slow fire; ten shots rapid fire at 200 yards, sitting or kneeling from standing, on the "A" target; ten shots rapid fire at 300 yards, prone from standing, on the "A" target; ten shots slow fire at 600 yards; and twenty shots slow fire at 1000 yards, in that order. The first two stages are fired in the morning of the first day; the 300 yards rapid-fire and 600-yard stages in the afternoon; and the 1000-yard stage in the morning of the second day.


The team match was fired on the "D" Range, which has a total of 128 targets, with plans already under way to increase it by ten more before the 1940 matches. Team captains assembled at the Range Director's Office at seven o'clock Friday morning to draw for targets after



Master Gunnery Sgt. T. J. Jones, winner of the "President's Match," Score 147 x 150, admires the "Appreciation Cup" presented to the high Marine in the "President's Match" by the U. S. Cavalry.

the pits had been sealed, and again before the afternoon firing and the thousand-yard stage on Saturday morning. This ceremony required a good fifteen minutes. As soon as each team captain had drawn his target assignment out of the hat, the word was passed to the waiting members of the team and there was a wild scramble to get to the line and set-up in position preparatory to the command "Commence Firing."

It is hard to imagine a more stirring scene than that of a half mile of exposed targets; the competitors on the firing line; the score boards dressed behind each firing point; a range officer for every two targets and the chief range officers supervising the whole; while still farther to the rear, the line of spectators grouped around the varicolored standards which mark the locations of the teams they represent, friends and enemies intermingled, attempting by all manner of cabalistic signs and dogma to pull their team into the lead or to hex the opponents into bad luck. Scattered among the spectators, too, are those small groups of men who are yet to fire or have completed their string, chatting among themselves, apparently indifferent to the remarks around them, or to the rumors that "the Cavalry's two points behind us" or "we picked up a couple on that last dough-boy pair," or to the suppressed cheers and groans that accompany a good score or a poor one. Perhaps the biggest gallery of all collects around the master score board at the center of the line, on which is listed the name of every team



Composite target of the Herrick Trophy Team; 160 shots, all in the bull's-eye. Total score: 800 x 800, a new record.

in the match with scores kept posted to date by a steady stream of runners from the firing point to the board. The majority of the uninitiated are of the opinion that a rifle match is a colorless and drab affair but one day spent at Camp Perry during the National Team Match will convince the most confirmed skeptic that there are here all the elements of nervous tension and excitement which can be found in baseball or football or any other major sport.

Prior to the match, it was apparent that this would be no "walk-away." Both the Infantry and Cavalry had shown unusual strength at the short and mid-ranges; the Coast Guard was reputed to have its strongest team in years; and the Engineers were not to be overlooked. Given equal breaks and good conditions, probably only a few points would separate the four or five leading teams at the end of the 600-yard stage. As is so often the case, the match would be decided at the thousand-yard range and we rightfully felt that here we had a slight advantage.

THE COVER PICTURE

TEAM OFFICIALS

Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Team Detachment, 1939.

Front Row, *left to right*: Captain August Larson (team coach), Major William J. Whaling (team captain), Chief Marine Gunner Calvin A. Lloyd (assistant team coach).

Back Row, *left to right*: Major Geo. W. McHenry (team Q. M.), Marine Gunner James R. Tucker (assistant coach, pistol), Lieut. Harold E. Gillespie (MC), U. S. Navy.

Results of United Services of New England Matches, Camp Curtis Guild, Wakefield, Mass.

SATURDAY, JULY 29

Individual Service Pistol Match—Course: 10 shots, 50SF, 25TF and 25RF. Won by member U. S. Coast Guard Team—score 286; Marines 2d, 3rd, 4th and 5th.

Service Pistol Team Match (4-man team)—Course: 10 shots each man, 50SF, 25TF, and 25RF. Won by Marine Team—score 1105 (tied modern record score held by Detroit Police); Marines also 2nd and 4th.

Roger Williams Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots, 200 yds. prone. Won by Pfc. Alfred L. Wolters, USMC—score 50-15V; Marines also 2d, 3rd, 4th and 5th.

Quimby Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots, 600 yds. SF. Won by Cpl. William L. Jordan, Jr., USMC—score 50-8Vs; Marines also 3rd, 4th and 5th.

Cutler Match (.22 cal. pistol Ind.)—Course: 20 shots, 25 yds. SF. Won by Maj. William J. Whaling, USMC—score 99 and 100 in shoot off.

Kellers Match (4-man team, .22 cal. pistol)—Course: 20 shots per man, 25 yds., SF. Won by Marine Team—score 790; Marines also 3rd.

SUNDAY, JULY 30

Brown & Bigelow (.22 cal. pistol Ind.)—Course: 20 shots, 50 yds. SF. Won by member U. S. Coast Guard Team—score 188; Marines 2d, 3rd, 7th.

Berg Match (.22 cal. pistol 4-man team)—Course: 20 shots, 50 yds. SF. Won by Worcester R&P Club—score 728; Marines 4th and 5th.

MONDAY, JULY 31

Niedner Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots, 200 yds. RF k or s from standing. Won by member Coast Guard Team—score 50; Marines 2d, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th and 10th.

Cutting Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots 1000 yds. Won by Cpl. Thomas R. Mitchell, USMC—score 50-9Vs; Marines also 3rd, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th and 10th.

26th Division Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots each range, 300 yds. RF and 600 yds. SF. Won by Sgt. Steve Disco, USMC—score 100. Marines also 2d, 3rd, 5th, 6th, 7th and 9th.

2nd Battalion Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots 200 yds. SF standing. Won by Cpl. Clifford W. Rawlings, USMC—score 50&21Vs; Marines also 2nd, 5th, 8th and 10th.

Army Ordnance Match (2-man team—rifle)—Course: 10 shots each, 200 and 300 yds. RF. Won by Sgt. Johnny Jennings and MGy-Sgt. William F. Pulver, USMC—score 196; Marines also 2nd to 9th places.

TUESDAY, AUGUST 1

The United Services Match (4-man team—rifle)—Course: 10 shots, 200 and 600 yds., SF, 200 and 300 yds., RF. Won by Marine Corps team—score 722; Marines also 2nd, 3rd, 6th, and 9th.

The Governor's Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots at 200, 600 and 1000 yds., SF. Won by a member of the Coast Guard—score 146; Marines 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 8th, 9th and 10th.

(Continued on page 63)

Marine Corps Reserve Rifle Team

BY MAJOR J. F. HANKINS, U. S. M. C. R.



THE Marine Corps Reserve Rifle Team has just completed its fifth year of competition for honors in the National Matches. Beginning upon the resumption of the matches in 1935 the reserve has been represented each year in this tournament of the nation's best marksmen which is held at Camp Perry, Ohio, annually. The reserve has followed the examples of sportsmanship and methods of training of the regular Marine Corps and has won its place among the leading marksmen of the nation.

The primary objective of the national matches has been taken as the policy governing the reserve rifle team. That is, the training of qualified marksmanship instructors. The reserve as a whole has benefited by this policy and the marksmanship standards of the reserve are being contin-


ually raised through the efforts of the team. Each Infantry Battalion is urged to send a representative to the team each year in order that he may be given training in the small arms firing school and return to his battalion as an instructor. This system is also an incentive to members of the battalion to become more proficient during the marksmanship training of his organization. However, in some cases the Commanding Officer is reluctant to recommend a representative for the teams fearing that the individual would make a poor showing in the matches and reflect discredit upon the battalion. In several cases battalions were urged to select a representative on the basis of interest and enthusiasm for the reserve. In all such cases the individual developed into an expert rifleman and an excellent instructor.

The reserve team detachment composed of twenty-eight shooters was organized at Wakefield, Mass., on 16 July, 1939. Fourteen members had never fired at a longer range than 200 yards. Twenty-two members of the team represented the organized battalions, the other six being selected from the Volunteer class of the inactive reserve. In order to train the inexperienced men a small arms firing school was conducted during the first two weeks. This schooling included rifle, pistol, and the automatic rifle.

The team gained valuable experience by participating



First Row—Lt. Walsh, Capt. Card, Maj. Hankins (team captain), Lt. Swanson (team coach), Lt. McIlhenny, Gy-Sgt. Willoughby. Second Row—Sgt. Bartlett, Sgt. Cantrell, Private Sauer, Sgt. Buck, Sgt. Doyle, Sgt. Landwehr, Gy-Sgt. Jost, Cpl. MacLeod.



Marine Corps Reserve Rifle Team Detachment

in the New England matches held at Wakefield. While the team did not make any unusual showing in the matches, the individuals learned much about competitive shooting which stood them in good stead at the National Matches. After the New England matches a short period of intensive training was conducted prior to going to Camp Perry for the National Matches.

Having rounded out its program of preliminary training at Wakefield, the reserve team proceeded to Camp Perry and arrived there on 20 August. During the first week at Camp Perry thirty-one members of the reserve team were enrolled in the Army small arms firing school. All enrollees completed the course and received certificates of proficiency for satisfactory completion of a course of instruction in rifle marksmanship upon graduation. During this school the reserve received its first instruction and indoctrination firing of the new M1 Semi-Automatic rifle. Upon completion of the school the team members were entered in all the individual rifle matches.

The record of the team in the matches is one of which all its members are proud. Members of the team fired in 10 individual matches and four team matches winning one team match, two individual matches, 73 cash prizes totaling \$530.90, five national trophies, and 77 medals. It placed seven members among the "President's Hundred" out of a record number of 2,032 competitors in the match. Twelve members of the team won legs on the "Distinguished Marksman" Badge. Sergeant Clarence J. Buck of the 19th Battalion, Augusta, Georgia, who had never fired before except at 200 yards, won two legs on the

distinguished classification, one of which he won in the National Individual match, taking first silver medal among more than 2,500 competitors.

First Lieutenant Walter R. Walsh was the outstanding shooter on the team. Lieutenant Walsh set a new record in winning the Dupont all-around championship comprising scores fired in matches with the service rifle, the "Bull gun," Cal. 22 rifle, Cal. 38 revolver, and the service automatic pistol. In this match he was awarded the Dupont Trophy. He also won the Cal. 22 pistol timed fire match, setting a new world's record score of 199 out of a possible 200 at 25 yards. He was a firing member of the U. S. International Pistol Team which won the world's championship; in this match he made second high score among the ten shooters on the United States team.

The A. E. F. Roumanian Trophy Team Match which consists of firing 10 shots per man at both 600 and 1,000 yards in which teams are composed of 6 firing members, 1 alternate, 1 team captain, and 1 team coach in which a total of 52 teams were entered, was won for the third consecutive year by the reserve team, establishing a new world's record score of 585, nine points over the old record which was also established by the reserve team of 1938. In this match the reserve team was closely pressed at all times by an excellent team of the U. S. Coast Guard who also broke the old record with a score of 583.

In the Herrick Trophy Team Match which consists of 20 shots per man at 1,000 yards in which teams are composed of 8 firing members, 2 alternates, 1 team captain,

(Continued on page 63)

UNITED SERVICES OF NEW ENGLAND MATCHES
RIFLE TEAM MATCHES

Hayden Trophy (10-man team)—Course: National Rifle Team Match. (21 entries).

	200S	200R	300R	600S	1000S	Total
1. Marine Corps Team "C"						
Corp. William L. Jordon, Jr.	46	50	46	48	89	279
Sgt. Victor F. Brown	47	49	50	48	96	290
Sgt. Donald R. Rusk	45	49	46	48	93	281
Corp. Clifford W. Rawlings	49	49	47	50	98	293
Pfc. Kenneth N. Irwin	48	48	45	49	95	285
Corp. Thomas R. Mitchell	47	50	49	48	91	285
PlSgt. Floyd E. Moore	46	50	46	47	93	282
Sgt. Wilbur L. Jessup	45	44	47	49	97	282
Pfc. Herman L. Poole	46	48	48	49	95	286
Sgt. Malcolm J. Holland	48	50	49	50	86	283
Team Score	467	487	473	486	933	2846
2. U. S. Coast Guard "C"	454	478	457	476	959	2824
3. U. S. Coast Guard "G"	449	486	465	481	938	2819
4. U. S. Infantry	467	485	462	482	922	2818
8. U. S. Cavalry	440	472	453	458	880	2703
9. Marine Corps Reserve	458	431	461	435	787	2572

PISTOL TEAM MATCHES

Service Pistol (4-man team)—Course: 10 shots, 50SF, 25TF and 25R. Won by Marine Corps—score 1105 (tied modern record score held by Detroit Police).

Artillery (4-man team)—Course: 10 shots, 50SF, 25TF, and 25RF. Won by Marine Corps—score 1131.

Keller (4-man team)—Course: 20 shots per man, 25SF. Won by Marine Corps—score 790 (.22 cal. match).

NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION MATCHES

Camp Perry, Ohio—August 26 to September 2, 1939

	Score	Medal
<i>Members' Trophy Match</i> (2,000 entries)		
Won by 1st Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	*50 (14Vs)	Trophy and Gold
2nd—Pfc. Mark W. Billing, USMC	50 (7Vs)	Silver
3rd—Cpl. Carl L. Propst, USMC	50 (7Vs)	Bronze
<i>Crowell Trophy Match</i> (1,737 entries)		
Won by Mr. Wm. F. Johnston, New York Civilian	50 (10Vs)	Trophy and Gold
4th—Sgt. Victor F. Brown, USMC	50 (9Vs)	Bronze
5th—Maj. Joseph F. Hankins, USMCR	50 (8Vs)	Bronze
9th—Sgt. Waldo A. Phinney, USMC	50 (8Vs)	Bronze
10th—1st Lt. Emmet O. Swanson, USMCR	50 (8Vs)	Bronze
<i>Navy Cup Match</i> (1,977 entries)		
Won by Mr. John W. Aitken, N. Dak. Civilian	96	Trophy and Gold
4th—Sgt. Raymond D. Chaney, USMC	94	Bronze
6th—Cpl. Clifford W. Rawlings, USMC	94	Bronze
<i>Marine Corps Cup Match</i> (1,982 entries)		
Won by Pfc. Claud L. Floyd, Jr., USMC	*100 (13Vs)	Trophy and Gold
6th—Sgt. Bennie M. Bunn, USMC	99 (13Vs)	Bronze
7th—1st Lt. Walter R. Walsh, USMCR	99 (12Vs)	Bronze
8th—Sgt. Valentine J. Kravitz, USMC	99 (12Vs)	Bronze
9th—Sgt. Arthur A. Compton, USMC	99 (10Vs)	Bronze
<i>Coast Guard Trophy Match</i> (1,927 entries)		
Won by Sgt. Coats Brown, U. S. Infantry	99	Trophy and Gold
3rd—Maj. William W. Davidson, USMC	99	Bronze
4th—1st Lt. Robert D. Moser, USMC	99	Bronze
<i>Leech Cup Match</i> (1,773 entries)		
Won by Cpl. Clifford A. Barger, U. S. Infantry	*105 (19Vs)	Trophy and Gold
5th—1st Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	104 (13Vs)	Bronze
6th—M GySgt. Thomas J. Jones, USMC	104 (12Vs)	Bronze
7th—SgtMaj. Nolan Tillman, USMC	104 (11Vs)	Bronze

<i>Camp Perry Instructors' Match</i> (956 entries)		
Won by Mr. Geo. A. Patterson, California, Civilian	50 (7Vs)	Trophy and Gold
8th—Maj. Joseph F. Hankins, USMCR	49 (5Vs)	Bronze
<i>Wimbledon Cup Match</i> (1,938 entries)		
Won by Pfc. Alfred L. Wolters, USMC	*100 (27Vs)	Trophy and Gold
2nd—Pfc. Broox E. Clements, USMC	100 (19Vs)	Silver
10th—Cpl. Clifford W. Rawlings, USMC	100 (17Vs)	Bronze
<i>The President's Match</i> (2,032 entries)		
Won by MGySgt. Thomas J. Jones, USMC	†147 (10Vs)	Gold
4th—Sgt. S. J. Bartletti, USMCR	146 (13Vs)	Bronze
5th—Sgt. Valentine J. Kravitz, USMC	146 (11Vs)	Bronze
6th—1st Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	146 (9Vs)	Bronze
9th—Maj. Joseph F. Hankins, USMCR	145 (12Vs)	Bronze
Twenty members of the Marine Corps Team and seven members of the Marine Corps Reserve Team placed in the <i>President's Hundred</i> .		
<i>Scott Trophy Match</i> (1,788 entries)		
Won by Sgt. Edward Yeszerski, Cavalry Team	†50	Trophy and Gold
2nd—Pfc. Alfred L. Wolters, USMC	50	Silver
5th—Sgt. Arthur A. Compton, USMC	50	Bronze
<i>Wright Memorial Trophy Match</i> (632 entries)		
(NRA Grand Aggregate)		
Won by MGySgt. Thomas J. Jones, USMC	636	Trophy and Gold
2nd—Cpl. Clifford W. Rawlings, USMC	632	Silver
3rd—Sgt. Waldo A. Phinney, USMC	629	Bronze
6th—1st Lt. Walter R. Walsh, USMCR	628	Bronze
7th—1st Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	627	Bronze
10th—Sgt. Valentine J. Kravitz, USMC	625	Bronze
<i>A. E. F. Roumanian Team Match</i> (52 entries)		
(6-man team)		
Won by Marine Corps Reserve	*585	Trophy and Silver
2nd—U. S. Coast Guard	583	Bronze
<i>Enlisted Men's Trophy Team Match</i> (53 entries)		
(6-man team)		
Won by U. S. Coast Guard	857	Trophy and Silver
2nd—Cavalry	853	Bronze
3rd—Marine Corps	851	Bronze
<i>Herrick Trophy Team Match</i> (112 entries)		
(8-man team)		
Won by Marine Corps	*800 (12Vs)	Trophy and Silver
2nd—Infantry	796	Bronze
3rd—Cavalry	793	Bronze
Marine Corps Reserve Team (High team using service rifle with service sights)	763	Crutchfield Trophy and Silver

Members of the Marine Corps Rifle and Pistol Team participated in several pistol and revolver matches and were awarded two trophies and 31 gold, silver and bronze medals.

NRA Rapid Fire Match (Any center-fire pistol or revolver)—Gold Medal. Won by Sgt. John E. Heath, USMC—score 197.

NRA Rapid Fire Match (.45 caliber pistol)—Trophy and gold medal. Won by Pfc. Walter E. Fletcher, USMC—score 192.

Orton Memorial Trophy Pistol Match—Trophy and gold medal. Won by Maj. William J. Whaling, USMC—score 279.

*New record. †Tied record.

THE NATIONAL MATCHES

National Rifle Team Match (127 entries)

	200 SF	300 RF	600 SF	1000 SF	Total Score
Won by U. S. Infantry	416	479	470	485	907
2nd—U. S. Cavalry	410	481	468	488	906

3rd—Marine Corps—Maj. William J. Whaling, Captain, MCR&P Team; Capt. August Larson, Team Captain; ChMarGun. Calvin A. Lloyd, Team Coach.

Corp. William L. Jordan, Jr.	42	48	46	46	89	271
Sgt. Victor F. Brown	43	48	48	48	94	281
Sgt. Donald R. Rusk	44	48	48	49	91	280
Corp. Clifford W. Rawlings	43	49	48	50	95	285
Pfc. Kenneth N. Irwin	40	48	47	49	94	278
Corp. Thomas R. Mitchell	42	46	48	47	95	278
Pfc. Alfred L. Wolters	36	45	50	48	94	273
Sgt. Wilbur L. Jessup	40	46	48	47	95	276
1st Lt. Robert D. Moser	39	49	47	44	88	267
Sgt. Steve Disco	38	48	44	47	85	262

Team total	407	475	474	475	920	2751
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Alternates: Pfc. Herman L. Poole and Sgt. Malcolm J. Holland.

4th—U. S. Engineers	412	479	471	470	881	2713
6th—*Marine Corps Reserve No. 1	398	468	461	471	904	2702
8th—U. S. Coast Guard	388	472	470	471	893	2694

*Awarded "The Rattlesnake Trophy."

National Pistol Team Match (33 entries)

Won by Marine Corps Team—Maj. W. J. Whaling, Team Captain; MGun. J. R. Tucker, Alternate.	50yds. SF	25yds. TF	25yds. RF	Total Score
Sgt. John E. Heath	80	95	90	265
1st Lt. Philip C. Metzger	81	93	74	248
Pfc. Vito Perna	81	94	90	265
Sgt. Robert E. Schneeman	75	97	95	267
Sgt. Thurman E. Barrier	82	95	93	270

Team total	399	474	442	1315
2nd—U. S. Infantry	414	453	439	1306
3rd—U. S. Treasury	423	456	427	1306
4th—U. S. Cavalry	392	464	428	1284
6th—U. S. Coast Guard	396	450	426	1272

National Individual Rifle Match (2,027 entries)

	Class	Score	Medal
Won by Sgt. Coats Brown, U. S. Infantry	Non-Dist.	288	Trophy and Gold
2nd—PlSgt. Claude N. Harris, USMC	Dist.	288	Gold Bar
3rd—Corp. Thomas R. Mitchell, USMC	Dist.	286	Gold Bar
5th—PlSgt. Edward V. Seeser, USMC	Dist.	284	Gold Bar
12th—Sgt. Raymond D. Chaney, USMC	Dist.	281	Gold Bar
25th—Pfc. Paul K. Bird, USMC	Dist.	278	Silver Bar
34th—Capt. Marion A. Fawcett, USMC	Non-Dist.	277	Silver
36th—Corp. William L. Jordan, Jr., USMC	Non-Dist.	277	Silver
39th—1st Lt. Robert D. Moser, USMC	Non-Dist.	277	Silver
42nd—2nd Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	Dist.	276	Silver Bar
50th—Sgt. Wilbur L. Jessup, USMC	Dist.	276	Silver Bar
52nd—Pfc. Alfred L. Wolters, USMC	Dist.	275	Bronze Bar
53rd—Corp. Charles R. Guilbeau, USMC	Non-Dist.	275	Bronze
64th—Sgt. Earl C. Tipton, USMC	Non-Dist.	275	Bronze
89th—Sgt. Victor F. Brown, USMC	Dist.	273	Bronze Bar
93rd—Corp. Clifford W. Rawlings, USMC	Dist.	273	Bronze Bar
99th—Corp. Carl L. Propst, USMC	Dist.	272	Bronze Bar
110th—Sgt. Johnny Jennings, USMC	Dist.	272	Bronze Bar
124th—Pfc. Horace D. Trigg, USMC	Non-Dist.	271	Bronze
128th—SgtMaj. Nolan Tillman, USMC	Dist.	271	Bronze Bar
132nd—Sgt. Valentine J. Kravitz, USMC	Dist.	271	Bronze Bar
149th—Pvt. Milton L. Jensen, USMC	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze
155th—PlSgt. Floyd E. Moore, USMC	Dist.	270	Bronze Bar
158th—Pfc. Herman L. Poole, USMC	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze
170th—1st Sgt. Kenneth E. Harker, USMC	Dist.	270	Bronze Bar
177th—Corp. Donald E. Irwin, USMC	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze

Marine Corps Reserve Medal Winners:

24th—Sgt. Clarence J. Buck	Non-Dist.	278	Silver
58th—GySgt. Julius D. Willoughby	Dist.	275	Bronze Bar
60th—Pvt. George M. Sivec	Non-Dist	275	Bronze
65th—Sgt. Salvatore J. Barletti	Dist.	274	Bronze Bar
79th—Pfc. Clarence P. Johnson	Non-Dist.	273	Bronze
84th—1st Lt. Emmet O. Swanson	Dist.	273	Bronze Bar
119th—2nd Lt. Walter S. McIlhenny	Non-Dist.	271	Bronze
144th—Cpl. Lewis N. MacLeod	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze
151st—MGun. Frank M. Richard	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze
152nd—2nd Lt. Russell W. Schmidt	Non-Dist.	270	Bronze

National Individual Pistol Match (668 entries)

Won by Mr. P. M. Chapman, U. S. Treasury	Dist.	280	Trophy and Gold
7th—1st Lt. Philip C. Metzger, USMC	Dist.	275	Gold Bar
12th—Pfc. Percy W. Hawes, USMC	Dist.	272	Gold Bar
13th—Maj. William P. Richards, USMC	Dist.	272	Gold Bar
17th—Sgt. John E. Heath, USMC	Dist.	271	Gold Bar
18th—Sgt. Robert E. Schneeman, USMC	Dist.	271	Gold Bar
19th—1st Lt. Edwin L. Hamilton, USMC	Non-Dist.	270	Gold
22nd—Sgt. Thurman E. Barrier, USMC	Dist.	268	Gold Bar
48th—MGun. James R. Tucker, USMC	Dist.	264	Silver Bar
49th—Pfc. Walter E. Fletcher, USMC	Non-Dist.	263	Silver
50th—PISgt. Edward V. Seeser, USMC	Dist.	263	Silver Bar
53rd—Pfc. Mark W. Billing, USMC	Non-Dist.	262	Silver
54th—Pfc. Vito Perna, USMC	Dist.	262	Silver Bar
89th—Cpl. Thomas R. Mitchell, USMC	Dist.	256	Bronze Bar
92nd—1st Lt. Noel O. Castle, USMC	Non-Dist.	256	Bronze
99th—Sgt. Malcolm J. Holland, USMC	Non-Dist.	255	Bronze

Marine Corps Reserve Medal Winners:

15th—1st Lt. Walter R. Walsh	Dist.	271	Gold Bar
67th—1st Lt. Henry J. Adams, Jr.	Dist.	260	Bronze Bar

Infantry Team Match (A Musketry Problem)—Teams consisting of 8 men including 7 riflemen and 1 automatic rifleman selected from the members eligible to fire in the National Rifle Team Match. One rifleman (designated corporal) as leader.

	Score	Medal
Won by Washington State National Guard	530	Trophy and Bronze
6th—U. S. Marine Corps	494	Bronze

NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR

A study of the flow of attendance shows that 9:30 P. M. is the most popular hour at the Fair. The reason for this is said to be the display at this time of the spectacular Lagoon of Nations show—a new development in open-air spectacles which combines in a symphonic arrangement music, fireworks, flame, colored lights and the play of huge fountains. Attendance at these free shows is estimated at 40,000 on weekdays and 60,000 on Saturdays, Sundays and holidays.

June 20, 1939.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I was very favorably impressed by the fine military appearance of the Naval and Marine Corps units participating in the welcoming of the King and Queen of England to Washington on June eighth, and upon the occasion of the embarkation of Their Majesties on board the U.S.S. *Potomac* at the Washington Navy Yard on June ninth.

The impressiveness of these two events was due in no small measure to the careful planning and keen visualization of the requirements of the situation on the part of

the Commandant of the Washington Navy Yard, the Commanding General, First Marine Brigade, F.M.F., Quantico, Virginia, and the Commanding Officer, Marine Barracks, Washington, D. C. Please accord these officers appropriate recognition of their services.

Very sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

The Honorable
The Secretary of the Navy

June 20, 1939.

My dear General:

I enclose for your information a copy of a letter I have this day transmitted to the Secretary of the Navy.

The remarks made therein apply with equal force to all the officers and men of the Marine Corps who participated in these ceremonies, and I request that you express to them my appreciation.

"Well Done!"

Sincerely yours,
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
Major General Thomas Holcomb, U.S.M.C.
Major General Commandant,
United States Marine Corps.

THE CORPS MARCHES ON

Recent Changes Effected as the Result of New Conditions

ON September 5 and September 8 the President issued proclamations declaring a national emergency and laying down certain tasks to be performed by the various armed services with regard to neutrality. Insofar as this directive affects the Marine Corps, the necessary steps have been taken to meet requirements. To the Corps at large these measures are of sufficient interest to warrant an orderly narration of what has transpired and a thought or two upon what the future may hold for us.

ENLISTED STRENGTH

Setting aside normal budgetary limitations it was ordered that the enlisted strength of the Corps be brought to 25,000 immediately. This threw the first burden upon the recruiting service and required its rapid expansion. The recruiters were geared to procure 1,000 additional men over a period of 12 months. They had to be stepped up to securing about 6,000 additional men in a period of about 3 months. Correspondingly larger increases in the Army and Navy makes the problem more difficult, as competition is bound to be keen. Another factor affecting this operation is that the recruiting must be done under peace-time conditions.

RECRUIT TRAINING

Almost simultaneously with the problems of the recruiters those of the two recruit depots become acute. More men must be trained and made ready for service in a shorter period. Again we are faced with the condition that we are at peace, and that the pressure for acceleration of the processes of training can be only partially applied. As compared to 1917 we also have an increased number of subjects to cover, due to technical developments since that time. To meet new conditions, and expedite matters at the depots, the schedules were temporarily reduced to four weeks in duration, and sufficiently intensified to produce adequate results in the time allotted. The problems of additional housing and increased staffs required immediate attention, and the necessary steps were initiated to meet the increased need of the recruit depots.

THE NEW DRILL

Since the new drill has been under consideration for some time, it required only the stimulus of the new situation to bring that matter to a head. The more leisurely processes were discarded and orders were issued placing the new drill into effect upon receipt of FM-22-5. In a remarkably short time the procurement and distribution of the Manual was begun, and by the time this is published the process of transition will be under way throughout the Corps. To adjust matters to the needs of the Examining Board it was decided that examinations in drill subjects could be optional until January 1, 1940, and must ac-

cord with the new drill thereafter. By and large, it is very probable that the new drill will eventually shorten the period required to train recruits very materially. Most of the old-timers will give the customary "soldier's growl" over the change, until they realize that the bulk of it consists in forgetting their old squad movements.

ALLOCATION OF FORCES

Certain requirements led to the following general allocation of the new men:

Fleet Marine Force (including Aviation), 4,000.
Naval Activities Ashore, 2,000.

It was necessary to work up priorities, decide upon the new units to be formed and their strength, and what to give the existing units. All this was done on the basis of a careful economy of strength to ensure that the vital requirements were met at the expense of those less urgent in nature. Since the proportionate strength of the Corps is as yet below that (20% of the Navy) required to cover all exigencies, the personnel problem is a difficult one for M-1 and the Personnel Division.

MATERIEL

Housing, clothing, food and various kinds of equipment and arms must be furnished by the Quartermaster. Certain other weapons and equipment are provided by Naval Ordnance and Engineering. All increases in strength are normally taken care of in this respect by the provisions of the budget. Abnormal demands resulting from a sudden increase present problems for the Quartermaster and for the M-4 Section the solution of which call for hard work and clear thinking. Money alone will not provide these necessary supplies. It takes time to make a pair of shoes or a blouse or a truck or a field piece; or to set up cantonments and barracks. Immediate decisions had to be made curtailing normal peace-time clothing requirements to fit the new situation. Stocks had to be examined and the most economical employment made of everything required. Long lists of material, suitably broken down, must be made up to support calculated expense. New contracts must be let for various items of supply, based on the demands of the new situation.

ADMINISTRATION

The matter of promotions will be of considerable interest to all. Just what the increase in the Corps will mean

in the way of promotions is not known at this time, but it is believed that all branches and all grades will be affected.

The Adjutant and Inspector's Department, upon whom the burden of recruiting falls, must also take into consideration and make provision for a natural expansion of administrative work entailed by an increase of about 30% in the present strength of the Corps. Accordingly, until the Department can be reenforced and enlarged the present staff is overtaxed to the extent that it must function adequately in the interim with its present force. Numerous applications for service from a great many sources, especially from ex-marines, must be considered and handled on their own merits and in accordance with the interests of the Corps. Numerous data concerning all classes of retired and reserve personnel must be prepared for use in planning. Of course, routine, administrative and inspection work will increase in proportion as the Corps increases. Provisions have been made for temporary additional clerical assistance and for the addition of the necessary commissioned personnel in the near future.

The Division of Reserve must likewise meet the increased demands upon their administrative facilities created by the possible employment of all or a part of the reserves as required.


Sudden increases such as the one now taking place create many a problem for the Paymaster's Department, and a great deal of thought must be given to the problems presented by employment of funds available and in making estimates of the requirements of the immediate future in their field of activity. The legal aspects of each step taken in the emergency must be properly considered and

due importance given to the necessity for accomplishing emergency payments under peace-time accounting restrictions.

LOOKING AHEAD

Without indulging in any prophecy it is permissible to venture into the future to the extent of visualizing what may be in store for us. It may be that the emergency has reached its peak and will be of short duration, in which case it is probable that normal conditions will be restored and the reduced requirements of the Corps will bring down our strength to where it is today. This would present no problem. It may happen that the present emergency will continue its even progress and the Corps will be required to perform no tasks greater than those now contemplated, in which case the strength now authorized (25,000) plus a gradual and modest increase will take care of the situation. This possibility presents few difficulties. Again it may be that the present emergency will become more acute and will require increasingly greater efforts. The problem of expanding the Corps to meet this eventuality is one of interest to all of us. The burden placed upon the staff at Headquarters and the officers and men in the field depends upon the size of the expansion. In any event all hands must expect the disruptions, calls for extra work, unexpected orders, adjustment and readjustment of existing conditions—in short, all the concomitants of ante-bellum activity in its final stages.

Whatever the future may hold, the traditional handiness, flexibility, and adaptability which characterizes the Corps may confidently be expected to solve whatever problems may be met and to enable us to be of maximum service to the Nation.



Group of Midshipmen graduates who have elected to serve in the U. S. Marine Corps as their branch of the service after graduating from the U. S. Naval Academy.

Military History of Brigadier General Holland M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps

General Holland M. Smith was born on 20 April, 1882, in Seale, Russell County, Alabama. He was appointed a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps on 29 March, 1905; promoted first lieutenant 13 May, 1908; captain 12 June, 1916; major (temporary) 22 May, 1917; major (permanent) 4 June, 1920; lieutenant-colonel 9 July, 1930; colonel 29 May, 1934; and brigadier general 14 August, 1939.

General Smith has served at many of the shore stations of the Marine Corps and Navy in the United States, and aboard several ships of the Navy. He also served in the Philippines from May, 1906, to September, 1908, and again from August, 1912, to April, 1914; in Panama from December, 1909, to April, 1910; in Santo Domingo from June, 1916, to May, 1917; in France with the American Expeditionary Force from June, 1917, to March, 1919; and in Haiti from March, 1924, to August, 1925.

For his services in France General Smith was awarded the Croix de Guerre, with Palm and a Meritorious Service Citation by the Commander-in-Chief, American Expeditionary Force, for his courage and remarkable ability during the operations of the Fourth Marine Brigade in Belleau Wood and vicinity during June, 1918.

In March, 1937, General Smith was ordered to Headquarters, U. S. Marine Corps, Washington, D. C., for duty as Director, Division of Operations and Training. He served in that capacity until April, 1939, when he was appointed Assistant to the Commandant, in which capacity he is serving at the present time.

General Smith is a graduate of the Marine Corps Field Officers' School (Senior Course) and the Naval War College.


He holds the following decorations and medals:
Meritorious Service Citation by CinC, A.E.F.,
Order of the Purple Heart,
Croix de Guerre, with Palm,
Victory Medal,
Expeditionary medal for service in Panama, Santo Domingo and Haiti,
Dominican Campaign Medal,
Mexican Service Medal.

BOOK REVIEW

BOMBS BURSTING IN AIR, The Influence of Air Power on International Relations, by George Fielding Eliot. Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc., \$1.75.

The author of "The Ramparts We Watch" has again come through with a clear and interesting document, well worth the hour or two required to read, and particularly so at this time.

"Bombs Bursting in Air" is divided in two parts, the first dealing with Air Power in Europe, and the second with America's Interest in Air Power. The author wisely covers the Principles of War briefly, which will be helpful to the lay reader and which will certainly do the professional no harm. Early in the book the author points out a fact which is of considerable interest, namely: the airplane is




Brigadier General Holland M. Smith, U. S. Marine Corps.

only the third revolutionary military invention, or discovery, in the history of civilized mankind, the first being Discipline and the second being Gunpowder. Such being the case, the conduct of the present war will be of considerable interest, as the possibilities of the airplane in warfare are not known.

Major Eliot treats Air Power in Europe in a simple and clear manner, covering the Qualities of Air Power, Elements of Air Superiority, Geographical Factors, etc. The airplane has become an instrument of blackmail in the opinion of the author and was certainly used as such by Germany prior to the outbreak of the present war. We wonder if Major Eliot had his tongue in his cheek when he pointed out the lack of enthusiasm about declaring war today by the statesmen as opposed to the days when there was no airplane and the wars were fought by the soldiers and sailors. Maybe the airplane is more of an instrument of peace than of war.

Major Eliot wondered if Germany would be willing to gamble her air force in an attack on England. Should London be destroyed, Germany would win the war beyond a doubt, in his opinion, but should the German air force fail

(Continued on page 63)



NAVY DAY

BY JOHN ALVIL CROGHAN

our Eastern littoral, striking at will at vulnerable points. But a temporary and partial eclipse of this control found General Cornwallis besieged at Yorktown by Washington who commanded a force of sixteen thousand troops, more than half of whom were French regulars, which outnumbered the English more than two to one.³ In the adjacent waters lay the fleet of the French Admiral De Grasse, cutting off egress from the Yorktown peninsula by sea. De Grasse succeeded in arresting the relief operations of the British Admiral Graves' squadrons, finally forcing him to retire to New York. With him, to quote Mahan, "disappeared the last hope of succor that was to gladden Cornwallis' eyes."⁴ Cornwallis capitulated, and with this disaster Great Britain largely abandoned hope of subduing the rebellious colonists.

It is pertinent to add, as illustrating the ephemeral character of the French command of the sea which resulted in the Yorktown triumph for the Americans, that De Grasse was defeated and taken prisoner by the British at the Battle of the Saints on April 12, 1782.

Having achieved the goal of independence with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, our statesmen promptly discarded all existing plans for naval development and allowed the few existing warships to become obsolescent. Our great Naval hero of the Revolution, John Paul Jones, found the new nation he had helped to create both ungrateful and unsympathetic, and accepted a commission from a foreign sovereign.

The Articles of Confederation, on whose framework was hung the amorphous form of national government which prevailed during the immediate post-war years, made indirect provision for a Naval force in the clause which stipulated:

"No vessels of war shall be kept in time of peace by any State, except such number only, as shall be deemed necessary by the United States in Congress assembled, for the defence of such State, or its trade; * * *"⁵

But this backward method of furnishing authority for the protection of our commerce on the high seas was as futile as the entire congeries of misdirected governmental activities under the easily worn fabric of the Confederation. The gravity of the existing situation is sketched in the words of Commander Holloway Frost:

"Few of us now realize the weakness of our country during its first years of peace. It could hardly be called a nation. Under the Articles of Confederation there was practically no central authority; each state jealously retained its full sovereign powers. We were little more than an ill-assorted league of nations, with few interests in common, bankrupt, and heavily in debt to foreign powers. Even the common bond of war with the mother country, loose as that was, no longer held. A majority of our leaders believed an army and navy dangerous to the free institutions we prided ourselves on having won. Foreign nations looked on us as we look on China."⁶

As far as is known, no construction or other manifestation of Naval development was undertaken under the weak Confederation government, and we must look to the Federal Constitution for the legal foundation upon which our Navy was created.

THE forbidding international outlook of the present may well cause the citizen of this country, in his celebration of Navy Day, October 27, to regard our sea forces from a viewpoint similar to that which inspired Blackstone when the great commentator, in eulogizing British seapower, declared:

"The Royal Navy of England hath ever been its greatest defense and ornament; it is its ancient and natural strength,—the floating bulwark of our island."¹

For the first time in our history the United States, on the outbreak of a general war in Europe, possesses a fleet capable of defending its national interests successfully against any aggressor nation, or reasonable combination of such potential enemies.

This statement is not made with the anticipation that this country will become presently involved in a war; it is presented to indicate that the United States is prepared to cope with any situation that may develop in one of the world's danger areas.

That this ability to defend our commercial and neutral rights on the high seas has not been a perennial asset throughout our history is demonstrated by an examination of the record.

When, on the 18th of April, 1775, Major Pitcairn's redcoats met resistance from the determined band of embattled farmers at Lexington and Concord to precipitate the American Revolution, the colonies had no Naval force.

But as the Continental Army seemed to spring out of the soil, so the Navy seemed to spring out of the sea.² Through strenuous, though sporadic efforts, the nucleus of a Naval force was created. The brilliant achievements of Jones and others provided an inspiration to the struggling patriots. Yet, we did not possess a fleet in the real sense of the word, and our efforts were largely impotent against the overwhelming numbers of the British navy.

However, by a paradox, seapower proved the decisive factor in bringing about a Colonial triumph. During the major portion of the conflict Britain's command of the sea had permitted its armies to move at will up and down

¹Commentaries, Wm. Blackstone, Vol. I, Bk. 1, Chap. 13, p. 418.
²A Short History of the U. S. Navy, Clark, Stevens, Alden and Westcott, p. 9.

³History of the United States, Martin, p. 174.
⁴Influence of Seapower on History, Mahan, p. 389.
⁵Articles of Confederation, Article VI.
⁶We Build a Navy, H. H. Frost, p. 109.

One of the high objectives enunciated by the Founding Fathers in this document of transcendent skill and philosophical insight was to provide for the common defense. This worthy and necessary aim was given legal effect in that portion of the body of the Constitution which authorizes the Congress to provide and maintain a Navy.⁷

George Washington recognized the value of taking steps to found a Navy. He declared, "It may become a question worthy of consideration, whether the surplus should not be applied in preparations for building and equipping a Navy, without which, in case of war, we could neither protect our Commerce nor yield that assistance to each other, which, on such an extent of Seacoast, our mutual safety would require."⁸ Later, he reaffirmed this position when he stated to both Houses of Congress:

"To an active and external commerce the protection of a naval force is indispensable. To secure respect to a national flag requires a force organized and ready to defend it from insult and aggression."⁹

But our early legislators did not deem it expedient to invest forthwith in this type of national insurance, and the Constitutional authority we have noted lay dormant until, in March, 1794, Congress adopted a measure for the construction of six frigates. This law, which was passed only with great difficulty, resulted not primarily from a surge of patriotic feeling, but rather from the insistent pressure of merchants who had suffered the loss of ships and cargoes at the hands of the North African Corairs, and who were clamoring for Naval protection.

Pursuant to the law the keels of the six vessels were laid, and in 1797 the *Constellation*, *Constitution* and *United States* were launched. The exigencies of space and time forbid a detailed chronicle of its growth, its vicissitudes, and the distinguished record of its officers and men. However, it is desired to focus attention momentarily on the one conflict after we had achieved our independence during the course of which our shores were invaded, and to mention it in connection with the dangerous potentialities which might have emerged from the first World War had not another great Navy blocked the approach to our shores.

Following the period of desultory warfare with the then irresponsible Government of France between 1798 and 1801, and the Tripolitan War, the people of this country turned their glances from abroad and became absorbed in the great internal problems attendant upon the young Republic.

The Louisiana Purchase and the related growth of the fever for western exploration which culminated in the Lewis and Clark Expedition now gripped the public's attention. More disquieting subjects of interest were the schismatic implications of the Northeastern Confederacy, the Yazoo Land Claims, which gave rise to the famous opinion of John Marshall in *Fletcher v. Peck*,¹⁰ and the ignominious Burr Conspiracy.

But across the Atlantic events were shaping them-

selves to again plunge the United States in the cauldron of war.

In 1802 the people of France voted Napoleon Bonaparte First Consul for life. Two years later he crowned himself Emperor of the French. The astounding grasp which his personality and exploits held upon the people of his nation is expressed by one of his biographers thus:

"* * * For two thousand years, no one had inspired mankind with such love and such a readiness to die for him."¹¹

Ruler of France, Napoleon now assayed the task of mastering Europe. In martial panoply he led his armies from one success to another. Only England blocked his way through the organization of numerous coalitions against his power. At last the Corsican proposed to destroy England, and in 1803 prepared to invade Great Britain, placing an army in northern France to deliver the stroke. His plan resembled that of Germany more than a hundred years later; to accomplish the overthrow of the British government, and establish an independent republic in Ireland.¹²

But failure to gain control of the sea doomed Napoleon's scheme just as it forestalled the ambition of the Kaiser in the present century. As a General in North Africa, Napoleon had his first taste of British seapower when the indomitable Nelson destroyed the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile; the vital defeat at Trafalgar by the same great Nelson may have caused the Emperor to realize with his nearly clairvoyant military powers that his sun was eclipsed and that Waterloo lay over the horizon. No longer might he say with confidence, as he had previously to Roederer, "Nous sommes maîtres du monde."¹³

Our interest in the titanic struggles between England and France was but an incident of that conflict; yet it was of deep importance to our people, and eventually brought us into our second war with England.

By 1805 American tonnage had grown to 922,298 tons. The value of imports had risen to \$77,000,000 and our exports aggregated \$80,000,000. Moreover, nine-tenths of this commerce was carried in American-built and American-owned ships.¹⁴

Consequently, the British restrictions on our shipping, the Embargo, the Non-Intercourse Act, the continued impressment of American seamen by the English warship commanders, and the indignity of the abortive Chesapeake-Leopard affair resulted in a mounting tide of indignation against Great Britain. This egregious conduct against U. S. trade, coupled with the intransigent attitude of our western "war hawks," led to the unfortunate War of 1812.

The classic lesson to be gathered from the period of hostilities is that our impotence at sea was nearly entirely responsible for the series of disasters that befell us.

When Congress, in response to President Madison's message, declared war against Great Britain on June 12, 1813, we were ill-prepared to contest with our opponent for supremacy at sea. At the time we had only sixteen

⁷U. S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8.

⁸Washington, Lincoln, Wilson: *Three War Statesmen*, by J. McA. Palmer, pp. 22-23.

⁹The Extent to Which the Navy Should be Increased, Rear Admiral Frederick Rodgers, U.S.N., in the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. XXVI, p. 140 (1905).

¹⁰6 Cranch 87 (1810).

¹¹Napoleon the Man, Dmitri Merezhkovsky, p. 25.

¹²Europe Since 1789, Turner, 79.

¹³Europe Since 1789, Turner, p. 67.

¹⁴History of the United States, Martin, p. 381.

serviceable warships in our Navy; several were powerful frigates, but there was not a single ship of the line.¹⁵

The British had in commission more than eight hundred war craft, including two hundred and thirty which were larger than our largest vessel. To add to the forbidding picture, the U. S. population of eight millions was "unready, blundering, and rent by internal dissensions," while Great Britain's twenty million people were hardened by war and were tremendously superior in military resources.¹⁶

An excellent and impartial description of the status of our Navy, the problem advanced by the war, and the ultimate results of our weakness at sea is furnished by the historian Beard:¹⁷

"The navy within the limits of its equipment was in better condition than the army. It was not hampered by state interference or by the necessity of handling raw militiamen but it had neither the tonnage nor the guns required for a contest with the greatest sea power on earth. Called upon to defend a long coast line and protect an extensive commerce, it rendered a good account of itself. Perry's victory on Lake Erie, Macdonough's stroke at Plattsburg, and the stirring deeds of Lawrence, Rodgers, and a score of commanders bore testimony to the valor of American seamen. Aided by a swarm of privateers, the Navy for many months worked havoc on British commerce, repaying the patriots for some of the depredations committed by Captains of King George under the guise of 'international law.'

"All this was heroic and afforded new pages for romance but it was not war and the government of the United States was in no position to wage one efficiently. When the British ministry finally awoke to the gravity of the situation, it brought its superior sea power to bear on America with awful effect. It blockaded the Atlantic coast, paralyzed American commerce, foreign and domestic, and held the whole seaboard in a vise-like grip."

That a fortuitous train of circumstances spared the United States the fruits of unpreparedness in the way of aggression and humiliation is graphically outlined by Hendrik Van Loon:

"* * * The endless Napoleonic wars had completely exhausted Great Britain and the country was on the verge of a collapse. Finally in October of the year 1813 Napoleon had been defeated at Leipzig and had been forced to go into voluntary exile on the Island of Elba. At last the British government had its hand free and was able to gather an army of veterans in Montreal and Quebec for the recapture of the rebellious American provinces. But just when everything was set for the great campaign, the Corsican monster escaped to the European mainland and England was once more called upon to deliver her quota of allied troops. After the victory of Waterloo and the conclusion of the peace of Paris, when one out of every seven people in England had been reduced to the state of a pauper by the uninterrupted decades of war, it seemed absurd and wicked to continue a conflict in which no one was really interested. Besides, now that Napoleon had been sent to St. Helena, the greater part of the British Navy had become superfluous, and there was no longer any need for pressing foreign sailors into service of His Majesty."¹⁸

The War of 1812 illustrates what befell this country in the absence of a powerful navy. As the size and wealth of the United States increased during the ensuing century our navy increased in size and strength.

¹⁵A Short History of the United States Navy, by Clark, Stevens, Alden and Kraft, p. 101.

¹⁶History of the United States, Martin, p. 408.

¹⁷The Rise of American Civilization, Beard, Vol. I, p. 418.

¹⁸America, Van Loon, p. 291.

This was particularly true after the victory over Spain and the acquisition of outlying colonial possessions. Incidentally, it is no more than a truism to state that the triumph over Spain and the obtention of the colonies were the direct outgrowth of having in 1898 a Naval force superior in numbers, efficiency and training to that of the Spanish.

When the Great War started in 1914 Germany had the second most powerful Navy in the world, while ours was fifth in position. Had the armed contest been solely between this country and Germany, we would not have had control of the sea and would have faced almost certain invasion by Germany. But the presence of the British Navy in the struggle made this impossible. Instead, the United States supplied the Allies with war materials for the course of the war, and upon actually engaging in hostilities in 1917 was able to transport large armies to France under the ultimate protection of the British Grand Fleet.

Colonel Richard Stockton, the eminent writer on National Defense, had admirably summed up the respective positions of the British and German naval forces during the World War in the following sententious paragraphs:

"We should not forget what happened to the German Navy, which was *second* strongest in the world. We should not forget what was accomplished by the British Navy, which was actually strongest on earth."¹⁹

* * * * *

"The British Navy, by preventing the German fleet from starving England to submission within a few weeks, not only showed the importance of a good navy, but illustrated the folly of having a navy like Germany's—second in strength, but not strong enough to compete with the first ranking navy."²⁰

In 1812 our lack of seapower led us to be handled roughly and caused us to be invaded. During the World War the seapower of our ally not only prevented ultimate invasion of this country, but enabled us adequately to supply the manpower and materials which eventually brought about an Allied Victory.

The foregoing comparison brings to us the poignant fact that the United States, despite its great size and wealth, did not possess until a relatively short time ago a first-class Navy. By a first-class Navy is meant a Navy equal to the best in the world in all particulars, for a sea force which falls short of this criterion is no better than a second best hand in a card game. At the close of the World War we were constructing the greatest Naval force on earth. This was sacrificed for a kind of paper equality and some half-baked promises at the Washington Arms Conference.

It has taken us nearly the entire one hundred and fifty years of our national existence to seize upon the prime importance of seapower and have ready for action a fleet capable of meeting any opponent. It is vitally imperative, as we contemplate the approach of the day dedicated to our Navy, to be determined that there must be no regression from the position we have achieved. Instead, there must be a quickening of the tempo of Naval development. Across the Atlantic the long-dread-

¹⁹Inevitable War, Stockton, p. 325.

²⁰Ibid., p. 336.

ed war is being waged; in Asia and the Pacific there are many unsolved problems.

Since March, 1933, 107 Naval vessels have been placed in commission in the United States Navy. Including the experimental small boat program, 102 are on the building ways or projected. The total then is 208 Naval ships.²¹

We have (completed and in process of building) 23 capital ships, 7 plane carriers, 18 heavy cruisers, 25 light cruisers, 264 destroyers, and 114 submarines. The training and efficiency of our fleet is at a high level, and we have every reason to be proud of our Navy.

The greatest and most fervent wish of every American on Navy Day will be—

“LET US STAY OUT OF WAR.”

This wish is a sound one; but there are problems which must be faced.

The first problem is that of our relation to Europe during the present war. Germany's fleet is today negligible in comparison with those of France and Britain. Her commerce on the seas of the world will probably be at the time of this writing non-existent. Sooner or later we will inevitably start supplying Great Britain and France with food and war materials. Germany will be denied this source of supply by existing strategic conditions. What will be her reaction to and eventual action upon, this state of affairs?

In Asia the Japanese Empire is at war with China. In this war she has met with steady British opposition, which at times has severely strained the relations between the two nations.

Since the renaissance of Japan following the relinquishment of control by Keiki, the last Tokugawa Shogun, and the beginning of the era of Meiji in 1868, Dai Nippon has followed an unwavering course calculated to place her in a position of hegemony in Asia. Her territorial gains include Korea, Manchuria and the former German Islands in the Pacific. At Washington in 1921-1922 she won recognition as the world's third Naval power. Her diplomacy has been fashioned along waiting lines, for time and certain strategical considerations are on her side.

Will Japan, always an opportunist, seize the occasion presented by the present war to further her expansionist aims against the British, Dutch and French in the Orient? If she does, can we afford to stand by and watch?

No one possesses the sybilline vision to perceive the correct solution to such problems. But a sane appreciation dictates the necessity of continued naval expansion until a rational international settlement along equitable lines is achieved among nations.

Shakespeare expressed in verse that it is excellent to have a giant's strength, but tyrannous to use it like a giant.²² The Constitution and the greatness of our country require that we maintain the Naval strength of a giant, for a giant we are among nations. Let our people judge as to the manner of its employment. Their discretion will not be ill-conceived.

²¹Navy Dept. release, Aug. 15, 1939.
²²Measure for Measure, Act. II, Sc. 2.

NOTES ON COMBAT ARMS AND MODERN INFANTRY

REASON FOR CURVED FIRE WEAPONS

Since experience has proved the necessity of placing effective fire close to friendly infantry and falling upon hostile weapons sheltered in trenches and shell holes, the 81-mm. mortar (Battalion Commander's weapon), the 60-mm. mortar (Company Commander's weapon) and the grenade thrower (Platoon Commander's weapon) have replaced the old Stokes mortar and the V.B. rifle grenade, thus providing infantry with a logical sequence of curved fire weapons.

DEFENSE AGAINST TANKS

Requires a more systematic study and use of terrain employing natural and artificial obstacles to the limit, at the same time employing anti-tank guns and field mines to interdict probable lines of approach.

THE RIFLE

The rifle, which was to a certain extent discredited after the war, has returned to favor, not only as a weapon capable of producing fire but also as an arm for use in hand-to-hand combat.

FUTURE TRENDS

—Development of a powerful machine gun capable of efficient anti-aircraft defense.

—Development of an individual automatic weapon causing a change in the combat group and consequently in the Rifle Company.

—Solution of the problem of the rapid transport of heavy weapons and gun crews in the advance zone.

—Closer organic contact between the tank and infantry.

TERRAIN

Terrain not only determines tactical distributions but forms the basis of any logical use of fire. The compartments determine the combination of infantry and artillery fire.

SECURITY

The advent of the tank, distant artillery shelling and the airplane require the development of a new mentality and the close coordination of active and passive means of defense.

SPECIALIZATION

While specialization has become necessary in the Infantry, it does not preclude instruction in weapons other than the arm operated by the individual soldier.

It is a fundamental principle that a collective arm must never be abandoned or remain out of action due to the destruction of the crew.

MARCH TRAINING

Great stress must be placed on march training.

MORALE

Emphasis must be placed on the development of morale.

When low morale develops, the condition should be treated like an illness, a diagnosis made, cause determined and the remedy courageously applied.

An example of the foregoing is the action taken by Marshal Petain on assuming command of the French Armies in May, 1917.

Those Alluring Azores

BY MR. CHARLES WEIL

I

THOUGH the United States is the strongest and most secure nation in the world, it is far from unassailable or invincible. If we should lose command of our sea approaches, we can be invaded, as well as blockaded into submission. Enemy forces of flotilla craft, stationed off Gibraltar, the Channel ports, Singapore, Guam, the Bonin or Marshall Islands, might be as effective to stop almost all our foreign trade as if hostile battlefleets stood immediately outside Sandy Hook or the Golden Gate.

However, we need fear territorial aggression from no single power as long as we maintain a navy second to none, supreme in the western hemisphere. Behind such a naval screen our splendid man power can be trained and our resources mobilized to meet any power now in existence.

This was succinctly and authoritatively set forth in the testimony of Admiral Leahy under questioning by Representative Maas (P. 1951, Hearing, House Committee on Naval Affairs, 75th Congress, H. R. 9218):

Q. Is there any nation on earth that has a number of commercial ships or transports and convoys to make an invasion of the United States possible?

A. Many nations have a sufficient number of transports to invade the United States if they could eliminate our navy before they started the expedition.

Q. In other words, the only protection we have against invasion is a navy adequate to prevent enemies from ever reaching our shores?

A. That is correct.

Q. It is necessary to meet the enemy at sea and prevent him from coming to our shores, if we are to prevent substantial damage, is it not?

A. It is."

The distribution and balance of power in Europe today is such that no nation or known concert of nations is in a position to spare the forces necessary to attack us. Such an effort would expose enemies to attack in their rear. The same is true of Asia.

But what of tomorrow? What if there be a redistribution of power over seas? Powers often work in concert. We have no allies. Were a superior naval coalition to challenge us, our fleet could be shut up in our harbors or actually destroyed. That would be possible even now, if two or three large European powers, whose rears were secured by force or diplomacy, joined in attacking. Likewise, if a trans-oceanic hegemony should be

created which, with its rear necessarily secured by having disarmed neighboring States, and which could out-build us on the sea by virtue of the economic strength it would acquire, should decide to make war on us.

A large European fleet and another strong naval force from Asia could wipe our ships off the seas. Of course, if each approached us in its own ocean we might, we hope, exploit the advantages of central position and interior lines afforded by the Panama Canal, to meet one and then the other, defeating them in detail.

But the question arises whether such enemy fleets would not seek to join outside our waters. No doubt there would be logistic difficulties to such concentration. But there is no such word as "impossible" when it comes to matters of preparation and when a European navy has no fear of meeting a strong American fleet on their way to friendly bases in Asiatic waters, or vice versa.

Nor is it prudent to calculate on a hostile alliance suffering from the lack of unity which has adversely affected some coalitions in the past. There was adequate team work between the Allied fleets 1914-1918, particularly between the British and American navies. At Salamis, the Greek coalition won. Lepanto was a victory for the Christian allies and the Danish-Dutch coalition defeated the Swedish in 1676.

What had been the main political causes of inefficiency in a coalition fleet in the past, are likely to be lacking when the allied enemy fleets, tend, by the geographical position of their home bases, and when they are bound by pre-arrangement, if victorious, to exploit the fruits of their success in waters far distant from each other.

Hence, to be on the safer side, we must be prepared to face a combination itself well prepared with a coordinated plan, unified command of all services, with elements sufficiently homogeneous to cooperate and interchange, as well as with coordinated tactical doctrines.

Also, were there a coalition between a nation with a great navy and another with a great army, or were one nation to combine both an army preponderant in its region and a navy mistress in its waters, we should be faced with serious peril from an expeditionary force to the western hemisphere.

It is that fusion of supreme sea power and land power with their air auxiliaries which we must beware of,—that combination which can reach and strike, invest and penetrate, invade and blockade us.

Inasmuch as, by definition, any hegemony would have regionally supreme sea and land power, it is obvious that the creation of such dominion would involve serious risks to our security.

A hegemony either in Europe or in Asia, with its rear secured, would be more than we could cope with. In Europe there are, with Africa, which would fall into the lap of an European hegemony, about six hundred million people, with twice our output of coal, steel, and electricity. In Asia, there would be even more people, and undeveloped resources we cannot at present estimate.

The possibility of going overseas to break a distant blockade by the wielders of such iron sway, would be out of the question, for it is the consensus of naval experts that it would take a two to one superiority for any navy to operate overseas without bases or allies. Being doubtful whether we could even keep pace in naval construction with any such hegemony, we surely could not double its effort.

Europe certainly, and Asia probably, could outbuild us on the seas. The two together could overwhelm the ship-building power of the merely 230,000,000 people in the western hemisphere, with relative ease. Either could spare expeditionary forces to operate against us.

Moreover, in the struggle to establish an European hegemony, many important islands in the Pacific belonging to England, France, Holland, would fall into the hands of an Asiatic seapower and provide outposts and advanced bases for their ships against us.

Nor is it likely that two such regional hegemonies, one in Europe and another in Asia, would conflict with each other rather than with us. For we would face both, on the seas, the best medium of communications. They, on the other hand, would meet in arid central Asia, with its paucity of communications and its undeveloped, or rather unknown, resources, over which there is little to fight.

That the creation of hegemonies, both across the Atlantic and across the Pacific appear to be contemplated, is a matter of such general comment in the press, that its possibilities need not be labored at great length. That there is also a serious possibility of a coalition being formed which could defeat us, is evidenced by the testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations before a Congressional Committee (Hearing, House Committee on Naval Affairs, 75th Congress, H. R. 9218, pp. 1944-1966):

"Mr. Scott: I notice in these comparisons, in all of them, that after comparing our Navy with each individual country, you compare it with Japan, Italy and Germany combined. The reason for the last comparison is because of the fact that those three countries are the only three naval powers that have a written agreement amongst themselves. Was that the reason for the comparison with the three countries?

"Admiral Leahy: My reason for tabulating a combination of the naval powers of those three nations is that they are in some kind of an agreement. The character of their agreement is entirely unknown to me, but, in my opinion, it should be considered in a study of relative naval power.

"Mr. Scott: If the United States, because of the conditions of world politics, feels it necessary to in-

crease the Navy, how large a navy must we have to forestall an attack, beat off an attack by any one of those countries or any combination of those countries as given in the comparison, Italy, Germany and Japan, which will have 30 capital ships as compared to our 21? Could the 21 ships plus the other units of the fleet withstand such an attack?

"Admiral Leahy: Again I am unable to say what the outcome of such a very unexpected combination might be. Certainly, based upon the relative naval power, a 30 battleship fleet should be able to defeat a 20 battleship fleet."

Thus, a hegemony or a coalition can impose hardship upon us, either by distant blockade or actual invasion. Such an aggregation of power can defeat or contain our sea forces and subsequently convoy overseas expeditionary forces beyond our power to repel.

There is little that we can do to prevent the creation of a hegemony, save as in 1917, joining with nations most likely to be resisting the effort to create such an aggregation of power, to our own peril.

We have as yet had no experience in dealing with a coalition, and it is to that we must address our attention.

The logical riposte to a coalition is the organization of a counter coalition. But this country deems itself pledged to a lone hand in foreign affairs, to no entangling alliances. Hence, it is unlikely that any nations will engage themselves to come to our help, should we be attacked by a strong coalition, unless, reciprocally, we engage ourselves to come to their assistance.

Without allies or strongly fortified bases overseas, we would be at a great disadvantage against a coalition or a distant blockade. However, if we must go without allies we are not pledged to go without oversea bases from which we may have a fighting chance to deal with superior hostile combinations. Such bases might enable us to play our lone hand and so avoid alliances, thus limiting our military association with other powers to instances where the creation of a hegemony may be involved.

Such a coalition challenge can undoubtedly be met by having a navy equal at least to the combined navies of all probable enemies. But it would be cheaper to deal with them if we can, with a base from which those enemy naval forces can be intercepted and prevented from joining, and from which base a distant blockade can be broken.

We have such positions in the Pacific. From Guam or the Philippines, if properly fortified, we could prevent the junction of a fleet based on Singapore, with a fleet based on Sasebo, or between a Vladivostock force and a Singapore force. It would be, of course, impossible for us to prevent the junction of fleets based on Sasebo and Vladivostok. But, we have no such base in the Atlantic at all, the ocean in which our greatest interests lie, over which go most of our trade, and on the coast of which lie our most important cities.

It is too often overlooked that a navy without a base near the theatre of operations is helpless against a navy that has such a base.

"Only ships with bases at their disposal are the ships that count. Since bases multiply the number and power of usable ships . . . they are the genuine equivalents of ships." (Ships That Count—Knox, N. I. P. Oct., 1936, p. 1419.)

Before battle, bases with drydocks are needed for fuel and water, to keep ships in repair by scraping bottoms and for maintenance of hull and machinery. Thus, bases permit that concentration of strength in time and position that alone spells victory. After battle, bases are indispensable to rescue damaged units, for repairs, refueling, resupply, and replacements of personnel as well as alterations which battle experience may show to have been necessary.

As Captain Knox put it, as to battle fleet or commerce raiders operating in distant waters, "we can multiply ship power much faster through a new base than through new ships."

When we consider bases, we must bear in mind the air arm. For it, more than a battle fleet, is dependent on bases to refuel, rest, repair, and take on munitions if it will exercise continuous rather than intermittent pressure. When the air arm has bases it is the most mobile of weapons; without bases it must be transported by ships in crates.

An air base, strategically located, would be the means of bringing our air force to bear against an attempt to create a hegemony by an aerial "blitzkrieg." For it is asserted in some quarters that the United States cannot offer any immediate military threat to a continental nation. Hence, they urge we cannot help, for instance, a seapower to resist the effort of a landpower to create a hegemony, since the issue of the war might be decided in favor of the landpower by the exercise of airpower, by sudden air attack on cities or strategic positions before we can make our strength felt.

However, with a base or bases overseas organized, we can bring the mass of an American independent airforce quickly to bear up a decisive point overseas. Thus, by having an overseas air base the United States can make certain that no hegemony dangerous to its security could be created by a lightning air stroke; whatever one may believe as to the possibilities of the "blitzkrieg."

Under the circumstances, attention must necessarily be called to the unique position of the Azores, to which our clipper airships now hop regularly.

Our chief naval bases on the Atlantic seaboard are Norfolk, Philadelphia, New York and Boston, from whence our fleet can operate effectively against any enemy force approaching by the North Atlantic sea lane, and can reach out to meet a threat almost to the shores of Europe; that is, to Cape Farewell and the Azores. But beyond the Azores, it would be imprudent for our fleet to venture.

The Azores (Horta) are 830 miles, however, from Cape Roca on the Continent of Europe, and 900 miles from Cape Cantin on the coast of Africa, and 1,107 miles from Gibraltar. San Miguel is 700 miles from the coast of Portugal and 750 miles to Cape Cantin. These distances are within the effective radius of short range

units, such as destroyers, submarine chasers and scouting vessels needed to make sure that enemy fleets cannot get by, hugging the coast line to rendezvous with other enemy bodies.

This archipelago is nearer to our home bases than any other islands, such as Madeira (Portuguese) or the Canary, or Cape Verde Islands (Spanish). Likewise, they are farther from the opposite shores of the Atlantic than the other islands mentioned above, and hence less subject to continuous bombing by air. (We exclude consideration of Flores and Corvo, which are 100 miles nearer to us but which have no harbor, Corvo being only a crater.)

Attention has already been called to the negative advantage of our having these islands, or, at least, of denying them to other strong seapowers. More recently, A. Lawrence Lowell ("Frontiers of the United States" Foreign Affairs, July, 1939, p. 666) said, as to the Azores:

"In the hands of a strong maritime power they might serve as a naval base from which a hostile fleet could reach any part of our Atlantic position in less time than our fleet would take to go from one end to the other of the line we must defend in that ocean."

And Major Eliot ("The Ramparts We Watch," p. 82) stated:

"For these islands to pass into German control, either directly or by means of a Portuguese puppet government dominated by Nazi and Fascist influence, would be a matter of such grave concern to this country, that it is a question that we ought not to resist it by force should it appear imminent."

Paraphrasing Admiral Mahan as to Hawaii ("The Interest of America in Sea Power Present and Future," p. 47), the serious menace to our Atlantic coast and Atlantic trade, if so important a position were held by a possible enemy, has been mentioned so frequently in the press, that it may be assumed that it is generally acknowledged. Upon one particular, however, too much stress cannot be laid, one to which naval officers cannot but be more sensitive than the general public, and that is, the immense disadvantage to us of any maritime enemy having a base 2,000 miles from every point of our coast line from Maine to Florida.

Shut out from the Azores as a base, an enemy is thrown back for supplies and fuel to distances of 2,500 to 3,000 miles, or between 5,000 and 6,000 miles going and coming, an impediment to sustained maritime or aerial operations well nigh prohibitive.

On the positive side, however, an American fleet operating from the Azores can intercept and thwart the junction of fleets between the Atlantic and the Mediterranean between the Atlantic and the Pacific; and fleets from three nations, one of which is Atlantic, one of which is Mediterranean, and the third of which is Pacific in origin.

The only thing that an Azores fleet is not in a position to prevent, just as a Philippine fleet cannot prevent the junction of a Vladivostok and Sasebo fleet, is the

junction of two or three North Atlantic European fleets. But otherwise, a fleet based on the Azores can meet the kind of coalition that Admiral Leahy (*supra*) said could probably defeat our fleet.

It is a shorter distance from Hawaii via the Panama to the Azores than it is from Sasebo to Gibraltar, whether via Singapore, Aden, or via Sonda Straits, around Cape Hope or around Cape Horn. The latter two are, of course, most improbable routes.

The position, therefore, is one that is central, on strategic lines, and permits operations on interior lines against all other strategic lines in the south and middle Atlantic. That is why the Azores were used as a base of operations by Phillip III in Queen Anne's War, as well as by the Allied and American fleets during the World War to forestall a German hegemony.

Nor is there a position in the Atlantic as favorable as the Azores, from which to meet a threat against Latin America or the Panama Canal, emanating from Europe, whether of expeditionary forces, munitions, volunteer corps, or "pirate" submarines. Also, being close to the European coast, American forces based there could keep open the gateway to European trade from which we could not be cut off entirely by weak naval forces as is now the case.

Little more need be said as to the necessity of preventing any strong seapower from obtaining these islands. But it is a question whether so merely negative an attitude is adequate, whether the surest way of preventing these keys to our Atlantic sea approaches from falling into unfriendly hands, is not for them to be acquired by the United States, if it can be done righteously; that is, without objection of the Portuguese government and the Azoreans themselves.

Undoubtedly, they would be more effective in the defense of American interests than any of the islands heretofore mentioned as bases in the Atlantic that we should acquire, such as the Barbadoes, Trinidad, Jamaica or Bermuda. Our interest in the Azores islands is purely defensive and surpasses that of any other nation in the world.

By acquiring and developing them as a strongly fortified base, the United States can dispense with the heavy cost of building and maintaining either a two-navy standard or a two-ocean navy, as it is frequently referred to in the press.

Their purchase could possibly be effected on reasonable terms, since Portugal is an ally of Great Britain's. At any rate, any help, diplomatic, economic, or other, that we might give to any power should be conditioned in advance on their assent to our purchase of these cross-ward islands, or at least to the recognition of our paramount interests therein.

Nor is any third party likely to object to our purchase or assertion of special interest in these islands. For such objection would reveal a clearly unfriendly disposition. Any objector would confess thereby a desire to keep the security of the country in doubt, whether from the creation of a hegemony or from an attack by a coalition. On the other hand, the waiver of objections would be

some evidence at least that no such unfriendly dispositions are harbored. Hence, no opposition is to be expected, since it would be a boomerang of the first water, a diplomatic faux pas that would lead to American hostility to the objector nation at the first favorable opportunity.

In the hands of unaggressive America, these islands menace no one, great or small. In the hands of a great European power they menace the communications of the others. In the hands of a small power like Portugal, likely to become subservient to, or be conquered by a great power, they represent a menace to all others as well as ourselves. Europe should welcome the opportunity of putting them in our safe hands.

Whether or not an economic asset to Portugal, the Azores constitute, however, a serious strategic liability to Lisbon, since they afford a position which some European nation is likely to conquer Portugal itself to obtain. But insofar as they are of value to Portugal in a budgetary sense, they can be compensated for by an adequate price, payable, if preferred by Portugal, in installments. Insofar as they provide Portugal with either goods or markets, these can still be vouchsafed to her under tariff treaty arrangements perfectly within the realm of the practicable. Insofar as language and culture are concerned, equal privileges can be granted to both the Portuguese and English languages, as we granted them in Porto Rico and the Philippines.

In fact, the exercise by Portugal of due prudence would appear to dictate the sale to us of these islands, or special rights therein; to get something for them instead of waiting until some other nation, less actuated than the United States by the honest principles of giving a quid pro quo for what they want, should take them by force.

Napoleon sold us Louisiana; Spain sold us Florida; Russia sold us Alaska, and Denmark sold us the Virgin Islands, with such considerations in view. Portugal would do well to ponder whether we would not be the proper guardians of this position.

II

As Mahan said (*supra*, p. 39):

"The military or strategical value of a naval position depends upon its situation, upon its strength and upon its resources. Of the three, the first is of most consequence, because it results from the nature of things; whereas the two latter, when deficient, can be supplied artificially, in whole or in part. Fortifications remedy the weaknesses of a position, foresight accumulates beforehand the resources which nature does not yield on the spot; but it is not within the power of man to change the geographical situation of a point which lies outside the limit of a strategic effect."

So now, after consideration of the strategic description of the islands with respect to location, we come to a consideration of the physical operating conditions of the picturesque archipelago itself, which stretches northwest to southeast for 375 miles between 36° 59' and 39°

44° north and 25° 45' and 31° 16' west, at the intersection of two important trade routes, between the English channel ports and the Panama Canal, and between all the North American ports and the Mediterranean and Suez Canal. Lying along the safest air route between the North American continent and Europe, they also constitute the biggest cable nerve center in the world, with fifteen important trans-Atlantic cable lines passing through the City of Horta.

The nine islands are in three groups, with areas of 924 square miles all told. St. Michael and St. Mary; Fayal, Pico, St. George, Terceira and Graciosa, and the last group, Flores and Corvo.

The chief drawback about the islands, geographically, is that like the Hawaiians, they are volcanic in origin and suffer occasionally from earthquakes, the last of which in 1936 damaged Horta severely. However, that damage has been repaired and the harbor dredged. There are about three small harbors, Ponta Delgado, Horta and Angra, and there is deep water all about these islands. Another important drawback is the lack of any natural enclosed harbor in which a large number of heavy draught ships may be anchored, immune from storms or surprise submarine attacks. And to build a harbor of adequate size would probably be quite expensive, because of the deep water close to the shore and the high land close to beach.

The islands are mountainous, one peak rising 7,613 feet above sea level. However, there is much fertile land on these islands, which are rich with vegetation and benefit from a temperate, humid, but healthy climate, at sea level, never under 41° F. and practically never above 86°. In fact, the islands are a health resort.

They lie within the northern limit of the northeast trade winds. The population numbers about 254,000, mostly white Portuguese, with some Flemish, and Moorish extraction. The stock is good, but illiteracy runs high, and the standards of living fairly low. While Portuguese is the language, many of the inhabitants speak or understand English, as a result of associations with America.

There is a high birth rate in the islands, and consequently, considerable emigration. Many Azoreans have come to the United States; 60,000 to Massachusetts and Rhode Island; about 35,000 to California and Hawaii.

Consequently, there are many connections and natural affinities between the Azoreans and the United States. Our country is well liked, not only because many relatives are living in the United States, but because many return to pass their declining years in the place of their birth, and in consequence of the good impression made upon the inhabitants by the courtesy and liberality of the American sailors who were stationed there and passed through the islands during the World War.

The largest island is St. Miguel, 41 miles long, 7 to 9 miles wide, with an area of 297 miles square, and a population of 117,000. Its principal city is the Port of Ponta Delgado. That could serve as a base for scouting forces, destroyers, submarines and patrol planes. St. Miguel has several other bays that could be used to give primary support by tenders to submarines and patrol

planes. In the northeast St. Miguel has some fairly flat terrain that can be developed as a landing field for shore base airplanes near Furnas.

There have been, however, twenty volcanic eruptions or earthquakes since 1445; more than any of the other of the group and the port of Porta Delgado is too small to anchor any large fleet.

Near St. Michael and 53 miles south lies St. Maria, with an area of 42 square miles and 6,400 inhabitants. St. Maria has had no earthquakes recorded, but has no harbor, although San Lourenco and Villa do Porto, now open roadsteads, could probably be developed to serve as secondary submarine and patrol plane bases. However, this island is in the easternmost group and, therefore, the most exposed to surprise attacks by air. On account of the limited qualities of self-maintenance of submarines and patrol planes, the closeness of St. Maria and St. Miguel to the area of hostile operations is a countervailing advantage. For shore based planes, there is a plain about two miles wide at the western end of Santa Maria.

Between those two islands lies the Formigas rocks twenty-four miles northeast of St. Maria. The other group of rocks is Dollabaret, one mile south from the Formigas.

Terceira is in the central group, 19 miles long, 9 miles wide, 223 square miles, and 48,000 inhabitants; it is about 98 miles northeast of St. Michael. This island has a small natural, and formerly fortified, harbor at Angra, with three moles and a sheltered anchorage. Earthquakes in 1614, 1761, 1800, 1801 and 1841, however, make it a risky site for a base. Moreover, it is exposed to southwest gales of considerable force. A port might be developed at Bahai Praia, but it, too, is more exposed to storms than Horta and both ports can be bombarded from the open sea. It therefore could only be used as a secondary base, unless developed, enclosed, and fortified. On the southeastern part of the island is a plateau of flat terrain, three miles in diameter, that could be used as a landing field.

Forty-five miles northeast of Terceira is the island of Graciosa, eight miles long, five miles wide, with a surface of 171 square miles. It has no port and only 8,000 people.

Thirty-five miles south of Graciosa is the narrow 36-mile-long Isle of St. Jorge, of 40 square miles and 14,000 population. It has no natural port. This is the least mountainous island of the archipelago and is the most centrally located, but has no natural features to commend it for military purposes.

Ten miles south of St. Jorge is Pico of 175 square miles; 30 miles long, 10 miles in width, and 22,000 souls. On this is the high peak that rises 7,613 feet, and is still an active volcano. Pico has no natural harbor, but about the middle of the island is some flat terrain that might be developed for use by airplanes.

Fayal (Horta) is four miles west of Pico and has an area of 64 square miles and a population of 20,000. It is 14 miles long and 9 miles wide. It has the best enclosed harbor in the islands that needs a breakwater and some dredging to render it a safe port for a small number of deep draft ships in all weather. One drawback to Fayal is lack of water supplies.

Fayal and Terceira possess carriage roads which encircle the islands and cross them. San Miguel is likewise encircled and intersected by roads.

The westernmost islands are Flores and Corvo, about 145 miles northwest of Fayal. The latter has 7 square miles, a population of only 750, and no harbor. It is the nearest island to the North American Continent, 1,680 miles from Newfoundland. Flores is 10 miles from Corvo, 12 miles long, 9 miles wide, and has a population of 7,000 on an area of 57 square miles. These islands are too far from Europe and have no natural harbor.

It is, therefore, on an island of the central group that a naval establishment should preferably be situated. Preferably, too, such a harbor had best be away from the sea, sheltered from storms and sustained bombardment from ships. Horta fills this bill better than any available in the islands. It is on the inside, in a fairly central position, with alternative exits to the sea, and the navigable approaches can be covered by land works on every side. It can be warned of attacks from the other islands and is far enough away from the continent to make sustained air attack improbable. It has also a better record as to earthquakes and volcanic activity than Ponta Delgado.

Adjoining Horta Bay is Bahai Praia that could be built into a single establishment in case a major fleet base is built on the islands. However, such development, by the building of breakwaters, is certain to be expensive because of the deep water, in spots as much as thirty fathoms within a mile of the shore. About 57 miles southwest of Fayal are the Princess Alice Banks.

Economically, the islands are no particular prize. We could never be accused of economic imperialism in seeking to acquire an archipelago, which raises just about enough crops to feed its population and has practically no industry, save primitive linen, beet sugar, flour, spirits and embroidery factories, and the making of articles of straw and pottery, with no mines, little timber, except on Pico, and no fuel. But being relatively self-sufficient as far as food is concerned, is already a great advantage. There are not only fishing and livestock on the islands, but dairy products and whaling, and the islands produce crops of cereals, vegetables, fruit, beans, corn, meat, milk, butter cheese, bananas, eggs, sugar beet, tobacco, fish, wine, mineral waters, pineapples, tea, sweet potatoes, and flax hemp.

The foreign trade of the islands is unimportant and most of their trade is with Portugal showing probably an unfavorable balance of trade on the whole. No recent or complete figures are available. In 1913, however, the figures for the ports of St. Michael and Fayal show exports of £347,000 and imports £427,000, an unfavorable balance by £80,000. That, together with the cost of government, indicates that the islands are of little economic value by themselves, their importance being purely strategic.

The islands have played but a small part in the history of the outside world. It is believed that they were known to Carthaginian navigators, and were shown on Genoese maps of the 14th century, but otherwise have never been of any consequence to any Mediterranean

power. It is also believed that they were visited in the 14th century by Arabian geographers.

They were "discovered," however, in 1432 by the Portuguese; were visited by Columbus in 1493, on his return from America, and have remained under Portuguese sovereignty ever since, save for sixty years, during which Portugal and Spain were united, from 1580 to 1640. They are autonomous, though not a colony, but integral provinces of Portugal.

It was during that period of Spanish and Portuguese colonial activity that the Azores had a fleeting moment of importance, when they afforded a rendezvous for Spanish and Portuguese ships returning from the West Indies and the Far East.

It was during this period that the poetically important, but strategically inconsequential, battle took place between the English ship *Revenge* off Flores in 1591 against 15 Spanish ships of the line. Fayal was seized and looted in 1597 by Sir Walter Raleigh and an English fleet attacked St. Michael without success. The islands were visited by Frobisher and Hawkins, but otherwise have never bulked large in the military and political history of the world, except as they served as lurking places for commerce raiders.

The fact that no great European power ever sought to take these unfortified islands from a weak sea power like Portugal is proof positive of the fact that they are of little defensive importance to any European power even today. Whereas, the fact that they were of importance to Spain when Spain was fighting for a position in American waters, and the facts that Admiral Rogers went by the Azores in 1813, that the U. S. Privateer "General Armstrong" was sunk in Fayal in 1812, and that the American fleet used this position during the World War as a base, supply deposit, and for an airdrome, indicates the historical significance of the group to the United States. During the World War Ponta Delgada was bombarded by a German U boat.

The only interest that has ever been shown in the Azores by other powers was indicated by the correspondence relative to the treaty between Great Britain and Germany in 1898, which dealt in a general way with the Portuguese colonies. That treaty, however, simply provided that Germany might buy certain of the Portuguese colonies in Africa if Portugal was willing to sell. But it does appear that the Portuguese Government at that time was in negotiations with France for a £6,000,000 loan to be guaranteed by a pledge of special rights relative to customs receipts including "those of the islands adjacent to Portugal." "Since the expression 'adjacent to Portugal' may include the Azores," wrote Lord Salisbury, he asked the Portuguese government "to give an understanding in writing that the Azores shall not, without the written consent of this country (England) pass under the control of any third power," under penalty of a rupture of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance. It also appears the German diplomat, Hatzfeld, received word of that position in a "disconcerted manner," and the loan negotiations in Paris broke down immediately at that time. Anglo-French rivalries in Africa were at the acute


(Continued on page 62)

The Spanish Moroccan Zone

BY COLONEL FRANK E. EVANS, U.S.M.C.

THE termination of the Spanish civil war has again thrown the international spotlight on the role that Spanish Morocco may play should war come to the Mediterranean. A glance at the map is sufficient to realize the strategic significance of Spanish Morocco. From Larache, its westernmost point, facing the Atlantic, this territory runs for six hundred miles to the Algerian border, with its greatest depth, from Ceuta to the French border, a distance of one hundred miles.

Across the span of thirteen sea-leagues the fortress of Ceuta faces the rock fortress of Gibraltar. One can hear clearly, on fog-enshrouded days, the fog signals of either side. Here is the narrowest point of the "Gut," as seamen know the historic Straits of Gibraltar. From Fort El Hacho at Ceuta the fog gun is fired every five minutes, and halfways between these periods comes the answer from the explosive fog signal on Mount Europa, high above the British garrison. The Spanish light, mounted on a white



Military Map of Morocco. Shaded portions show progress of pacification of French Morocco, while area at top of map shows extent of Spanish Zone.

Courtesy of Etat Major, Rabat, French Morocco

circular tower on Mosqueros Hill, with its visibility of twenty-nine miles, and the still more powerful light on Mount Europa, are easily visible at night from either fortress.

On the north the Spanish Zone faces the great military and naval base of the Rock within easy gunfire. Along its entire length of six hundred miles on the south lies the power of the French Zone, France's greatest colonial reservoir of fighting men.

The writer traveled through the northern fringe of Spanish Morocco while on leave in 1930. Two years later, with credentials from the Navy Department, and with the authorization of the French War Office, he spent three months in French Morocco, skirting the old line of the Riff campaign of 1926, crossing from Agadir on the Atlantic by the old caravan route to the Sahara, observing the French operations against the dissident Berber tribes in the Grand Atlas.

Full advantage was taken of those travels to learn what was possible of the military situation as it then existed in the Spanish Zone, six years after the insurrection of Abd-el-Krim and his final defeat by the combined French and Spanish forces. Three possible phases were involved, the possibility of a renewed revolt by the native tribes of the Spanish Zone, of a garrison revolt in that zone, and, in either case, the readiness of France to enter the Spanish Zone in military intervention.

French military officials made no secret of their determination and readiness to master such a revolt. In the light of the present precarious situation it is well to review their preparations, preparations that have not relaxed as the years have passed. There cannot be the slightest doubt that, if Spain's potential allies, Italy and Germany, should take the aggressive role with the Spanish Moroccan Zone as a base from which to harry the fleets and commerce of France and Great Britain, to incite a revolt in the French Zone, or to attack its garrison, those preparations will well repay France for her foresight and heavy expenditures.


Should war come, and Spain should throw her resources in with the dictator countries, her retention of the Spanish Moroccan Zone would be a dangerous threat to France and Great Britain. Sea-based units in the zone would raise havoc with Britain's life line through the Mediterranean, and hamper the despatch of the XIXth Army Corps, France's crack colonial troops, to any point on either shore of the Mediterranean. A revolt stirred up by native and other agents in French Morocco from the Spanish Moroccan base would seriously impair the fine French colonial war machine. Swift military intervention by the Moroccan and Algerian garrisons and the occupation of the Spanish Zone is the only alternative left to France.

Seven years have elapsed since my visit to French Morocco. It was held no secret from me at the time that at the Etat Major of the French Troops of Occupation in Rabat, complete files were kept rigorously up to date for the despatch of French columns into the Spanish Zone should any form of revolt there threaten the security and prestige of French Morocco. Within the space of forty-eight hours Rabat's military experts could have put their plans into full operation. Their entire northern military

zones had been entirely reorganized along the lines that the Riff campaign had dictated.

Unnecessary posts, either because they housed too small a unit, difficult to supply, or lacking accessible water, were abandoned. Key posts, sufficient for the garrisoning of a battalion, were strengthened physically, made ready for immediate reenforcement. The Riff campaign, when the French forces became involved by Abd-el-Krim's swift advance, found the French seriously handicapped by inadequate communications. My visit to the old Riff line disclosed units working like beavers to strengthen the defensive line. Rocade motor roads of macadam already paralleled the front. From them ran lateral roads for troop movements. The standard gauge railroad from Tangier to Fez was being extended to the east to connect with the Algerian-Tunisian railway system at Oujda on the Algerian border, four hundred miles distant from Fez, and paralleling the entire border between the French and Spanish zones. This work was completed in 1933, and will permit speedy transfer of units between Morocco and Algeria. On the Spanish side there is little in rail or road communications to match the facility with which the French high command can rush supplies and troops to any point on the border. One highly significant demonstration of the straight-thinking and thoroughness of the Rabat staff was pointed out to me by a French staff officer as we surveyed the surrounding terrain from the walls of a freshly constructed battalion post. Within our view lay several native villages. Their defensive walls and their outstanding buildings gleamed bright in the African sun under coatings of prosaic whitewash. To the tourist this touch spoke volumes in favor of French sanitation. To the initiated it afforded accurate registration for artillery fire, for bombing planes. Before the whitewash brush had been applied those brown huddles of walls and buildings would have acted as a perfect camouflage against the same somber background of the terrain.

War, as well as politics, seeks strange bedfellows. The close of the Riff campaign, so disastrous to Spanish prestige in heavy losses and inglorious defeats before France saved the day under Petain's leadership, brought stern demands from France. Unless those demands were accepted, France warned, her Moroccan troops would march across the border and take complete control to avert the possibility of another native revolt that had brought Spain so close to irremediable disaster and forced on France a campaign costly in men and money. The Spanish authorities agreed without demur, sobered and chastened by the debacle that they had escaped only through France's aid. They freely accepted France's proffer of military aid to forestall the menace of another native revolt. They instituted a vigilant embargo against the smuggling of arms into their zone, and imposed heavy punishments for the possession of contraband weapons. They inaugurated an intelligent program of roads and public works to provide the impoverished inhabitants with means of subsistence and to allay economic discontent. Only in the northwestern portion of Spanish Morocco are water, pasture and fertile lands. All the rest is arid, with only mineral resources available in the vicinity of Melilla. In the northwestern area civil wars of the Raisuli regime and the Riff revolt denuded it, and it had emerged from the Riff trou-



Courtesy of Etat Major, Rabat, French Morocco

Military map of Morocco showing the Railroad Net.

bles neglected and impoverished. Under French guidance agricultural implements and seed were provided, and steady improvement followed. While acceptance of these measures may have sadly irked the Spanish, the alternative of refusal was the plain warning of French extension of authority into their zone as a matter of self-defense against the threat of another Abd-el-Krim rising to power.

At the time the possibility of another Riffian revolt was well discounted by Rabat. Revolt needed the acquisition of arms and munitions on a considerable scale; the coming to age of a new generation of tribesmen warriors. The tribesmen were too impoverished to pay the prohibitive prices of a modern rifle; the embargo against gun-running was too severely enforced. War had made serious inroads in the ranks of fighting men. Thirteen years have passed since Abd-el-Krim unleashed his horde of fierce tribesmen against the Spanish garrisons, wiped them out, and surged on to attack the French border posts with artillery manned by European mercenaries, grenades and other arms and munitions wrested from the demoralized and beaten Spaniards.

Left to their own restricted resources, rifles of various

pedigrees, a handful of cartridges, a sharp-bladed knife for hand-to-hand combat, and with their old fighting ranks denuded of its veterans, the recruitment of youngsters of a coming generation would have left the tribesmen impotent as a fighting factor. But the passage of the years brought undreamed-of factors into play in the Spanish Zone.

Civil war broke in Spain. A rebel plane carried General Franco from virtual retirement in the Canary Islands to Ceuta in the Spanish Moroccan Zone. German and Italian arms, munitions and gold poured into the zone, and their uniforms became a familiar sight. German and Italian warships and freighters, and their transport planes, ferried Franco's contingent of the Spanish Foreign Legion and tribesmen across the thirteen sea-leagues of the "Gut" to Spanish ports under the guns of Gibraltar. Born to war, absorbing its traditions from their birth, inured to hardships, the tribesmen, welded into a shock troop unit under the stabilizing influence of the Spanish legionnaires, dominated the force under Franco.

Ceuta and Melilla were converted into military and naval bases overnight. Into their harbors steamed units of the German and Italian fleets, and their submarines sallied out

of them to attack government craft and neutral shipping. Their officers and agents carried on their trades in the zone unmolested, allies of Franco.

The civil war, with Italian legions and planes, German planes and military experts throwing their weight to Franco, came to its predestined end. Franco was faced with heavy obligations to the Berlin-Rome axis. The Spanish Moroccan Zone bulked large in those obligations, facing the bottleneck of the "Gut," a formidable threat to British and French domination of the Western Mediterranean unless it remained neutral, or passed into their hands.

The Spanish Foreign Legion and the tribesmen of the Riff returned to their barracks at Ceuta and Melilla, seasoned, able fighters, but with ranks sadly thinned by war.

It would be idle to presume, however, that from the beginning of the Spanish adventure, and the infiltration of German and Italian influence into the Spanish zone, that French intelligence officers, already familiar with its terrain, and officers of French Morocco's Bureau of Native Affairs, skilled in the psychology and the dialects of Riff tribesmen, had not penetrated into Ceuta and Melilla, appraising the military situation in all its aspects, noting new installations, returning to Rabat to bring up the plans of its staff in meticulous detail should any move by the Berlin-Rome axis precipitate war, and dictate French armed intervention.

Her Foreign Legionnaires, hawk-nosed Moroccans and Algerians, grinning black Senegalese, trained to the minute, mobile far beyond the capabilities of French line troops, would lead that advance of the XIXth French Army Corps, followed by French guns, tanks and armored cars, moving under their screen of reconnaissance and bombing squadrons. With the Spanish Zone under French control, the Berlin-Rome axis would suffer a formidable setback at the very outset of war.

THE ROCK FORTRESS OF CEUTA

Ceuta, called Cepta under the Romans and Sebta under the Moors, has always retained a savor of ancient days despite its garrison flavor. Don Juan of Portugal wrested it from the Mohammedans in 1415, and the Portuguese left their imprint on the rock stronghold. Ceuta passed into the hands of Spain when Portugal separated from the mother country in 1580. With Spain's dream of an empire rudely checked by the loss of Cuba and the Philippines in 1898, her military leaders turned to the dream of making Ceuta a second Gibraltar. Behind the dull-gray walls of Fort El Macho Spain for years had imprisoned her political offenders, and Ceuta, though it fell far short of Gibraltar's impregnability, became invested with much of the sinister import of France's Cayenne penal settlements.

The approach to Ceuta from Tangier, thirty miles to the westward, is along a coastline where bold mountain peaks are topped with Roman watch towers, manned later by the pirates who preyed on Mediterranean commerce. Ceuta lies low on a peninsula that at its widest point measures but two hundred yards, between the heights of Mount Marabut and the bastioned walls of El Hacho. Just beyond El Hacho this remarkable peninsula, with its tip thrusting out to the northeast, drops sharply away to the south and Algeria. On its narrow strip, against a ragged skyline, Ceuta presents a harsh, somber aspect, with few

glimpses of green verdure. It has the austere aspect of Spain, but once ashore there are traces of architecture that still preserve the influence of the Moors and the Portuguese.

Until Spain provided modern harbor works Ceuta was of negligible commercial value, but she now enjoys an excellent artificial harbor through the construction of two breakwaters, a modern mole and other harbor facilities. When one disembarks there on the Mole Alfonso XIII, it is in the shadow of an old fortress. Beyond its moat lies an incongruous native settlement of squalid huts patched with salvaged timber and tin. The royal flag of Spain flew over the old fortress before Spain joined the ranks of the republics, and the royal arms carved over the great doors remain.

Over the palm-fringed Plaza Alfonso XII, over barracks and public buildings, on my visit, the red and yellow standard of Spain flew. Ceuta has long been a soldier town and all day long one had the impression of a restless, passing parade. Mule carts, tandem-drawn, rattled through the crowded streets. Native hucksters and sellers of Moorish articles besieged the countless cafes. Shop windows gleamed with medals and ribbons and regimental devices. Bugles sounded their calls, and always there was the rasp of hobnails on the narrow sidewalks that passed beneath glass-encased balconies of grilled iron.

Native troops, lean and fierce of aspect, moved noiselessly past, picturesque in their maroon fezes and sashes. Infantry in baggy khaki, rosettes of yellow, red and white on their infantry berets or shapeless campaign hats. Peasant lads in uniform, cigarettes between their lips, hands in their pockets. Engineers who wore on their khaki collars silver devices which, on inspection, proved to be a replica of the famed Giralda tower of Seville, surmounted by a crown, with a wreath of laurel at the base. Aviators in smart olive green, a distinctive uniform that they forfeited later through too much involvement in an abortive rebellion. Swagging legionnaires who, alone with the aviators, were immaculately uniformed.

SPAIN'S FOREIGN LEGION

Formed at the time of the Riffian revolt of 1921, the Legion early proved its worth under the leadership of Colonel Milan Astray, who learned his soldier trade in the French Foreign Legion. It was the Legion that saved Berenguer's army from utter disaster on that bitter retreat from Tetuan by heroic rear-guard actions. It was the Legion that, man for man, drew eight pesetas a day in contrast to the one peseta paid to the line troops. Their khaki was tailor-made, not the dull khaki of the line, but olive green with roll collar, and in place of the gilt buttons serviceable ones of brown leather. They wore their device, a battle axe crossed on the right by a bow and arrow of ancient type, on the left by a rifle of old design, on the brass belt plates, and embroidered in red, white and yellow on their shoulder straps. Tassels of the Spanish colors depended from the peak of their overseas caps.

It was not difficult to engage two of them in conversation, and they waxed eloquent as they emptied their wine glasses with the nonchalance of old soldiers. One was a Portuguese, keen, mercurial, with a smattering of French and English. The other, a burly, pleasant-faced Italian. They were eager to recount the feats of the Legion against



The Panorama of Ceuta Bay

the redoubtable Rifians, to tell legendary stories of Colonel Astray, then retired but still the Legion's honorary colonel, unabashed in their fervent desire for action, wistful in their desire to be ranked on the same plane as the Foreign Legion of France.

"Yes, we draw more pay in one day than a soldier of the French Foreign Legion in three months," they boasted, "but the French legionnaire, he is always fighting. Some of them desert, cross the border and join us, but what good is money in Ceuta? We would rather be fighting!"

The Portuguese fingered absent-mindedly the light green ribbon and silver cross of the Tetuan medal, and the dark green ribbon and bronze medal of Melilla.

The Italian broke in with a swift rush of talk, and his comrade translated.

"My friend, Filippo, is what you call my buddy. He asks that you come out tomorrow to our barracks, ten miles out on the road to Tetuan. He is the colonel's chauffeur, and the colonel would like to show you the Legion. You will see that we have the finest barracks in Spanish Morocco, with flower beds, and perhaps the colonel will give you a review. You will see how the Legion lives, and," he added proudly, while his buddy smiled wistfully, "you will see that even the French Foreign Legion has nothing on us wops! And," he lowered his voice to a confidential pitch, "you will see that we legionnaires have at the barracks thirty-forty, of the prettiest native girls in all Spanish Morocco!"

Alas, on the morning the rain was falling in sheets, and the ship was scheduled to sail at noon for Oran. The flower beds, the review, the pretty girls, the famous ram mascot of the Legion, all were washed out in the downpour.

THE MILITARY CAPITAL OF THE ZONE

One hundred and seventy miles to the eastward lies Melilla, a city of tragic history, and military capital of the Spanish Moroccan Zone. Its beginnings were a part and parcel of Portugal's golden days of conquest. Melilla is, in contrast to Ceuta, a bit of Andalusia under African skies; a gay little capital whose boulevards were broader and cleaner than any in Spain. Seated under one of its cafe awnings, while Morocco and Spain promenaded by, it was fantastic of belief that ten years before this charming bit of transplanted Spain was so closely encircled by

Abd-el-Krim's fierce warriors that a Spanish soldier who lifted his head above its walls was a target for a Riffian bullet.

In its darkest days General Berenguer, speeding from Tetuan in the interior in advance of sorely needed reinforcements, found but thirty-seven rifles at his command. A raid at that time would have found Melilla an easy target, but Abd-el-Krim was nodding, and the golden opportunity passed.

Melilla's development dates back only to 1909, but within that time it had become a modern city, in an exotic setting of parks and boulevards, plazas and huge military barracks. Its waterfront is a maze of docks and breakwaters, teeming with shipping.

Melilla was acquired by Spain in 1496 when the Lord Lieutenant of Andalusia seized it on behalf of the Catholic sovereigns, as a base for the conquest of North Africa. It acquired little value or prominence until 1847, when Spain placed her scattered possessions, or presidios, in Morocco under a captain-general. The occupation was marked by Riffian raids and piratical attacks, followed by inconclusive punitive expeditions. Then, in 1893, the Rifians revolted, stirred by reports of the desecration of the tomb of Sidi Mariash. It grew to such proportions that Spain was forced to increase the Melilla garrison to 22,000 rifles. For the first time Spain adopted the policy of firm handling of the warlike tribes.

In 1909 the opening of iron mines in the interior fanned a fresh revolt and hand in hand with a costly campaign Spain launched its program of development. Three years later the Franco-Spanish treaty confirmed Spain's right in Morocco. During the World War Melilla was an active base for German intrigue and propaganda but Spain, buying off the native leaders, preserved comparative quiet. This reigned until the great Riffian uprising of 1921, which bared an amazing state of incompetency and graft in the army of occupation, inflicted staggering losses and, in its aftermath of the wave of anger that swept over Spain, seated Primo de Rivera as dictator.

DISASTER SWEEPS THE ZONE

The story of Melilla would be incomplete without a summary of the almost incredible events of 1921. At the time General Berenguer was at Tetuan, thirty miles distant in the interior, as High Commissioner. In command



In the Heart of Melilla.

at Melilla was General Silvestre, a bluff old soldier who had risen from the ranks. Despite his desire to launch a campaign against the Riffs, then rallying to the standard of Abd-el-Krim, Silvestre had been held inactive by orders from Tetuan. Finally the two generals met for conference on this mooted point aboard a gunboat in Melilla harbor. At its close, denied his request for troops with which to make an advance into the Alhucemas Bay area, Silvestre openly defied Berenguer. Their quarrel became so violent that the gunboat's commander threatened to put both in irons.

When Berenguer returned to his post Silvestre organized a force of 20,000, one-third of which was native troops, and carried out his plans. He apparently attached slight importance to the power and ability of Abd-el-Krim, though the French had warned him that Abd-el-Krim, then in Spanish employ, had long been intriguing against him. He had contented himself with sending for Abd-el-Krim, soundly berating him, and throwing him into jail. Abd-el-Krim lost little time in breaking jail and sending to the old general a message bristling with threats of an early revenge.


The Riffian chief lost little time after his escape. He opened hostilities by storming and capturing advanced posts, and capped it by cutting off a garrison of 800 men at Igueriben, two kilometers from the post of Anual. When Silvestre took the field the garrison of Igueriben had been cut off from water, supplies and munitions for three weeks.

At Anual Silvestre organized a column of 4,000, mostly natives, and ordered the Igueriben garrison by heliograph to fall back on Anual. Between the two posts ran a deep defile, its heights held by the Riffians, and the withdrawal could not be covered by gunfire from Anual. Faced by this dilemma, the Igueriben officers shot themselves to escape capture and mutilation, and of the 800 who started for Anual but seven survived.

Silvestre then determined on a sortie in force, but his officers, discipline riddled by the activities of the officers' junta, rebelled and decided to fall back on Melilla. In this attempt they and their men were literally blown to pieces by hand grenades and machine guns as they attempted to cross a defile. Silvestre, left alone with his staff, committed suicide.

Native troops deserted en masse to the standard of Abd-el-Krim, and Spain was plunged into the Riffian debacle. In three tragic days the Spaniards lost 19,000 men, 130 pieces of artillery and enormous quantities of supplies, munition and transport which Abd-el-Krim later, in 1926, turned against the French. Camps and posts were burned and 5,000 square kilometers were abandoned in the Spanish Zone. It took Rivera's new army of 70,000 a year and a half to reoccupy the devastated area. Only that singular lapse of inactivity on the part of Abd-el-Krim saved Melilla from pillage and the torch on that day when General Berenguer and his thirty-seven rifles were its only protection.

(Continued on page 62)



An old Fortress in Ceuta

A New Departure in Landing Boats

BY 2ND LT. ARTHUR B. BARROWS, U.S.M.C.


LET us start by listing some of the more desirable qualities and characteristics of boats for specialized use in the first subwaves of a Landing Operation. First, capacity for personnel; second, maneuverability and ability to go through surf; third, shallow draft; fourth, speed; fifth, protection for the personnel; sixth, fire-power; and last, the ability to get off of the beach after the landing. There are, of course, other desirable items, but let us leave them for the moment.

We can agree, we believe, that the boats which land the first subwaves must be faster, more maneuverable, less vulnerable to beach fire, and better surf boats than those which follow because of the fact that if the landing of the first subwaves is at all successful the succeeding boats and troops will be more or less covered by the fire of those already on the beach and their landing will consequently be possible from boats which are slower, larger, and hence more vulnerable to the defensive fire from the beach. Also, if the beach-line defenses have been overcome by the first subwaves there will be no bands of fire along the line of disembarkation, and troops and material may be unloaded from boats with comparatively great freeboard and consequent large capacity.

Let us start then with the premise that the placing of the first subwaves of infantry on the beach with such naval gunfire and aviation support as is possible, quickly, safely, in comparatively great numbers, and in sufficiently good condition to fight effectively, is most important to the success of the landing. Much experimenting has been done with surf-boats, sleds, etc., but most of this experimentation has been done with large boats powered by heavy inboard motors which seem to neutralize their power by their own great weight.

Let us lay down the specifications for a small landing boat and attempt to meet as many of these conditions as possible. The boat should carry at least a tactical unit. It should afford great speed, maneuverability, and seaworthiness (in surf at least). It should provide some type of protection for the personnel (either through speed, small size, armor, or great fire-power). It should be capable of easy and compact stowage. It should be capable of quick and easy loading as well as providing for easy disembarkation. It should have as shallow draft as possible consistent with handling qualities. It should be recoverable after the landing, or at least be capable of easy salvage if partially destroyed.

Casting about for a boat which meets a sufficient number of these specifications, we can afford to regard with some seriousness the development in the last few years of hollow, shallow boxes, powered by small outboard motors, used by one man as a surf-board or aquaplane. If a small, shallow, enclosed box built of wood and canvas and powered by a two or four horsepower outboard motor will plane and attain a speed of twenty or more miles per hour carry-



ing one man, why could not one be built some sixteen feet long, six feet wide, and a foot deep, powered by a thirty-two or thirty-five horsepower outboard motor, to carry an infantry squad of eight men? Please don't be amused yet but regard some of the following statistics. A standard type speedboat with a one hundred horsepower engine and a total weight of about two thousand pounds planes at about thirty miles an hour and will attain a maximum speed of about forty miles an hour. An outboard powered sled of a total weight of 600 pounds¹ starts planing at about fifteen miles an hour, and with a sixteen horsepower motor, reaches a top speed of some forty miles an hour. The difference in proportional efficiency seems to be due to the different type of bottom and the angle of application of force against the water by the screw. The most powerful motors used in competition under the auspices of the National Outboard Association have attained speeds over seventy miles an hour.²

A boat of the above stated dimensions if its own weight without motor or personnel did not exceed one hundred and fifty pounds would have a uniform draft of less than four inches with eight men and the motor on it, allowing one hundred and seventy-five pounds per man and two hundred and fifty pounds for the motor. The draft of this size motor (thirty-five horsepower) rarely exceeds fourteen inches when planing. The above draft figure may be arrived at by simple displacement calculation. The question whether or not a boat of these specifications would actually attain enough speed to make it practicable can probably be answered only by experiment.

The opinion has been stated to the author by drivers of outboard racers that the racers are superior boats in moderately rough weather due to the fact that at the comparatively high speed attained they hurdle waves and the planing bottom keeps them from diving and swamping. For exhibition purposes, boats of this type have been driven



¹This boat carried two men, whose weight was included, and the time for the entire race mentioned indicated an average speed of forty-six m.p.h.
²These are probably sixty horsepower motors.

over ramps some four feet high, hurdling considerable distances and alighting flat and still planing.³ Again, a completely enclosed box even if broached in surf or capsized cannot sink.

The discussion brings to mind an occurrence bearing directly on the matter of getting the personnel ashore safely, which occurrence was directly responsible for the conception of this idea for landing boats. We refer to the occasion of an accident to an outboard race-boat in which the driver was thrown out of the boat by the bucking of the boat in rough water in a fast turn and the passenger was unable to gain control of the boat soon enough to prevent its going ashore suddenly. The bank of the river in which the race was being held consisted of a gravel beach some ten yards wide and a gentle grassy slope up from the beach. The boat was travelling about forty m.p.h. (C-class race) and seemed hardly to slow down until it hit the grass and came to a not too abrupt stop about sixty feet from the water's edge. The bottom of the boat, which was of wood construction with $\frac{3}{8}$ -inch planking, was not ripped off but was only badly scored by the gravel of the beach. The passenger was unhurt and when asked about the sensations experienced stated that the deceleration incident to such an abrupt stop was not uncomfortable except for the fact that he was unprepared for it and had hit his head on the cowling when the boat hit the grass. The motor, a twin cylinder, heavy duty outboard, did not heat up and freeze, as was expected by most of those present, but apparently out-raced its fuel supply and stopped itself. Upon examination it was found that no appreciable damage had been done to the motor beyond the fact that dirt had gotten into the cooling system. The shear-pin on the propeller shaft was not broken because the motor had tipped up when the guard hit the beach. What astonished everyone was that when the motor was tipped up so forcibly it did not tear out the sternboard of the boat to which it was fastened.

Let us turn to a proposed design for a boat of this type and see how it might be adapted for our purposes. (See Fig. 1.) This boat is sixteen feet long, six feet wide, and one foot deep. It is of wood construction for a reason to be mentioned later. For the purpose of this writing it is impracticable to detail the design. There would be a spray guard of light metal attached along the sides and meeting at the top, so hinged as to be capable of being thrown back by the personnel under it upon striking the beach, thus allowing them to roll off of the deck onto the beach without exposing themselves unduly to the defensive fires along the beach-line. Due to the hollow construction, the boat cannot sink. At a uniform draft of four inches, it would displace the equivalent of about two thousand pounds. (Approximately 32 cu. ft. of water.) For purposes of discussion, the diagrams should make the design sufficiently clear.

Without actual experiment it is hardly possible to predict what the hydrodynamic qualities of the boat would be,

³At Miami, Florida, in 1934, especially for a newsreel.

The opinions expressed in this article are the private ones of the author and are not to be construed as reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the service at large. All statistics quoted are from the private records of a gentleman who has asked that he not be mentioned, or from advertising publications of outboard motor manufacturers. The standard type speed-boat upon which the statistics were quoted is one of famous make and the figures are actual measurements on this particular boat, the property of the gentleman mentioned above.

but a leaf from the album of knowledge about these boats carried in the heads of those who build them will tell us some of the things it will not do, as well as giving some hints about construction. First, racers agree that metal boats are not practical because, for some unknown reason, they split open upon contact with rough water. A builder of our acquaintance has admitted, however, that the U. S. Navy, using their methods of construction, might be able to build a metal boat of such strength and lightness as to operate satisfactorily. Second, special racing motors are not practicable from the military standpoint because of their undependability. The factory product without "souping" is, nevertheless, dependable in operation, and lacks only very little of being as fast as those motors which have been specially prepared for racing. The original getting under way will present a training problem, since the balance of the boat is very important in getting it to plane originally. We feel sure that Marines can learn this as quickly as they learn anything else.

Consider now the advantages of a boat of this type if it could be proven practical. Most striking at first glance is the exceptional stowability. Boats and motors for at least ten squads or equivalent organizations could be stowed in the space required for one motor launch and its skids. The boat is designed to carry a squad in the manner shown in Figure 2. Any squad leader can be taught quickly to operate an outboard motor. The small freeboard presented to the enemy coupled with the comparatively high speed would make these boats very poor targets. On a gently sloping beach, a boat of this kind would go under much of the fire along the beach expected in landing against opposition, and allow the troops to disembark practically in the prone position by throwing back the spray guard and rolling off onto the beach. This type of boat furnishes a much steadier foundation for the BAR man to fire, due to the fact that even in fairly rough water its bounding is limited and it rides on a more even keel than a slow boat. These boats would be comparatively inexpensive to build, consequently the loss of many of them would not be a great loss. These boats could be hoisted over the side of the transport fully loaded by a light crane, thus obviating the necessity of loading troops from nets or ladders. Other small advantages will appear to the reader, but it is not intended to compare this boat with any ship's boats now used for this purpose.

The reader has already picked out many disadvantages of this type of boat, so we will attempt to face as many of them as possible. Aside from its speed and small size, it presents no protection for personnel from defensive gunfire. It would be absolutely useless under conditions of extremely rough water. Due to differences of individual motors, it would be impossible for all boats of a subwave to arrive at the beach simultaneously. Some persons who have had unfortunate experiences with outboard motors will have little confidence in the ability of any personnel to use them successfully, but military personnel have better service from all motors than a corresponding number of civilians due to their greater training and the excellent care they give to them. It would be impossible for these boats to carry armor, or any greater armament than the weapons of the embarked squad. The necessary training of

(Continued on page 63)

SELECTED FOR MAJOR GENERAL, U.S.M.C.



THE Board which selected Brigadier-General Douglas C. McDougal, U. S. Marine Corps, for promotion to the rank of Major-General, was approved by the President of the United States on July 17, 1939.

General McDougal was born April 23, 1876, in San Francisco, Calif., and is a resident of Mare Island, Calif. He was appointed a Naval Cadet May 19, 1893, and resigned June 16, 1894. On the outbreak of the Spanish-American War in April, 1898, he enlisted in the Navy, was appointed an Ensign the following month and served in the latter capacity until October, 1898, when he was honorably discharged. During the Spanish-American War he served on the USS *St. Paul* while that vessel was engaged in scouting for and locating the Spanish fleet at Santiago, Cuba, and later on the USS *Hist* and USS *Marblehead*, participating in the Cuban blockade and in an engagement with shore batteries at Manzanillo.

In October, 1898, he was appointed a Cadet, U. S. Revenue Cutter Service, and resigned in June, 1899, to prepare for his examination for appointment as a Second Lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He was appointed a Second Lieutenant March 12, 1900; was promoted First Lieutenant October 14, 1903; Captain, January 23, 1908; Major, April 26, 1917; Lieutenant Colonel (temporary), July 1, 1918; Lieutenant Colonel, June 4, 1920; Colonel, October 1, 1926, and Brigadier General, March 1, 1934.

As a lieutenant, he served in the Far East for almost four years (1900-1904), in the Philippine Islands, China and Korea. He participated in the later operations incident to the Boxer Rebellion, and commanded the Legation Guard at Seoul, Korea. From 1906 to 1909, he commanded the Marine Detachment, USS *Colorado*, and was then ordered to Headquarters Marine Corps, where he served until the early part of 1911. His principal duty while at

Marine Corps Headquarters was as instructor in rifle marksmanship, and he was captain of the first Marine Corps Rifle Team to win the National Match. He was highly commended by the Major General Commandant and the Secretary of the Navy.

He attended the Naval War College during the school year 1913-1914, but before the course was completed was detached for expeditionary service in Mexico. He participated in the occupation of Vera Cruz and in the operations incident thereto in April, 1914. In 1915 and 1916, he participated in active operations in the field in Haiti, and also served in Santo Domingo in 1916, being commended by the Major General Commandant for his services.

From August, 1917, to July, 1918, he was assigned to Headquarters Marine Corps as Inspector of Target Practice. In July, 1918, he was ordered to Quantico, Va., for duty with the 13th Regiment, and in September of that year sailed for France, as second in command. He returned to the United States in August, 1919, and from September, 1919, to January, 1921, was in charge of ordnance material at the Depot of Supplies, Philadelphia, Pa.

From April, 1921, to April, 1925, General McDougal served as Chief of the Gendarmerie d'Haiti, and was highly commended for the excellence of the Gendarmerie under his command. In recognition of his services, the President of Haiti conferred upon him the Haitian Distinguished Service Medal. Following his return from Haiti, and until February, 1929, he was in charge of the War Plans Section, Headquarters Marine Corps, and during that period (in 1928) he was captain of the American International Rifle Team which competed at Rotterdam. Also, during this period (in 1926), he was appointed Aide to the President of Haiti during the latter's visit to Washington, and received the Haitian Medal of Honor and Merit for his contribution to the success of the mission.

From March, 1929, to January, 1931, served as Director in Chief of the Guardia Nacional in Nicaragua, and for outstanding services was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal by the President of the United States, and the Medal of Distinction and Medal of Merit by the President of Nicaragua.

From May, 1931, to April, 1934, served at Marine Corps Headquarters as Director of Operations and Training, and from April, 1934, to April, 1935, as Assistant to the Major General Commandant. In May, 1935, joined the Marine Corps Base, San Diego, Calif., as Commanding General, and in September of the same year was assigned the additional duty of Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, in which capacity he served until May, 1937, when ordered to the Marine Barracks, Parris Island, S. C., at which post he has since served as Commanding General, and has acted as State Administrator of the Works Progress Administration.

In addition to the decorations already mentioned, General McDougal holds the following medals:

- Spanish War Medal
- China Campaign Medal
- Mexican Campaign Medal
- Victory Medal (World War)
- Philippines Campaign Medal
- Dominican Campaign Medal
- Haitian Campaign Medal
- 2d Nicaraguan Campaign Medal
- Marine Corps Expeditionary Medal.

CARDED


Cameroons Coast Campaign

BY 2ND LIEUT. ROBERT D. HEINL, JR., U.S.M.C.

THE seizure of the German Cameroons coast by combined British and French forces attracted little attention in the Autumn of 1914. Other more important situations held public attention: German mine-layers in the North Sea; raiders deviling British trade along the sea-lanes; and the armies at grips in France. What with the commotion at home, one had neither time nor inclination to study an operation both remote from the theatre of war and very similar in many respects to those that British forces had been pursuing during a past century of colonial expansion. Thus the Cameroons campaign escaped notice at the time and thereafter, although it won a new colony for England, suppressed a most dangerous potential base for cruisers raiding South Atlantic trade, and constituted a large single step in the relentless sequence of Germany's obliteration as an imperial power.

That military students have also neglected these operations is owing to the same causes that diverted the contemporary public: remoteness and other more pressing engagements. There were landing operations in Cameroons, yes—but we have Gallipoli to study; amphibious fighting occurred constantly among the estuaries and deltas—but that sort of thing could be found in the Sudan, Upper Burma and Mesopotamia; Cameroons could wait—some day we might get to it.

But in August, 1914, the Cameroons came under a dual, even a triple, scrutiny. Stung by Germany's first cruiser-warfare, the British Admiralty turned naturally to consider not only the suppression of such annoyances, but the imperative necessity of reducing, neutralizing or seizing their bases, among which Cameroons were of such significance and suitability that Duala, their foremost port, on the estuary of the Cameroon River, already held several German liners supposedly fitting out as auxiliary cruisers. At the same time, the British Colonial Office, moved by entirely different motives, concluded that the occupation of the Cameroons was an entirely logical step in the destruction of Germany's colonial structure and the aggrandizement of Britain's. With the Cameroons adjoining British Nigeria, the Colonial Office (whose long memory harked back to 1884, when Bismarck had snatched the whole territory from the hands of treaty-making British consuls) felt that the present opportunity was favorable to restore the former West African status. And a third entity shared the sentiments both of the Admiralty and Colonial Office: the French government was equally happy to join in the suppression of raiders and in the conquest, or reconquest, of Cameroons territory ceded Germany in 1912 as a compensation for abstention in General Lyautey's Morocco. Accordingly on 15 August, a joint conference, held under the Admiralty's roof in London, determined upon immediate operations against the Cameroons coast,



with converging columns from the adjoining Allied colonies to pacify the interior. With the latter we have no concern.

Since control of the sea was paramount, as it always must be in overseas expeditions as well as in any operation against a foreign base, the Admiralty agreed to contribute H. M. S. *Cumberland*, a cruiser armed with a six-inch main battery, whose mission was first to convoy troops to the scene, to furnish necessary gunfire-support to landing operations, and to serve as a sort of depotship for the whole force. In addition, there was H. M. S. *Dwarf*, a happily-named mite of a gunboat normally assigned to the station and armed with a Marine Detachment and two four-inch guns. Finally Nigerian district craft were added, ten in all, a collection of armed yachts, tugs and launches, suitable mainly for patrol-work in the rivers and swamps of the enemy's 200-mile coastline. Senior Naval Officer in command of the forces afloat was Captain C. M. T. Fuller, R. N., of the *Cumberland*.

The West African Frontier Force, an intercolonial native organization analogous to the Haitian Gendarmerie, was to furnish 1,700 men and ten guns from Nigeria, and 600 men from Sierra Leone, both neighboring British colonies. The French had at hand 2,000 of their inimitable Senegalese (who were later to serve beside Marines in France) supported by six guns. Altogether it was a solid little expedition, though we read little of automatic weapons in the whole campaign, and only once of a brace of airplanes. To oppose the Allies, the Germans could muster little but 2,000 native police and *askari* stiffened by some 170 white officers and non-commissioned officers. German forces afloat included an armed yacht, *Nachtigal*, so named for Dr. Nachtigal, whose judicious treaty in 1883 had thwarted England, several of the Woermann liners which had taken refuge in Duala on the outbreak of the war, and a few district craft similar to those maintained by Nigeria.

So much, then, for the forces involved. Let us examine the theatre. Cameroons coast consists of an equatorial overgrown stretch of low-lying swamp and jungle, whose principal dangers, when not animal or human, are the Yellow Jack and blackwater fever. To drain this coastline and to penetrate the interior are numerous rivers with deltas and estuaries to correspond. Virtually all are at least semi-navigable, and the deltas lend themselves very well to the operations of small craft in close cooperation with columns ashore, a situation similar in some respects to that which obtained in the east coast of Nicaragua during the Occupation. Three principal ports dominate the strategic situation, Victoria, Duala, and Kribi. Of these, Duala is the foremost, located some twenty miles within the gaping mouth of the Cameroon River, a commercial centre readily defensible from sea or land. Not far up the coast lies Victoria, much less developed in 1914, a port whose main purpose was to serve Buea, the inland foothill city where German colonial administration centered. Perhaps sixty miles south of Duala is Kribi, least important of the three, but nevertheless a nerve-end in district government and readily exposed to the sea. Fernando Po, the offshore Spanish island which dominates the mouth of the Cameroon River, completes the picture. Here, in the last of August, 1914, went Captain Fuller in *Cumberland* to reconnoitre the coastal situation and to examine the island as a potential base.


As a result of his initial reconnaissance, Captain Fuller determined that there appeared no outstanding obstacles to continuation of the expedition's plans, and that although Duala was evidently on the *qui vive* against an Allied descent, no unanticipated factors had yet made themselves evident. Thus a formal decision was reached, in conference with Brigadier General C. M. Dobell, the experienced commander of the joint land forces, to move first against Duala, Victoria, and Buea, the three being located in a kind of strategic triangle, two angles of which were accessible to direct naval pressure, and the third to that of an amphibious penetration. Not only the Woermann liners in Duala and its powerful radio-station as well, but the pressing need of a sheltered harbor during the approaching

tornado season, determined Duala as an immediate objective.

In a movement very similar to Admiral Dewey's preliminary exploration of Subig Bay prior to the advance on Manila, Fuller and Dobell first reconnoitered Ambas Bay on whose shores was Victoria. Given the proper base-facilities here, the problem of a lee shore and an advanced base was solved. But despite the ease with which Marines were landed without opposition at Victoria, the port failed to suit the military exigencies of a protracted land-operation against Duala, because it was reported that any amount of rain would make it impossible to march against Duala through the bottom-lands between the two towns. Could they then move directly against Duala? They could, and why this had not been the original decision is hard to determine. To be sure the occupation of a neighboring advanced base would have been the height of orthodoxy, but somewhat superfluous, in view of the ease with which, on 9 September, the naval forces, soon to include a new reinforcement, *H. M. S. Challenger*, a cruiser of lighter draft which could move well up river, steamed inside Suellaba Point after some mine-sweeping and a preliminary bombardment to search out concealed enemy installations in the mouth of Cameroon River. *Dwarf* led the squadron, put to flight a small patrol-steamer, and determined that although a sunken barrage of wrecks blocked the river below Duala, there existed a passage through which German light craft were easily able to move in and out.

If you consider the broad reach of the Cameroon River as the palm of an open hand, there are five fingers from north to south, the Bimbia River, the Mungo River, the Duala River, the Lungasi River, and Kwakwa Creek which communicates with the next important river to the south, Sanaga. Duala is on the right southern bank of the Duala River and something less than ten miles from the Lungasi along a rail-line of the Midland Railroad which crosses the Lungasi upstream at the village of Yapoma, a sort of military backdoor to Duala, as General Dobell instantly recognized. Move up the Lungasi, land at the rail-crossing and advance directly upon Duala via its main line of retreat while the naval forces hold it in front. The problem is solved.

Meanwhile as the staff worked out the Army's share in the business, Captain Fuller lost no time in harassing the enemy and in scouting out their dispositions both directly in the Duala River and in the lower Lungasi. In each area, *Dwarf* conducted minesweeping runs, and brought fire against any target of opportunity, sometimes a launch and barge in tow, sometimes a shore battery, although one of the latter gave her a bad time just below the sunken barrage in the Duala River. Steam-launches from the cruisers were also active, chuffing up the back-channels, landing minute parties to assault equally minute defensive installations, whose main importance usually lay in the possession of telephone-equipment which was always at a premium in the Cameroons. It was an exciting phase of operations for the light craft, as the British official history observes: ". . . the creeks were tortuous and narrow, and at any moment the boats could be sniped out of the dense mangrove-swamps that fringed them, and sometimes they discovered an armed vessel."



Throughout, the *Dwarf* played a leading role, for its four-inch battery and Marines made it the equal of an expeditionary force self-contained, while its light draft allowed it to pass the barrage and nose in and out of backwaters which the Germans would much have preferred to be undisturbed. In two attempts to destroy the *Dwarf*, they made use of spar-torpedoes almost exactly reminiscent of Cushing's, which destroyed the C. S. S. *Albemarle* during the Civil War. Neither attempt succeeded because its perpetrators lacked the nerve and steadiness of Cushing. In a third and last desperate try, the *Nachtigal*, already outgunned, steamed downstream in the night of 16 September and rammed the *Dwarf*, which, though fairly hit, was able to keep afloat and sink her assailant by gunfire.

On 23 September, the British convoy of troops arrived, just upon completion of the deepening of the passage through the barrage so that *Challenger* could move upstream to bring Duala under her guns. To prevent any escape or the removal of valuable matériel by rail, the bulk of the troops were to attack via the Lungasi and the Midland Railroad, as previously planned, while *Challenger*'s guns dominated the Northern Railroad, another line which ran directly north out of Duala and across the river.

Between the all-important railroad bridge at Yapoma and its mouth, the Lungasi River bends in a wide arc, whose chord would stretch from Yapoma to the village of Mbenga on the same bank, but near the mouth. Further up in the arc itself is Pitti, another village, and strongly held not only by a boom of logs but by a well-intrenched position and troops. Thus a further refinement of the scheme: land an overland striking force at Mbenga to move directly across the chord to Yapoma while a joint operation proceeds against Pitti to clear the river. Two companies landed in the early morning of 26 September without opposition at Mbenga, and a third proceeded towards Pitti in an armed tug. But the operation soon bogged down in the face of impossible swamps back of Mbenga and a stout resistance at Pitti, which, although finally beat down, simply simmered into a retirement into the jungle by the Germans and a further delay too much for the Allied force in hand.

On its face the initial attack was a failure. General Dobell decided to try again, this time in a direct thrust from Yoss Point, on the same shore of the same river as Duala and but two miles downstream. But as his preparations to renew operations progressed on the morning of 27 September, Duala surrendered. The threat at their rear had been too much and the German weakness much greater than appeared. Taking advantage only of the night to evacuate as much railroad equipment as possible, and the early morning to destroy their prized radio-station, the German authorities struck their colors and surrendered the town and over thirty thousand tons of merchant shipping which lay at its dock. Marines from Captain Fuller's ships were speedily ashore, and the situation well in hand.

German retreat was along three divergent lines, from North to South as follows: (1) Up the Northern Railroad to the town of Mujuka some thirty miles north; (2) directly up the Duala River to the next important town, Ybassi; (3) down the Midland Railroad to Edea, on the south bank of the Sanaga River, which, it may be remem-

bered, is the next important stream below the Cameroon estuary with which it communicates by the Kwakwa Creek. But the Allies held Duala with its desirable base-facilities, and with its fall the first phase comes to a conclusion. Having reduced the foremost maritime stronghold of the Germans, the Admiralty was more than anxious to have its cruisers back, particularly *Cumberland*, in view of the surface-raiding situation, which was little improved. But the whole structure of the campaign inland, by which land forces of the neighboring colonies were to invade Cameroons, had collapsed in a series of devastating repulses, dictating, in the words of the official history, "a steady push inwards from the sea on the natural lines of communication" (i.e., the rivers). With a further conclusion which will some day achieve the dignity of axiom, the history summarizes: "In combined operations of this nature ships of force had always been found necessary, not for their own intrinsic fighting power, but because the support of the officers, crews, guns (*Cumberland* had dismounted and lent one six-inch to the forces ashore), boats and stores was indispensable to give effective weight and movement to the land forces." *Cumberland* would remain on the station.

It was well that the Admiralty decided to spare their cruisers, for as the fighting continued in a hard thrust overland along the Midland Railroad in another attempt to clear the Lungasi and capture the bridge at Yapoma, the French troops ashore found it impossible to proceed without the aid of water-borne support in the form of the Navy's landing-guns, launches and Marine detachments. But 6 October saw the problem solved when with this reinforcement the Senegalese stormed the bridge and established a bridgehead on the opposite bank. A gunboat expedition above Duala against Ybassi was forced to turn tail in a blast of unexpected fire, but on 12 October, landings were effected on both sides of the river near the town, which fell on 14 October.

Trace the Midland Railroad southward below Ypoma. Its next main station is the town of Edea, located on the Sanaga River. Here at another junction of rail-line and river the Germans had checked their retreat from Duala. Thus Edea was the next stronghold in the southerly area which claimed attention. But like Duala—and like almost any coastal town situated at the intersection of the railroad and a navigable stream—it was vulnerable to the same scheme of attack: approach the town directly with naval or amphibious forces while another column or columns come in by the back door of an adjacent stream and take the enemy in flank or rear. In the case of Edea, the adjacent stream is the next south of the Sanaga, the Nyong River, which, at Dehane, swings in a bight northward towards Edea. This time three columns would converge upon the objective, one moving exclusively by land along the rail-line from Yapoma (Senegalese entirely), a second directly up the Sanaga in British light craft and gunboats which would make the frontal attack, and a third (transports and a thousand French) from the Yong River and Dehane, twenty miles south of Edea. A sort of footnote to the second, or Sanaga River column, provided that about half its lighter draft vessels and 150 troops would move from Duala via the convenient corridor of Kwakwa Creek, which the British did not then realize to be held in force

at its southern entrance to the Sanaga.

October 20 saw the columns underway. Henderson's "March divided and fight concentrated" might have been their motto, and it was to their credit that they followed it so well. In spite of a surprising and definite repulse at the southern entrance of Kwakwa Creek, a second attempt found the defenders already flown, and escorted by its flotilla, the column began its march up the Sanaga. On the 22nd, Dehane was in the hands of the French, and matters were progressing like clockwork as the Senegalese moved south down the Midland, repairing the line as they went and doubtless thankful, if they thought of such things, that so accomplished a demolition-engineer as Sherman was not in their front. To their surprise and to that of the naval, or Sanaga column, Edea was already in Allied hands when they arrived. The Nyong River troops from Dehane were in full possession and the German garrison, unable to cope with overwhelming numbers and the concentration of naval artillery, had retreated far inland to Yaunde, at last out of range of the Navy. With the French in calm possession, the Sanaga Marines were at length without a situation in hand, well or otherwise.

Meanwhile a disconnected and unrelated series of minor operations had contributed somewhat to the Allied mastery of the coastline. In the middle of October, the French Navy's only representative, *Bruix*, armored cruiser, and *Surprise*, gunboat, were far south, bombarding Kribi and another minor port, Kampo, to the great annoyance of their occupants but without effect except to deny these harbors to any raiders which might be in the area. Even earlier, in late September, *Surprise* had popped unexpectedly into Okoko, Cameroons' most southern port, to discover two armed patrol-vessels and the incipiency of a base for raiding. With a dash almost equal to that of the unforgettable *Dwarf*, she sank both, destroyed such facilities as existed, and seized the usual telephone-equipment. In similar, but much less distinguished operations, the *Ivy*, Nigerian patrol-vessel, was ranging up and down the coast, likewise suppressing outbreaks of hostility and acquiring a hold-full of telephones.

Although the Germans might retreat before much superior force, they displayed elasticity in recovery, and the only certain way of assuring safety in an area was to rid it completely of enemy units. Witness the case of Ybassi, up the Duala River, which had fallen so easily on 14 October, and was now held by a small garrison. By the end of October, German troops were in position on both sides of the river below the town, and a virtual state of siege was in effect. On 3 November it became necessary to send a relieving column upstream, and on the 9th, the post was evacuated, partially because of the difficulty of seasonal river-conditions.

Of the original project for the occupation of the coast, but one major object remained unattained, largely through the press of other operations. This was the occupation of Buea, the highland administrative centre northwest of Duala. On 10 November, a plan very similar to that used against Edea was again set in operation, but with the modifications necessitated by the terrain. This time, the Mungo River, one of the five "fingers" spreading from the Cameroon River estuary, was to provide the water-route of approach. Three columns in all would participate (Brit-

ish this time, totaling about 2,000 men and 16 guns), aided by a naval feint in the form of a simulated major landing-operation at the port of Victoria. The main column was to advance from Tiko, in the Cameroon delta, twelve miles overland to Buea; the second column would proceed up the Northern Railroad to the town of Susa, near the Mungo River, which there curves sharply west, march to the Mungo and join a gunboat-flotilla for a joint march to Mpundu, the railhead of a light railroad whose line ran down within a mile or so of Buea; the last, with the mission of cutting the German line of retreat, would also move out from Susa on the Northern Railroad, but would move up the line to Mujuka, a town of some importance about fifty miles inland of Buea, where the troops would have the double advantage of being squarely across the path of enemy forces escaping from Buea, and of possession of the rail-line for a considerable distance up-country. Altogether it was a complex operation made possible only by the sheer inability of the out-numbered German forces to be everywhere at once.

Enter the *Dwarf*. Her role was to escort transports and on 12-13 November to provide support for the Navy-Marine Corps demonstration at Victoria. After giving the defenders ashore ample opportunity to surmise a major landing in progress, all ships began a preparatory bombardment of Victoria and the suburb Bota, also on the bay. On the 13th, the landing was carried out in face of an elaborate system of entrenchments which, if held by anything like an adequate force, would have given the Marines hot work. As it was, however, they got ashore almost unopposed and were shortly in possession of both towns and the terminus of the light railroad, whose inland end was also by this moment in the hands of the second or Mpundu-Mungo River column. The third column was near its objective on 14 November, and on the next day it had reached Mujuka. For the main column, moving overland, there was little to do but to march. Hostile forces provided some resistance, but scarcely more than was necessary to occupy the advance guard which pressed resolutely forward and drove the enemy through the jungle in confusion.

Thus Buea fell on 15 November. Little remained of the coastal campaign but mopping up and consolidation. The French, moving always southward along the coast, desired to take the next town below Edea, confusingly named Ebea, but after a considerable reconnaissance which gave away most of their plans, they abandoned the project, to the evident disgust of the British official historian, who comments acidly: "This was not our way of conducting coastal operations; our best masters of the art had always set surprise higher than reconnaissance." With this failure, the French had to get what they could, and thus occupied the port of Kribi, so the southward advance was not an unqualified failure. In the north, the British brought their share of the operations to a successful completion by moving up the Northern Railroad to its inland railhead, Nkongsamba, where they captured much matériel, including two aircraft, perhaps the progenitors of an aerial tradition which persists in Duala to this day and whose main support is a 'plane almost as venerable as these.

With the Cameroons coast completely in Allied hands, the campaign ceased to be amphibious, nor was it further

(Continued on page 61)

Retreat From Glory

A Personal Experience of The Spanish Civil War

BY CAPTAIN VINCENT USERA,
Late of The International Brigades

As Told To
LIEUTENANT HORACE S. MAZEL, U.S.M.C.R.

THE news of the capture of Teruel burst on us as a complete surprise, and sent Loyalist Spain into a frenzy of jubilation. Everywhere huge posters were displayed announcing the victory. We foreigners were especially elated because we knew that Teruel had been captured without the aid of the International Brigades who were still in reserve. At last, I thought, the Spanish Army has become trained to a point where it is capable of making an attack as well planned and executed as was Teruel without using the veteran Internationals for a spearhead. This turn of events convinced me that victory was not very remote.

Men and officers of the Tarazona training camp were chafing at the bit, anxious to get up to the front and be in at the finish, but we were told that the Brigade was full strength and did not need any replacements yet. It was not until several weeks had passed that news began drifting back that the Brigade had been in action and suffered casualties which a friend informed me were heavy.

One bitterly cold night an orderly called me to the Major's room. I saluted and sat down at Johnson's invitation.

"Vincent, I have a great deal of confidence in you," he began. "I'm sending you up in command of this next batch. Everyone is going."

"Everyone?" I repeated.

"Yes, I must send up every available man. I wanted to go myself but Albacete refused to hear of it."

This was a great news to me inasmuch as it signified that full responsibility and confidence were reposed in me. Since we were to leave within a few days I hastened to put my things in order. One afternoon the orders arrived and the 800 men who were moving up marched into the church where Johnson addressed them.

"You men are going to the front to try out in practice what you have learned here. I send you up with the complete assurance that you are the best trained unit ever to leave this training base. You have officers trained carefully by myself, and there is no reason why you should not be a powerful instrument capable of dealing a tremendous blow at the Fascist armies. You will be in command of a man who, like myself, is a professional soldier, a man in whom I have every confidence. He will be promoted shortly, and I expect to see him in positions of importance in the very near future. You all know him: Lieutenant Usera."

My adjutant was a charming, handsome young Irishman named O'Sullivan, who had already been seriously wounded at Brunete. The 800 men were to be divided

into seven companies. Even the majority of the repatriates, the men who were physically fit, were sent with me. I was given also twenty-odd prisoners, some of whom were being sent up with special recommendations that they "disappear."

We marched from the church to the trucks in an orderly manner. I was very proud of my command, many of whom I had come to know intimately. I felt that these fellows represented by far the best-trained troops I had seen in Spain, and it was the largest unit I had ever commanded. I hoped intensely that these men would be allowed to stay together and fight together, instead of being split up by nationalities as had all previous units sent to the front. But it was not to be.

In Albacete we were immediately ordered aboard freight cars waiting in the yards. A German staff officer approached me and, taking me aside, whispered, "Your destination is Alcaniz; the brigade is there."

The train started with a jerk. The men were singing and joking in very high spirits. Soon we approached Valencia where every care was exercised to avoid airplane observation. Men were cautioned not to make too much noise going by stations, and to keep their arms and heads inside to prevent spotting by unfriendly airmen, or ground observers. Valencians told us that the town had been bombed half an hour previously. At Raus farther on it was the same story again; we had just missed being the target for airplanes once more.

Aside from the acute physical discomfort and cold, the journey was otherwise uneventful, and we reached Alcaniz three days after leaving Albacete. The Aragon winter numbed us. We were met by Major Galiani, a bearded Italian attached to the 15th Brigade staff. He had recently returned from a propaganda trip around the United States, and was always dressed in the height of military elegance. "I am glad to see you, Usera," he said in his excellent English, "And you too, Parker," he added to my political commissar. "The Brigade is at Aliaga and I have been instructed to take these men to Alcorisa where everything is ready for them."

"How far is Alcorisa?" I asked.

"Thirty-six kilometers!"

"But we can't possibly march men thirty-six kilometers in a day," I protested.

"You can stop tonight at Castelserrras, and tomorrow I'll send you trucks. How is that?"

"That's much better!"

We commenced the march immediately. The Battalion marching with intervals of one hundred yards between

each section and the one following, guarded against air attack. Three or four times during the trip the airplane alarm was sounded, but we were never attacked despite excellent visibility overhead. The men were splendid. At first whistle they broke to both sides of the road and lay down in the scrub grass where it would have been very difficult to observe them except from directly above.

We arrived in Castelserras as night fell, to find our kitchen crew, which had been sent on ahead, in a violent argument with a German captain. Neither one understood the other. It seemed that the German would not lend us the cooking utensils he had stored away, without which we could not cook our supper. We finally came to terms, simply by offering to cook for his men too, and all hands were fed and bivouaced for the night.

The trucks appeared the next evening and we piled aboard in the biting cold. An hour's drive brought us to Alcorisa where we settled down. At the officers' mess Galiani explained the recent operations of the Brigade.

The 15th Brigade was part of the Army of Maneuver of the East, and was being used to attack, then was pulled out of the line and sent to attack at another place perhaps fifty kilometers distant. At Teruel, he explained, the 35th Division of which our brigade was a part, had been thrown into the breach to halt the violent Rebel counter-attack which was sweeping everything before it. The brigade had held tenaciously, despite the most terrific artillery bombardment our forces had suffered to date. The new Rebel artillery was superb, and everyone seemed certain

that they were manned by German crews. Their accuracy was diabolical.

To the right of the 15th, two brigades of raw Spanish troops had broken, leaving the field strewn with brand new Czech rifles and machine guns. Cavalry had broken through the gap left by these brigades and attacked the Mackenzie-Papineaus on their right flank, nearly capturing the battalion staff. Finally it became imperative to retire from these untenable positions, and the brigade had been relieved. Followed a night attack at Aliaga, which had been highly successful for our brigade, especially the Mackenzie-Papineaus which surprised the Rebels and captured a great number asleep.

The Brigade, we were told, was now in rest a short distance behind the lines.

After a few days of comparative inactivity in Alcorisa, we were visited by Colonel Copic who was starting on a well-earned leave. In a two-hour conference he told us in the usual pedantic style of all Russian officers, all the operations in which the brigade had been engaged, in detail. At its conclusion, Galiani called me aside and said, "I am sending you up with most of the officers and all but 300 men!"

Again we piled into trucks and headed for the Brigade, only to find when we arrived near Aliaga that the road was under fire and impossible. A staff officer of the brigade informed us that the brigade was in Puebla de Valverde some ten kilometers away, so that we turned immediately and headed for that town.

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At once I reported to Brigade Headquarters. Major Merriman, the chief of staff, divided the men up into their national groups, English, Canadian, American and Spanish, and sent them to their respective battalions, hidden in the gullies. I was presented to our brigade commander pro tem, a Russian named Nicolaef who could not speak a word of English. He and Merriman talked at some length, then Merriman turned to me.

"Well, Vince," he announced, "You're promoted to captain! And for the time being you will be attached to the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion. You will find an abnormal condition there: it is without doubt the best battalion in the brigade, but the relations between the Spaniards and the Internationals in the brigade itself have been bad; and in the Mac-Pap those relations are the worst of the brigades. A complete section of the Spaniards passed over to the Rebels with all their officers about a week ago. We know how much the Spaniards like and respect you, and we expect you to better these relations."

That these relations were bad I had known for a long time. Most of the Spaniards sent to us in the last few months had been conscripts who looked on us with awe and fear—and sometimes with actual dislike. The majority were not Communists and felt some misgivings about being forced to serve with officers who did not speak their language and who did not understand their national characteristics.

Under Spanish officers, whom they respected and liked, these men were capable of exalted heroism. But under weak and misunderstanding leadership they were the reverse. The Spanish commanders in the brigade at present were not of the type calculated to obtain the best results, and therefore the Internationals often accused them of being cowardly or, at best, half-hearted in their efforts. This naturally led to bad blood, and it had to be corrected because the International Brigades at that time were fighting against enemies in the Government who would gladly have seen the last of the International Brigades.

I reported to the commander of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, who temporarily put me in command of the new company formed in its majority by the new arrivals from Tarazona. In the meantime the other officers who had come up with me, whose commissions had not yet been ratified, were put into the different battalions *as sergeants!* To say that I was shocked by this stupidity is bald understatement. Nearly all of these men were veterans who had been sent back from the front after meritorious service and painstakingly trained by Major Johnson and myself. They were, as a rule, far superior to those who held rank in the brigade at the moment. And now here they were being treated like unnecessary appendages!

I complained of this treatment to Major Merriman, and to the chief of the GPU, a bearded, young Russian-American. I especially protested about the two Spanish officers who had accompanied me: Perky Garcia and Valdes, two splendid veterans who had been offered captaincies in a Spanish brigade but who had refused, to remain with us. After my protest something was done to alleviate this blow to morale.

The battalion commander, a Britisher named Cecil-Smith, liked to talk things over with me. He spoke feelingly about the stupidity and ineptness of the brigade staff and other battalions in the brigade. "Why haven't you

brought up Canadian officers, for instance, Vince? Why must I have American officers always in command of companies in a Canadian battalion?" he asked.

"We tried to develop them—but these Canucks are so terribly 'rank and file'. They don't want responsibility. Many refused to go to the officers' school, you know."

"All I know," he rejoined, "Is that the Canadians, including myself, are beginning to resent the fact that everything seems to be run by Jews. We had the same thing happen in Canada, and as a result the Communist Party there did not gain any real membership until the Jews who had disproportionate representation, were ousted from positions of power. It's not a matter of chauvinism; it's just a matter of plain proportionate representation! Canada has sent more men to the International Brigades in proportion to its population than any other country in the world. We are admittedly the best battalion in the brigade, and whenever there's a dirty job to be done, they always assign us to do it. Yet look at the number of Canadian officers there are!"

For the time being the front seemed quiet. With the exception of the men who had come up with me, officers and soldiers of the brigade were exhausted. Haggard, bearded faces showed plainly the strain these men had been under for weeks. Everyone spoke feebly of rest.

From our position in the reserve lines we could hear the far-away booming of artillery and occasional bursts of machine-gun fire and rifle shooting. Once or twice the enemy aircraft sent us scurrying for cover into our trenches, but they did little damage.

Finally we were ordered into the inevitable trucks again; no one seemed to know if we were headed for the front or for a rest. We passed through Alcorisa. Overhead there was a big black bomber circling and circling. Fearing an attack, we quit the trucks and hit the open fields more than once, but each time we merely continued to circle and observe.

The townspeople were in terror; they had been badly bombed the previous week. I saw, on the road between Alcorisa and Hijar, one of our trucks which, loaded with ammunition, had overturned and seriously injured three of its occupants. The driver had been terrorized by the circling plane. His nerves were plainly very badly shattered, because he shook like a leaf on a twig. I did not know it at the time, but the plane was evidently photographing the valley preparatory to the avalanche of troops which poured into the terrific attack to develop within a few days.

We looked in vain for our "gloriosa" aviation. The pilots were probably back of the lines swilling champagne as usual. The second day of our "rest" period found great activity in the air. Rebel bombers and fighters filled the sky, every hour or so, and from our position we could plainly hear furious bombing and strafing. For two weeks we had not seen a single Loyalist plane; the air undisputedly belonged to the Rebels, a circumstance singularly bad on morale. Our "Glorious aviation" came in for endless acrid and profane consideration from men and officers alike. "Those Bums get all the glory and do nothing!" growled one irate soldier, after being forced to duck for cover for the twentieth time that day.

The planes had begun to work on our nerves all right, and it did not help any when twenty of them swept sud-

denly over our hiding place, their machine guns crackling in the dry Spanish air as they dove down on us. The telephone rang. It was Brigade.

"Was that bombing and strafing near you?" asked Merriam on the wire.

"Part of it was," Cecil-Smith answered, "But there seems to be tremendous activity in front of us where the 95th Brigade is. I can't make out what is happening. Have you any information?"

There followed a long conversation which I could not hear. During this time a steady flow of camions rumbled back from the front at breakneck speed, empty. We saw nothing unusual in this until groups of haggard, tired men began to filter through our lines, some without arms.

Smith hung up and started to talk to me. Then he saw these stragglers. "What the hell is going on here? Go and find out what it's all about, Vincent!"

I stopped a sergeant coming down the road. "What brigade are you from?"

"The 95th Brigade," he said.

"What are you doing coming back here?"

"The Fascists have broken through!" he said. "Our officers have disappeared, and I decided to go back and report."

Smith jumped up. "Stop everybody coming down the road and shoot every officer who is leaving the front! Those are orders from Brigade!" He grabbed me. "Vincent! Send part of your company down the road to stop every truck coming this way. Send the other part of your company to our right flank with orders to stop any troops trying to cut back cross-country. As soon as you have arranged this, come back—I want to see you!"

When I returned Cecil-Smith with all the battalion officers were gathered in a semi-circle. Communications men were busy pulling in the wires as a preliminary to moving. In whispered tones Smith said to me, "Here's the dope." I could sense the anxiety underlying his outward calm. "The whole goddamned front has folded up like a house of cards! The officers of the 143rd have left their command and the brigade is retreating. Part of the 95th is still holding the line near Azuara. We are to reinforce them immediately. You will issue out 200 rounds of ammo to each rifleman, and five bombs apiece. Your company will be advance guard. As soon as you reach Azuara find a good defensive position and wait for the remainder of the battalion. Get there as quickly as possible. Let's go!"

I immediately grasped the gravity of the situation. I knew Cecil-Smith. He never exaggerated. In fifteen minutes my men were loaded into trucks and were roaring down the road to Azuara, all lights dimmed.

Streaming back from Azuara were peasants in carts, on muleback and afoot, meager household belongings in tow. It was a tragic and alarming sight. I kept stopping soldiers and forcing them to go back. They were tired, puzzled and frightened, and on command they turned docilely back towards the front as though too exhausted to care what became of them.

There was a sense of semi-exaltation amongst us in the trucks. We were anxious to get into action, and to prove again that the 15th International Brigade could stop anything. In the ghostly stillness of the night we arrived on

the outskirts of Azuara and quickly established defensive positions. The town itself was a ghost town, completely deserted; not even the bark of a stray dog greeted us. A few minutes later Cecil-Smith arrived in a car. I stepped over and saluted.

"How do you like my bally car, Vince?" he queried. "I just got it off one of the battalion commanders of the 143rd. He won't need it any more."

"Swell," I said, climbing in. "The Division Headquarters of this lousy outfit is across the bridge in those caves. Let's go and see them before they barge off."

We drove up to the headquarters which was in a huge cave in the side of a mountain. Men were busily engaged in loading trucks preparatory to moving. We strode in. Inside, the cave had been fixed up with even a bed, victrola, plates, stove and other unheard-of luxuries.

"Wonder if he brought his wife, too," muttered Smitty as we walked toward the Colonel commanding the division. I saluted.

"We are part of the 15th Brigade sent here to reinforce your troops," I announced. "Where can we find them?"

The Colonel called for a map, spread out in front of him by an obsequious officer. "They are on these heights," he said, pointing vaguely with a pencil.

"But this is a valley," I protested rapidly.

"Well, it's near here, anyway," was his answer. I realized the man could not read a map and glanced at Smitty.

"How far from here are they?" asked Smith.

"About four kilometers."

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"Just what is the situation at present?" queried Smith in a desperate attempt to indoctrinate us.

"Well, there are two battalions of the 95th, and one battalion of the 143rd up ahead. Two battalions have been surrounded and captured."

"What's over here to the right?" I inquired.

"I don't know."

"And to our left?" I prodded.

"Well, about thirty kilometers away there is the 14th Army Corps."

"And no troops in between?" demanded Smith.

"No."

"Jesus!" we both murmured.

We saluted and strode out silently. Immediately we pulled our troops toward the road and, with my company as advance guard, started toward the nebulous lines. It was cold and uncomfortably quiet. The 24th Spanish Battalion had caught up with us and attached itself to our rear. About a kilometer in front of the town we found the trenches of the 95th. A motorcycle despatch rider dashed up with a message for Cecil-Smith to report immediately to Brigade. I saw our anti-tank guns turning around.

"Where are you going?" I asked one of the gunners.

"We've got orders to report back to the Brigade."

"What the hell are we going to do for artillery?"

The man shrugged. Smith left in his car and his second in command, a young Finnish captain named Makela, ordered the battalion into a nearby ravine. Everyone laid down for a rest and soon most of us were asleep.

At about three o'clock in the morning Smith returned and called the officers together. "As usual, the brave Mac-Paps are about to get the dirty end of the stick," he remarked sarcastically. "We are to remain here and help hold the town, while the rest of the brigade assembles at Belchite. We have no artillery, and about six shovels for the whole battalion. With three hours to dig in, the prospects look very sweet! We'll have to get to work immediately and do whatever we can because at seven those birds will dump everything they've got on us. Don't let us kid ourselves!"

We quickly took positions to the left of the 95th, on the heights 800 meters in front of the town. On these heights stood a deserted monastery with a winding path leading to it, where for centuries Spanish penitents walked barefoot up the jagged steps lined with huge crosses. I placed my company some hundred yards to the left of the monastery and established a line curving in a semicircle to the rear. The men started to dig frantically with helmets, knives, spoons and anything else that would move earth to form a shallow protection against the inevitable flying steel which we knew would be hurled at us within a few hours. I tried desperately to find picks and shovels, and swore in a most thorough manner at the incompetence which deprived us of these vital tools at such an hour.

Dawn found us still digging desperately and expecting the attack to begin at any moment.

It was not long in coming. At nine o'clock the dull thud of an artillery piece cut the silence. Over our heads appeared a blackish puff of smoke; a marker to get the range. Three more pieces crashed to our front, and three shells screamed over our heads. Light rifle and machine-gun fire began to our front. Shots crackled from our own line at

Rebels who could be seen now advancing toward us. The enemy artillery fire increased in volume, and shells were beginning to hit the crest, preceded always by that ominous swish heralding the explosion. Their fire was very accurate. I crouched in my shallow trench.

S-s-swish—boom! A shell landed about twenty feet away from my fox-hole, and covered me with dirt. This was followed immediately by three more. The angry whine of bullets overhead increased like hundreds of avenging bees zipping on their way rearward.

A runner reached me, breathless. "The observer reports they are trying to flank us on the left!"

I screamed in his ear. "Go below and tell the third section to deploy immediately on those knolls to our left—quick!" He ran off. I was alarmed. If they succeeded in outflanking us, we would be surrounded and cut off from our only avenue of retreat, the single bridgehead over the river.

Suddenly a whole wing of planes appeared. The guns of the enemy pointed out our positions with puffs of black smoke which hovered over us, and the planes began their deadly work. I buried my face in the ground as bombs began exploding all around us. The earth jumped each time a bomb burst, and the air was full of zinging steel fragments and great clods of dirt. Then the planes broke their formation, went into a Lufbury Circle and strafed our line with their machine guns blazing. Down each ship would come, lower and lower in its deadly approach, hurling steel bullets at us as we lay unprotected from their merciless attack. They made three circles over our heads; as the planes of each circle began their dives all machine-guns opened up on us. Round and round they went, plane after plane. The bullets kicked up little spurts of dirt as they sprayed our positions.

After a half hour of this violent strafing, during which the ships came so low we could see the pilots' faces, they reformed in V's and I sighed in relief, believing them about to shove off. Instead, they circled and again passed over our positions, spewing hundreds of small ten-pound bombs over us. The place was an inferno—the ground seemed to leap up into the air.

I clenched my fists so tightly that my shoulders ached; my face buried itself in the ground time after time and I prayed that my steel helmet would be some help. Actually I expected to feel the tearing steel through my body any minute. Each explosion left me wondering that I was not yet touched. I wondered dully if anyone would survive this horrible bombardment and then slow anger welled within me at the incompetence which left us without artillery or anti-aircraft support to face overwhelming odds.

Rifle and machine-gun fire from both sides had practically ceased during this sky bombardment, but as the planes circled again to leave us, it broke out with renewed fury. I saw the Rebel lines leap up in a concerted rush for our position. An orderly, running bent over towards me, dropped in his tracks like a felled ox. The Rebel assault wave faltered and broke.

Somehow, we had stopped them.

Again the artillery began its devil's tattoo on our hill. The air was alive with the zip of three inch shells and shrapnel fragments. They aimed especially at the monastery belfry from whence one of our machine-guns was

pouring an effective fire into their lines. Shells hit their mark, throwing up clouds of dust, but the machine-gun continued to chatter defiantly. I saw first-aid men dash into the building to bring out shattered remnants of what once were men.

Shells crashed all around my shallow fox-hole, and it was becoming impossible for me to observe. I ordered the command post moved fifty yards farther back. Heavy fire became evident on our left flank, and I sighed with relief when I spotted our missing 1st company sweeping into battle formation towards the endangered flank. They surged up to the crest and past our men. The Rebels broke and retreated before this onslaught.

First-aid men were streaming back to our improvised hospital, carrying wounded and dying. But there was little doubt that we were holding the Rebels off. For three hours they had poured a murderous hail of shells into our positions and their planes had bombed and strafed us, unmolested by anti-aircraft; their infantry had assaulted three times and had been unable to dislodge us from our positions. This, despite the fact that we had neither artillery nor airplane support. A wave of pride suffused me. My green men were behaving like veterans, with all the coolness and telling accuracy of crack troops. Their training certainly was showing in a crisis.

Although our losses from the bombing and strafing were miraculously negligible, its effect on our tired, sleepless troops was pronounced. Their nerves were on edge. As the snarling planes swooped low, I could hear the machine-gun in the tower firing his faithful weapon at them—rat-tat-tat-tat-tat. But such a fast-moving target was elusive. Despite bombs from above, and bullets from diving aircraft, some of us would be goaded into standing upright in the midst of the attack and brandish clenched fists at the roaring planes. Don't ask me to explain it.

The coming of the planes always produced an eerie effect. There was a startling cessation of fire on both sides, a silence broken only by muttered curses and roaring motors. It would seem as though the whole countryside were holding its breath. The planes would come near, swoop suddenly, and the air would be filled with the fury of angry engines and stuttering guns interspersed with a hellish rumble of exploding bombs. An occasional scream or moan from some unfortunate victim came to our tortured ears as we hugged our ineffectual pits.

Finally the blessed night came, bringing with it the anticipated cessation of this aerial torment and a gradual slackening of ground combat. My men were in good spirits, considering, with high morale. Many discussed the courage of the Spanish gunner in the monastery belfry who, all through the day, had kept up a devastating fire although the enemy tried to silence him with all they had. Several times we had thought him quieted when a rain of machine-gun bullets would throw up dust all around the window of the belfry, only to be heartened by the defiant chatter of his gun in retaliation.

I reported back to Cecil-Smith at battalion headquarters.

"I heard you were hit in the buttocks!" he greeted me.

"I was," I said, "But it was only a scratch from a bit of flying rock." I gingerly felt a certain tender spot.

"Sit down, then," he invited. "Listen, Vince, if we stay

here tonight, by morning we will be completely surrounded. Take the phone and explain the situation to Brigade."

I did so. "Unless we can have reinforcements before midnight, the only sensible thing we can do is get out of here and back across the river. Otherwise, neither the tanks nor the troops can help us, once the bridge is in Rebel hands!"

Brigade pondered. "We did not know the situation was so bad. In that case, do what you think is right," came my reply.

We made plans for an immediate retreat. Smith turned to the commander of the 95th. "You'd better get your men across first, and take up positions covering the river."

"I don't know what happened to my men," replied the Commandante. "The Political Commissar took them across a short while ago and I don't know where they've gone!"

"These meddling commissars!" Smith exploded in English this time. "Then that means they've barged off somewhere."

By two o'clock in the morning we had successfully crossed the river and placed all our troops on the heights of the opposite bank. Once this was accomplished, I with my orderly sought a place to sleep, which we found in a nearby cave occupied by a doddering old hermit, and in a minute we were fast asleep.

The thunder of artillery awakened me, and I dashed to the entrance to find the sun well up in the heavens. I pulled my head in hastily when machine-gun bullets peppered the entrance to the cave. This was a hell of a note! In my haste to find a place to sleep I had ignored the direc-



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tion of the cave's entrance, which faced the enemy. How could I get out? We decided we would have to make a dash for it—and we did.

I climbed to the top of the hill where I had left my men, to find that it was deserted. No one was there. Strange, I thought—where have they gone? Shrapnel bursting over my head made me scurry down the opposite slope.

I walked back to where battalion headquarters had been, falling flat every time shrapnel burst over our heads. On the road, ominously deserted, I saw abandoned rifles and knapsacks. One of the knapsacks bore the name of one of the men in my company. What was this? Here were all the evidences of a hurried retreat. Yet I could hear the unmistakable sound of machine guns replying to the Rebels from the top of the hill.

Suddenly two horsemen appeared. I waved to them and they galloped towards me. Within hailing distance, they stopped suddenly and one of them threw up his carbine. His bullet whistled past my ear. I snatched out my pistol, but my orderly was faster than I. His rifle cracked and one of the men toppled grotesquely from his mount. His companion turned and fled precipitately. We ran over to the fallen trooper who was already twitching in his death throes and I saw the emblem of the Rebels sewn on his stained shirt.

"We've got to get the hell out of here—our outfit must have retreated without warning us!"

We headed in the general direction of Belchite and the brigade. Suddenly I froze in my tracks as I sighted a group of some thirty infantrymen a short distance away. It was too late to hide; they had seen me and were coming my way. Pistol in hand I awaited my doom. Imagine my relief when I recognized them as Spaniards from our own battalion.

"Where is the battalion?" I asked the sergeant in charge.

"I don't know," he replied in Spanish. "Last night some American told us in English that we were to move to the right, and I'm not sure what he was trying to tell us. While we were moving the Fascists began to shell heavily and we lost contact with the battalion."

"They must be up on the heights there, because I can hear the machine guns," I deduced. "And if they are, our place is with them. Let's go!" We started back towards the heights, glancing sceptically at the rain of shrapnel that was sweeping the crest. The slope slowed us down. One man was brought down with a piece of shrapnel in his leg before he had covered a hundred yards. Another was killed; a group of men suddenly fell and rolled down to the roadway. The exploding shells were covering the slope; I saw it would be impossible for us to gain the top.

Picking up our wounded men we started back for Belchite. No one seemed to know the exact road to take, and it was not long before we realized we were lost. The whole valley rang with the crackle of musketry and the crash of artillery. To our left we could see planes circling and diving and the sounds of their bombs and cold-blooded strafing reached us all too plainly. There was not a minute during the whole of that long day when there were no planes in the sky. A whole day we marched, picking up stragglers as we went, until my small force swelled to nearly a hundred men.

Dawn broke before we reached Albalate, to reveal a scene of troop-choked roads which, had the Rebel planes seen us, would have brought on a massacre. Twice we scattered when we sighted aircraft upstairs, but they seemed intent on observation only and did not molest us.

We finally reached the olive groves around Albalate where we stopped and had some food while we rested. About two o'clock we saw the Brigade Commander, Leonidoff, rush over to Cecil-Smith who appeared from nowhere, and address himself excitedly to the latter through his interpreter. Smith looked around and saw me.

"Vincent! Get your men on the road quickly. Take the road through Albalate to Hijar. Just keep going. The rebels are trying to enter Albalate, and if they do we're cut off! The whole goddam division!"

We commenced the march immediately. From behind me, I heard an officer shout hysterically, "Faster! Faster! Go as fast as you can!" We scattered to allow three of our tanks to lumber through en route to the rear. A troop of cavalry swept along the road, causing confusion in our ranks as horses neighed and pawed, infected with the growing panic. A white-faced cavalryman shouted.

"The Moors are coming! They're on the heights!"

Everyone glanced apprehensively at the heights above us.

Out of the woods on our right emerged the 24th Battalion which, instead of waiting for us to pass, mingled in with our column on the narrow road. In a second everything was confusion and disorder. Men began to run. Rifles and ammunition were thrown aside. The road became a swirling mass of shouting humanity.

I tried in vain to get some order, shouting at the top of my lungs in Spanish and English that there was nothing to be afraid of and not to be such damned cowards! More of our own cavalry streamed through us, regardless of the men in their path. Soldiers were trampled, screaming for mercy as they fell.

Tears of vexation and impotent anger sprang to my eyes as I saw machine-guns, rifles, trucks and field pieces abandoned where they lay by the fear-crazed men as they fled in unthinking panic. I had never witnessed such a spectacle; it was horrible. Here was the proud 15th Brigade in wild disorder running like a herd of cattle stampeding, and not a shot had been fired.

A careening truck ran over several prostrate men, crushing them like roaches before my sickened eyes. An ambulance swung around the curve, men clinging to every available portion of it, and narrowly missed passing over the gory mess in the road.

"Stop, you fools!" I screamed. I saw another officer on the road, pistol in hand, trying to halt this mad debacle. It was useless. The men were filled only with that primitive sense of self-preservation which closed their eyes and ears to everything but the all-consuming will to reach safety.

A truck rushed past me and I saw Cecil-Smith, grim-lipped, hanging on the running board. Another ambulance passed, and I heard a familiar voice shouting, "Come on, Vincent—get on, get on!" For a moment I hesitated. Then, seeing that I could be of no use, I leaped for the running board as the car sped down the road shrilly blowing its horn.

We dashed wildly through Albalate and on the road to Hijar. All along the road we passed men jogging along in the last stages of exhaustion. As we swept past them, they would extend their arms, pleadingly, like children, begging us to take them on the already over-laden ambulance. I felt embarrassed at the pitiful working of their faces as we left them behind us and sped onward.

We reached Hijar to find the road blocked by cars trying to pick their way through the dreadful rubble and debris caused by the aerial bombardment of a few hours before. The streets were blotched with blood and strewn with horribly contorted cadavers, faces grimacing at the sky from which Death had come so suddenly. I wondered how long it would be before the Rebel planes would spot us.

The heavy boom of guns became one continuous sullen rumble to which no one paid great attention. The ambulance rolled on.

Two miles farther back from Hijar the ambulance was halted by a Spanish officer who, pistol in hand, ordered everyone out. As far as the eye could see down the road, trucks were unloading shame-faced men who scurried up to the improvised line on the right and left of the road. The unknown Spanish officer was superb in his scornful anger as he drove men back towards the growing line. I drew my pistol and helped him to reform the frightened soldiers as more and more trucks came along. A field piece off the road blazed away occasionally, firing at I don't know what.

Suddenly six Rebel planes swooped out of the sky at us. I was too tired to care. The Spaniard and myself remained on the road, defying them to do their worst, trying to control the frightened, milling men. We ordered the troops to fire at the planes as they swept over us, and volley after volley crashed out. Bullets whistled past my ears but I paid them no attention. I was in a state of exaltation brought on by extreme fatigue and disgust; I wanted savagely to see one of the planes brought down; I felt that if I could see one of them crash in flames and could jeer at the charred body of its pilot, I would not mind dying.


They left as suddenly as they had come. A staff car appeared; it was General Walters. I felt strangely comforted and encouraged by his presence. His calmness was contagious, and the contempt with which he treated the fear-crazed men filled me with admiration. "If they don't want to fight, let them go. We don't want cowards!" he said distinctly in Spanish.

A runner came up to me. "Part of the battalion is back at Hijar," he said. "They're digging in there. You are to take these men down and give them a hand there."

I collected some sixty men who were still left me from the different battalions of the brigade, and we marched toward the front, singing at the top of our lungs. What a help it was; we felt like new men. I found the shattered remnants of our brigade about a mile back of Hijar, where they were occupying a splendid defensive position.

Major Merriman greeted me warmly and said, "I'm glad to see you, Vince. Go up here on the right and get those fellows into some shape to resist an attack."

I complied with the order before exhaustion overcame me and I dropped off to sleep.



The Major General Commandant welcomes the new 2d Lieutenants into the ranks of the "Soldiers of the Sea," after graduating from the Naval Academy.

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MAJOR R. McC. PATE, U.S.M.C.

INFANTRY, since the beginning of time, has been the basic arm, and probably always will be. The French speak of Infantry as "The Queen of the Battlefield," and rightly so, for who can deny the fact that the man on the ground, capable of holding that ground, is the deciding factor with regard to that particular ground. There has never yet been devised a weapon capable of driving man from ground when the man has had an opportunity to prepare that ground, and who has the necessary will to hold that which he has, be it airplane, gun, or gas. As weapons become more horrible, amateur tacticians decide that this is the end of all war, as man can no longer face the weapons which the enemy will present. When gunpowder was first introduced into Europe it was decided that war was at an end, as no human could, or would, stand such destruction. It was not realized that there were a good many elements which entered into the employment of gunpowder besides its explosive force. There was the matter of aim of the weapon, which had not occurred to the skeptic, or should we say hopeful people. It was soon discovered that this terrible weapon was not nearly so bad as pictured and that man not only could, but would stand up to such destruction, and that the destruction was not so terrible as first imagined.

During the World War the Infantry was first subjected to the airplane, and while it was only in a small way at that time, it made no appreciable difference in the employment of the Infantry. Just what will be the case in the present war is a matter of conjecture and one which will be closely watched by all the powers. It is believed, however, that the plane will not take over the burden of the Infantry and that the Infantry will remain the basic arm.

At the outbreak of the World War the Germans were believed to have the finest military machine the world had ever seen, and possibly such was the case. Their Infantry was certainly just as good if not better than that of any other power in the world at that time, but they did not realize that the automatic weapon, i.e., the machine gun, was such a capable weapon. Their Infantry made the attack in accordance with the latest doctrine, which gave very little interval between the skirmishers. It was simple to shoot them down. The British and the French did the same and all soon learned the value of the overwhelming power of the machine gun. It did not take the powers long to learn this lesson and in a short time the number of machine guns in the Infantry units was progressively increased. The material was improved at the same time, which, of course, only increased the fire power as the weapons became more reliable. This increase in fire power by the Infantry made the opposing Infantry change its formations in the attack to compensate for the increased defensive fire

power. It will be remembered that it was not until about 1917 that the interval between skirmishers was changed from *one* pace to *five* paces in the United States.

During the World War it was soon discovered that attacking Infantry must have automatic weapons with it in order to hold that which has been gained. The solution, of course was a light weapon, as the machine gun was too heavy and required a gun crew. The answer was the automatic rifle. The adoption of the automatic rifle brought about the reorganization of the company so that the elementary unit was the half platoon, or section, which, grouped around the automatic rifle, served to protect and to exploit its fire effect.

The value of the automatic weapon was soon recognized for the defense, as they were certainly a formidable weapon when properly emplaced and protected by wire. The same situation did not, however, apply in the attack. Flat trajectory weapons had no great effect on sheltered defenders and the security of the attacking troops did not permit the firing of machine guns too close to the leading echelons. In short order it was realized that the Infantry armament was essentially defensive. As a result, an offensive doctrine was developed about 1915-16 which was expressed by one of the contestants as "The Artillery conquers and the Infantry occupies." Experience soon showed the weakness of this doctrine, as the attack, carefully and powerfully prepared, reinforced by a heavy rolling barrage, started usually brilliantly enough, but often very quickly was stopped by isolated resistance which had escaped the hammering effects of the barrage. As regular as clockwork the barrage rolled on in accordance with the time schedule and the Infantry found itself alone, faced by enemy machine guns. The enemy, one moment overwhelmed by a storm of shells, reappeared everywhere. The Artillery did not conquer, because the Infantry did not occupy. It was then necessary to bring the Artillery back to fire on the new enemy front, at a cost of considerable delay and with great difficulty.

At this point in the war it was found necessary to provide the Infantry with a means of reducing isolated sheltered resistance, impossible of accomplishment with the automatic weapons. It was then that a curved fire weapon was evolved, first the hand grenade, which was an old weapon revived, and then the V. B. rifle grenade, which was something new, with a range of almost 200 yards. The rifle grenade was soon found to lack the power required and it became necessary to develop something even more powerful. The answer to the requirement of a more powerful weapon was the Stokes Mortar, developed by the British. Here was a weapon which was easy to transport, fairly accurate, and quite powerful. Faith in the flat trajectory weapons of the Infantry still remained, however, and such weapons as the 37-mm. gun were retained for employment against automatic weapons.

The adoption of these weapons naturally reacted upon organization and the hand grenade became one of the

arms of the elementary unit, the section, and insured, with the rifle, the close defense of the automatic rifle. It was also employed in the trench warfare and in the final combat to give the necessary punch. The rifle grenade became the weapon of the platoon leader, who used it in concentrations. The mortars were joined with the 37-mm. guns and became a Regimental Accompanying Weapons Platoon, to be used by the Regimental Commander himself or parcelled out to the battalions.

The new weapons, imperfect and still in small numbers, did not suffice. The 37-mm. gun and the machine gun appeared to be relatively powerless in the attack, because they were heavy, too close to the ground, and because their fire was often blanketed by advancing infantry. It was believed that if these powerful weapons could be transported by motor and protected by armor they could destroy the enemy automatic weapons at practically point blank range. The result, the tank. The tank was not at first an Infantry weapon but was considered to be Artillery; however, it was not long before the conception of the armored Infantryman, working for the Infantry and in the ranks, became doctrine.

By 1918 the organization of the Infantry and the equipment was as outlined and remained so until the end of the war, i.e., three battalions to the regiment, three companies of four platoons, each of two sections, and a machine gun company of four platoons, four guns to the platoon, and of course the Regimental Accompanying Weapons, the 37-mm. and the Stokes Mortars.


In 1918 the nature of the operations began to change somewhat, first on the German side, and then by the French. During the offensives of March to July of that year the Germans tried to shake off the trench warfare and to utilize maneuver in the open, based on total employment of fire power and using the maximum of the advantages of terrain. The French followed the Germans in this movement and the results of these experiments by the Germans and French were closely studied after the Armistice and resulted in certain conclusions which have remained as doctrine until the present day. The conclusions reached were that Infantry action will be based upon the employment of all available fire, resulting in the adoption of the term "Base of Fire," which is a rather indefinite term, but meaning nothing more than all the fire you can produce, not only with the forward echelons in the attack, but with the weapons in reserve units. Having the "Base of Fire," the Infantry must then maneuver, taking advantage of the pockets in the terrain, soft places in the enemy defense, all in conjunction with the "Base of Fire."

The period from 1921 to 1929 was not marked by any great changes, being a period of detente. The general policy was oriented toward disarmament, the period of service with the colors being reduced and the financial situation did not permit of material expansion. During this period, however, improvements were made in the weapons, notably the automatic rifle. The automatic rifle being improved, liberated a part of the machine guns from their defensive missions and permitted the "Base of Fire" to be really furnished, as first conceived in 1918. This employment of machine guns as the "Base of Fire" exploits the use of the gun to the maximum. It enables

employment at extreme ranges, makes it possible to fire over troops, and through gaps in the line. It also provides fire concentrations. There was still a limitation to the use of the machine gun, due primarily to its flat trajectory. This flat trajectory limits the employment of these weapons to the zone of artillery protection and the fire concentrations which are employed when the attack opens cannot be employed during the course of the combat, due to the necessity for observation, adjustments, and liaison between units. Hence it was still necessary to have the curved fire weapons. The rifle grenade and the Stokes Mortars were found to be insufficient. It was about this time that the situation with regard to armament changed to a period of feverish activity, the German military power having put an end to any hopes of disarmament and pacifism.

At this time the 81-mm. Brant Mortar was developed. This was an excellent weapon in almost every respect, being comparatively light, accurate, and having a considerable range. Test indicated that the new mortar in sufficient numbers could replace artillery in immediate support of the Infantry, leaving the artillery for more distant missions. This was a comforting thought, but soon found to be false. Based on this false premise, the idea was to group a considerable number of these mortars under the Regimental Commander so that he would be independent of all artillery support. But it was soon found that the mortars were not artillery, as they had all of the limiting features of the artillery, ammunition supply, etc., and were lacking in some of the fine points. It was at this point that the mortars were placed in the Accompanying Weapons Company, and the organization so arranged that the mortars could be readily available to the attacking units. They were *not* artillery, but accompanying weapons and to be used as such. The mortar, instead of being the Regimental Commander's weapon, is now the Battalion Commander's weapon.

It was at about this point in development that the 60-



mm. mortar was created and furnished to the rifle company commander. The picture now was each command echelon with its own curved fire weapon—the company with the 60-mm. mortar—the battalion with the 81-mm. mortar—the regiment with supporting artillery. There is still, however, a problem in connection with these weapons which to date has not been satisfactorily answered—namely, the ammunition supply.

By this period the Infantry was well supplied with weapons of an offensive nature, but there was still no defense against the tank, except the 37-mm. gun, which was known to be quite limited in this field. The 75's were considered, but they were required for other missions, and the number necessary for a proper anti-tank defense would have employed entirely too many of these valuable weapons. The Spanish War demonstrated the need of a heavily armored tank, and likewise the need for a weapon to combat the tank. A great many types of anti-tank weapons were developed and while it is not known just which types or type have been adopted, it is generally agreed that the Infantry Regiment will require about ten to fifteen of these weapons to properly defend a front of about one mile. It may be assumed that they have been provided.

During this same period the development of the semiautomatic rifle made great strides. All of the powers made every effort to meet what was felt to be a real need for the Infantryman. Practically all of the powers have developed a semiautomatic weapon—the question now is to provide these weapons and in a fast moving engagement to supply them with ammunition. The development of the semiautomatic and its actual use will no doubt bring about changes in the organization of the Infantry units. It will relieve the machine gun of some missions and will permit the machine gun to become heavier and more efficient, and to its employment against aircraft.

With all of the improvement in weapons for the Infantry, both mortars and semiautomatic rifles, the problem of supply becomes more involved, particularly in the offensive, where large supplies of ammunition are required. It is certain that the tonnage for a one day attack will far exceed the World War figures. No doubt the Infantry will use the organic cross country supply vehicles, but they will not always be available for the transportation of ammunition, and are not numerous in most organizations.

The mobility of the Infantry since the World War has been greatly increased. During the World War troops were transported many times by truck, but they were separated from their trains. Since that time the trains in most countries have been motorized, as have parts of the forward echelons, thus permitting of greatly increased mobility.

Coming now to the present day, we find the Infantry of most European countries capable of greatly increased fire power in both the offense and the defense. It can solve through maneuver and by its own fire power, local and limited battlefield incidents. However, in spite of all the progress made since 1914, it still remains a heavy and slow moving arm. From the standpoint of organization, the Infantry Regiment has become a complex

group, with units differing greatly from one another. It might be said that complexity, specialization, and orientation toward a perfected mechanism have been the essential characteristics of the evolution of Infantry.

While the materiel and mobility of the Infantry have been greatly improved and it is a powerful war instrument, capable of fulfilling efficiently its battle role, it still depends upon the quality of the men who constitute the Infantry. The quality of the men is found to be based upon their training and morale. The question of training is becoming more and more involved with the specialization. They are no longer just men in ranks, but are specialists and must be trained accordingly.

Technical instruction, however, is not everything, and there have been many discussions, particularly in Germany, of morale opposed to material. The value of material has a great influence on morale in the same manner that morale plays a large part in the results obtained from material. It will be the duty of the Staff to keep close contact with morale, treating a lack of it as if it were a disease, watching individual battalions and larger units for any signs of a weakening morale.

From these few remarks it will be seen that Infantry in Europe has changed considerably in detail since the outbreak of the World War in 1914. The weapons have been greatly improved, the organizations modified, and the actual employment on the battlefield, i.e., deployment, changed to meet the newer weapons. All of this has happened to the oldest arm of the military establishment within the past twenty-five years. What will be the evolution of Infantry during the next twenty-five years? It will be interesting to behold.

LETTERS RE CAMP PERRY SHOOT

14 September, 1939.

Headquarters, Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.

My dear General Marshall:

On behalf of the Marine Corps I wish to express to you our admiration for the excellent marksmanship displayed by the U. S. Infantry Rifle Team in winning the National Rifle Team Trophy at Camp Perry, Ohio, this year, and by the U. S. Cavalry Team in placing second in that match.

The conduct of the Matches as a whole, under the direction of the Executive Officer, Colonel Oliver S. Wood, U. S. Infantry, was the best of many years. Every competitor was afforded an opportunity to fire under equal conditions and with partiality to none. The War Department is to be congratulated upon the smooth operation of the range and the administration of Camp Perry as a whole during the National Matches of 1939.

Very truly yours,

T. HOLCOMB,
Major General Commandant.

General George C. Marshall,
Chief of Staff, U. S. Army,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
September 19, 1939.

My dear General Holcomb:

I deeply appreciate your letter of September 15th offering congratulations on the records made by the Infantry and Cavalry teams of the Army in the National Rifle Team Trophy Match at Camp Perry this year and generously commenting on the manner in which the matches were conducted.

It is gratifying to receive your congratulations and compliments and I am happy to pass them on to the officers and men directly concerned. The Army will be proud to receive your commendations.

Possibly in the next match I may have the pleasure of offering congratulations to the Marine Corps on winning first place, but this year I have the greater opportunity, to thank you for perfect sportsmanship. Regardless of which team wins in future competitions, I am certain that nothing can mar the fraternity of spirit and mutual admiration of the Army and the Marine Corps.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

Major General T. Holcomb,
Commandant, The Marine Corps,
Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.

14 September, 1939.

My dear General Lynch:

Will you please accept the congratulations of the U. S. Marine Corps on the well-earned victory of the U. S. Infantry Team in winning the National Rifle Team Match at Camp Perry, Ohio, this year. The winning of this trophy, as well as of that of the National Individual Rifle Trophy by Sergeant Brown of the Infantry Team, is indicative of the excellence of rifle marksmanship in the Infantry as a whole, and warrants our sincere admiration.

Very truly yours,

T. HOLCOMB,

Major General Commandant.

Major General George A. Lynch,
Chief of Infantry,
War Department,
Washington, D. C.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF INFANTRY
September 16, 1939.

My dear General Holcomb:

Your kind letter of 14 September received and appreciated. In the hard fought matches just completed there was room for all to be most gratified in the team showings. The slender six points which separated the three leading teams is eloquent of the keenness of the competition throughout.

May I extend the Infantry's salute to your pistol team for their victory, and to Sergeant Harris and Corporal Mitchell for their splendid showing in the National Individual. Winning the Orton, Herrick, Roumanian, Wright, President's, Marine Corps and Members trophy

matches is a record any team may well be proud of, and leaves the honors well divided.

Very sincerely,

GEORGE A. LYNCH,

Major General, Chief of Infantry.

Major General T. Holcomb,
Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

14 September, 1939.

My dear General Herr:

I wish to express to you and to the U. S. Cavalry the congratulations of the Marine Corps on the excellent performance of the Cavalry Rifle Team during the recent rifle and pistol matches held at Camp Perry, Ohio, especially in taking second place in the National Rifle Team Match. Our associations with the rifle and pistol teams of the Cavalry have always been most pleasant, and the fair play and sportsmanship exemplified by the Cavalry Team under the leadership of Captain Martin this year, warrant our sincere admiration.

Very truly yours, T. HOLCOMB,
Major General Commandant.

Major General John K. Herr,
Chief of Cavalry,
War Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF CAVALRY
September 15, 1939.

Major General T. Holcomb, U. S. Marine Corps,
Commandant, Headquarters U. S. Marine Corps,
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Holcomb:

I was very much gratified to receive your letter of congratulations concerning our Rifle Team and expressing such warm appreciation concerning the Cavalry Team and its Captain.

Our association with the Marines has always been of a very friendly nature and the quality of your Teams of every kind, both for shooting and in athletics, has been an inspiration that causes emulation.

I will be happy to transmit a copy of your letter to Captain Martin.

Sincerely yours,

J. K. HERR,

Major General, U. S. Army,
Chief of Cavalry.

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Room 1038

NAVY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON. D. C.

Adjustable Telescope Rest Made At The Navy Yard, Portsmouth, N. H.



HERE has been developed at the Naval Prison, Portsmouth, New Hampshire, a gallery telescope rest embodying such simplicity, ease of construction, and low cost, that the information and plans for its construction are given for use by other posts having need for such rests.

A rest was needed that could be adjusted to accommodate the shooter whether prone, sitting, kneeling, or sitting on a stool. No attempt was made to give it an extension up to the height of eye of a man standing, since the offhand shooter normally sits on some sort of stool between shots. The rest developed permits adjustment for heights of eye from 17½ inches to 57 inches. The telescope in the rest can be moved both in azimuth and in angular elevation without shifting the position of the base, thus permitting one spotter to spot for several shooters if desired. Being adjustable, this rest eliminates the necessity for several different rests of varying heights and also the unsatisfactory method of piling stools up to allow the use of the telescope.


The materials needed for the construction are cheap and can be purchased in any locality, but many of the parts can be taken from the pile of odds and ends of pipe and metal that accumulate in all plumbing or machine shop stock rooms. If purchased, the total cost of the material for this telescope rest would be less than \$1.50.

Any machinist or plumber of average ability can construct the rest in a machine shop. No precision work is


required; an ability to use a machine lathe and welding tools being all that is necessary.

The base of the rest is a piece of $\frac{1}{4}$ " iron plate cut in the shape of an equilateral triangle having sides 19" long. About 1" is cut off each corner. The center of the plate is cut out to take a 6" length of $1\frac{1}{2}$ " standard iron pipe which is to be secured to the plate with a lock nut on each side. The corners of the plate are bent at right angles to the central portion to make legs 4" high. By using a base of triangular shape, the rest has three legs instead of four, thus making it steady regardless of whether the floor on which it is used is even or not.

The lower section of the upright is a 6" length of $1\frac{1}{2}$ " standard iron pipe threaded at one end to take the lock nuts previously mentioned. At the unthreaded end of the pipe, and with its center $\frac{5}{8}$ " from the end, a brass nut for a $\frac{1}{4}$ " bolt is soldered to the outside of the pipe. A hole is then drilled and tapped so that a $\frac{1}{4}$ " bolt will pass through both nut and pipe. The addition of the nut was found necessary since in some cases the pipes making up the upright had to be turned down too thin to give the strength and security needed at this point.



Telescopic Rest, Extended Position



Telescopic Rest, Collapsed Position

Four similar lengths of pipe are manufactured as follows: An 8" length of $1\frac{1}{4}$ " pipe is turned down in a machine lathe to an outside diameter of $1\frac{9}{16}$ ". A 9" length of 1" pipe is cut but need not be turned down, as it will fit sufficiently well inside the $1\frac{1}{4}$ " pipe. A 10" length of $\frac{3}{4}$ " pipe is turned down to an outside diameter of 1" to fit within the 1" pipe. An 11" length of $\frac{1}{2}$ " pipe is turned down to $\frac{3}{4}$ " to fit within the $\frac{3}{4}$ " pipe. To each of these pieces a brass nut is soldered as described above and the pipe drilled and tapped for a $\frac{1}{4}$ " bolt.

The upper section of the upright is a 12" length of $\frac{3}{4}$ " pipe threaded at one end to screw into a "T" fitting. Beginning 1" from the threaded end, the remainder of the pipe is turned down to an outside diameter of $1\frac{9}{16}$ ".

The "T" fitting mentioned above is drilled and tapped to take a $\frac{1}{4}$ " bolt at the intersection of the center lines of its openings.

The head or tray in which the telescope lays is made from a 12" length of 2" copper tubing which is cut longitudinally into two halves. To it is brazed a 7" length of $\frac{5}{8}$ " iron rod bent at a right angle to give one side 2" long. The 2" leg is brazed at right angles to the outside of the copper tubing at its mid-point.

The set screws are made by soldering semicircular pieces of $\frac{1}{16}$ " sheet brass into the slots of $\frac{1}{4}$ " brass bolts $\frac{5}{8}$ " long, to make wing bolts of them.

The actual assembly is simply a case of fitting the various pieces of pipe together and setting up on the wing bolts to hold them in place.

Several minor obstacles were encountered before the final satisfactory rest was evolved. The use of oxy-acetylene welding to fasten the lower section of pipe to the base caused the plate to buckle—hence the lock nuts. Elec-

tric welding would eliminate this difficulty, and make the threading of the pipe and the use of lock nuts unnecessary. Brazing the brass nuts to the pipe ruined the threads, making it necessary to use solder instead. It was discovered that the use of longitudinal slots in the pipes to prevent their turning within each other weakened them so that the pressure of the set screws caused a partial collapse of the inner pipes and binding.

The accompanying photographs give a clear conception of what the finished product looks like, and it is believed will clear up any questions that may arise as to assembly.

IN THE OLDEN DAYS

The following letters illustrate some of the difficulties of former Marine officers:

Marine Barracks, Brooklyn, New York
June 19, 1846

Sir:

On the 12" of this month application was made by Capt. English for a supply of muskets—No answer has been received to this letter—There are at present fifteen men at the post without arms and these men are daily increasing. I request your early attention to this.

I am respectfully,
Yr. Ob't. Servant,
Sam'l. Miller
Lt. Col.

Major A. A. Nicholson,
Quartermaster of Marines

Marine Barracks, Brooklyn,
New York, June 2d 1846

Sir:

We are entirely exposed on the North East side of the Barracks Yard from cattle and Hogs to our great annoyance. Mr. Acosta has been repeatedly written to on the subject, as well as to the Quartermaster. It is pretended that the graduation is necessary to enable him to put up the fence—that is not necessary—the line of the avenue is only essential, as the raising the wall to the proper heights can be done at any subsequent period and the wall will keep the cattle out. The fact is that the balance of the enclosure is no kind of bar to a free ingress and egress.

Respectfully,
Your obd't. Sv't.,
Sam'l. Miller,
Lt. Col., Comd'g.

Brig. Gen'l
Com'dt. Henderson,
Com'dt. of Marines

P.S. June 2d

Lt. Tansill arrived here last evening with 2 corporals and ten privates. At the request of Capt. Stringham I have anticipated the arrival of the balance of the Guard and furnished one sergeant and twenty men this morning.

Res'y
Miller,
L.C.C.

The Political Background

While Italy publicly and insistently proclaims her grievances over her position in Northern Africa, and Mussolini demands the cession of Tunisia and other advantages at the expense of France, she is faced with the fact that the Treaty of 1908, in effect, gave France the control of Spanish Morocco had she wished at the time to exercise it. It will be recalled that in that treaty France, in return for Italy's acquiescence in Moroccan matters, recognized Italy's rights in Tripoli.

Italy, when the international status of Tangier was under consideration by France, Spain and Great Britain, took the position that she was vitally interested in any action affecting the Mediterranean area. Great Britain, however, barred her from participation in the negotiations, and it was not until a year and a half later, with France offering no objections, that Italy was given her share of equal status as an administrator in the International Zone of Tangier.

Under a later agreement Italian colonists in the North African possessions of France were no longer to forfeit their nationality and automatically become French citizens after a stated residence. In French Morocco they are the most numerous of the foreign element. They maintain their separate schools. In each locality their Fascist representative is openly recognized as the leader and spokesman of the Italian contingent.

Should Italy attempt to reopen the question of the Spanish Zone it would be equivalent to an attempt to reopen the entire Moroccan question. There is little doubt any demand coupling the Spanish Zone with the cession of Tunisia would be met with armed force if the matter was pressed to a conclusion.

Prior to the Spanish civil war and the victory of Franco there had been a steadily growing Spanish-French rapprochement. Spain, despite the unpopularity of the Moroccan adventure, despite the public advocacy of Rivera in 1913, then Captain General of Barcelona, of abandonment of the Spanish zone, clung stubbornly to its occupation, and an aroused Spanish pride resulted in Rivera's removal from his high post. Back of this reluctance to surrender an unpopular, profitless and costly occupation were two factors. Spain clung to the belief and hope that she would recoup her losses through exploitation of the zone's mineral resources. Spanish statesmen, whose judgment has since been vindicated, entertained an increasingly appreciative appraisal of the great strategic potentialities of the *coulloir* of the zone.

Its transfer to an unfriendly or sympathetic power would have presented a serious menace to Spain. In 1931, eight years ago, Spain and France were fast cementing a friendship. In that year Resident General Lucien Saint, the civil administrator of French Morocco, paid a ceremonial visit to Madrid. The Spanish High Commissioner, Ferrer, returned it at Rabat a year later. In the following year Premier Herriot paid a notable visit to Madrid. The status quo, therefore, before the present regime came into power in Spain, was on solid foundation, reacting with mutual benefit.

It may be idle to speculate on which side Spain would ally herself if war came to the Mediterranean. Franco,

despite his present unpaid obligations, may see alliance with France and Great Britain the wiser step, for victory to their standards would automatically cancel those heavy obligations. That step would be one of far-reaching significance with Ceuta but thirteen sea-leagues from Gibraltar. Should he throw his lot with Hitler and Mussolini a quick thrust from French Morocco on the south, and Gibraltar on the north, might well spell the elimination of Ceuta's threat, and render Spanish aid to the Berlin-Rome axis one of negligible value.

Prior to the World War France, backed by Great Britain, was periodically agitated over Germany's real intentions of penetration into Morocco under the pretense of defending her commercial interests in Northern Africa. Two German cruisers inaugurated a well-defined policy by steaming into Tangier after years of absence from that port. In 1911 rose the Agadir incident when Germany despatched the gunboat *Panther* there, and later the cruiser *Berlin*, and Europe perched on the brink of war.

That furor ended with a Franco-German accord which recognized French rights to a free hand in the Moroccan sphere, while Germany was mollified by a slice of the French Congo adjacent to German territory. France looked upon the settlement as little more than an award of rights already possessed. Germany treasured up resentment over her failure to win a Moroccan port. She had been out-maneuvered by superior French diplomacy over a long period of years, backed by Great Britain.

Agadir had brought a major crisis, ending in France's victory, but it remained a point of departure for the catastrophe of 1914, inflaming German hatred of Great Britain.

The Spanish civil war, with Germany and Italy, at first secretly, and then openly employing the zone as an air and submarine base, speedily converted that area into a veritable powder keg, a root for conflict that holds a striking parallel to the events of 1911.

It is a question whether German intrigue in the Spanish Zone was designed to test France's forbearance, or a step toward a bargaining point in her campaign for the restoration of her lost colonies. In either event it has served to keep France on the alert, primed for a swift advance into the zone to avert its military occupation by the Berlin-Rome partnership.

Throughout the period of the Spanish civil war Germany lost little opportunity to increase her activities in Tangier, Ceuta and Melilla. She installed an air base at Tetuan, thirty miles inland from Melilla. Her agents carried Teutonic propaganda throughout the zone, and the tribes on the French border seethed with unrest. She paraded a fleet of twenty-nine warships along the Moroccan coast. While the inland garrisons were manned almost wholly by the Spanish rebels, under Spanish officers, young German airmen operated openly from Tetuan and Ceuta in raids against loyalist points in Spain.

Following her sensational debarkation of troops at Ceuta and Melilla she answered French protests with the declaration that the Reich government denied any purpose of striking at her treaties. The senior Spanish officer in the zone, Colonel Beigbeder, offered to conduct French offi-

cers along the line from Melilla to Larache on the Atlantic.

At the same time France was not resting on her oars. Vice Admirals Abrial and Laborde, recognized specialists on North African questions, chose this time for maneuvers in Moroccan waters. Coincident with the maneuvers British men-of-war, freed by the settlement of the Ethiopian campaign, got under way for gunnery exercises in the Gibraltar-Madeira area.

History repeated itself. Kaiser Wilhelm II, gravely impressed by well-knit Franco-British solidarity at the time of the Agadir incident, had surrendered his dreams of a German African empire. Hitler, likewise impressed, turned his attention to other matters. He contented himself with spectacular display of the Reich's renaissance as a sea power, with speeding up, regardless of cost, a ship-building program to outstrip that of France. Profiting by the cloak of the Spanish civil war, Germany built at Cadiz a *succursale*, or ship-building branch. The crack cruiser *Emden* showed her flag in Spanish and Moroccan ports, and as far south as Sierra Leone. At Lisbon Germany maintained "colonial agents" charged with mysterious missions in the colonies of Western North Africa. In the Bissagos Islands she erected, with Portuguese consent, large agricultural warehouses for trade in the palm oil industry. The official title of the establishment, as reported by French officers, was the Compania Agricola et Fabrica de Guine. The buildings, they estimated, could easily be converted into barracks and for the storage of military supplies.

The Bissagos Islands, north of Sierra Leone and off the coast of Portuguese Guiana, lie between Dakar on the north and Conakry on the south. A hundred in all, these islands are ideal natural air and submarine bases, according to authentic French reports. On the principal isle, Bubaque, Germany erected a powerful radio station. Many isles, according to the French reports, are well adapted for the installation of artillery.

With the passage of time, emboldened by her unchecked activities, Germany sent her men-of-war into the Canaries, to Rio del Oro, Spanish-owned, and into Portuguese Madeira. French naval strategists followed these moves with anxious eyes. The line of Dakar-Brest would be a vital one for France's sea communications, for it crosses the Canaries and Madeira. From any base along that line enemy submarines could cover a great radius, enemy land-based planes could function for reconnaissance and attack. An enemy base, or bases, would threaten French communications with South America, her Central African empire, and those entering the Mediterranean from the Atlantic. They would be a sword of Damocles suspended over the threads of French sea traffic, and their acquisition would divert a very considerable part of the French navy to meet their menace.

From the Spanish Zone in Northern Morocco these activities of Germany have been mainly launched. Never in its chequered history has the Spanish Zone bulked so large in the strategy of a possible world war. In the hands of France, backed by Britain's sea power, its occupation would immeasurably reduce its present menace to her sea lanes. In the hands of her enemies it would prove the key base for their sea and air operations over a very considerable area of war.

THE NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR

Combining pageantry with pomp and formal ceremony, the special events and days that will be celebrated at the New York World's Fair 1939 during the six-month period this summer offer an unparalleled succession of brilliant spectacles, it was announced January 25 by Grover A. Whalen, President of the Fair Corporation.

Rulers and statesmen of the 62 foreign nations participating in the exposition will witness pageants in which hundreds of thousands of nationals in costume will take part. Massed choirs, folk festivals, parades will be staged before spectators that will number up to 1,000,000. Army and navy contingents, both American and foreign, will pass in review. American historic, patriotic and fraternal organizations will stage elaborate displays.

In addition to exercises occurring in the Court of Peace, along Constitution Mall and other of the Fair's main assembly areas, festivities will be continued in the foreign pavilions, the state buildings or the exhibitors' halls, according to the particular day. These will include banquets followed by balls.

THE CAMEROONS

(Continued from page 45)

concerned with the seizure of bases and their consequent denial to the enemy. Although much work remained to be done by the forces inland, with control of the sea and the coast deprived, the Germans faced eventual defeat, surrounded as they were on three sides by hostile Allied colonies and on the fourth by an ocean whose sea-lanes were England's. As an amphibious and as an inter-Allied venture, the campaign was notable for cooperation between all concerned. Coordination between ship and shore, between French and English was of a high order. Despite mixed commands, and the occasional necessity of yielding a point, the two Allies worked together supremely well. In this connection, however, it should be remembered that most of the yielding fell to the French, who conceded to General Dobell supreme command, but it is equally to his credit that he allowed French subordinate commanders great freedom, which bore fruit in the capture of Edea. Naval support of land forces should illustrate how effective naval gunfire can be in the hands of personnel who have become familiar with the technique of bombardment. At no point would the campaign have continued to progress without the aid of Captain Fuller and his warships.

From the soldier's point of view, the Cameroons coast campaign contributes few lessons which should not already be learned. Security, both in point of intelligence and of actual safety on the march through country uniformly difficult, was consistently maintained. Nowhere do we read of a major surprise or ambush inflicted upon French or British forces. Logistic confusion or breakdowns are notable entirely by absence. Columns appeared ready for action at the scheduled time and place in virtually every operation that was undertaken. Is it any wonder that most succeeded? Thus we may conclude an examination of the Cameroons coast campaign. As has been noted, it was small, remote and obscure. Yet it may claim a place of distinction on a roll where few names are listed, very few; that of the successful amphibious expeditions.

THE SPANISH-MOROCCAN ZONE

(Continued from page 38)

THE CHARM OF MELILLA

Little known to the average tourist is the fascinating bit of Spain and Africa that is Melilla, easily accessible by steamer from Algeciras, Gibraltar or Tangier. Dominating its outdoor life is the Calle Alfonso XII, lined on either side of its half mile with cafes and smart shops. On Sundays and holidays Melilla goes to town. At the stroke of five in the afternoon all motor traffic on the street is suspended, not to be resumed until three hours later. Water carts have passed and the African sunlight has made it spotless from curb to curb.

The Spanish ladies promenade leisurely back and forth with their officer escorts. They wear the towering combs and lacy mantillas of Andalusia. Their gowns are the latest creations from the continent, and they present a charming sight as they weave back and forth in expert etiquette the fans that open and close like giant butterflies. It is pleasant under the cafe awnings, and doubly so if the visitor, as is usually the case, has just arrived from the international area of Tangier with its divided authority. No whining beggars, no insistent peddlers, no sinister guides detract from the spectacle. The seltzer bottle is plied only in its legitimate role, not as a weapon of defense from importunate and insolent peddlers. Excellent German beer and light Spanish wines are high in quality and low in price. With each order the waiter serves succulent pink crayfish or spiced olives in a delicious sauce. When one tires of the promenade there is a lovely park a hundred yards distant where other promenaders pass under the shade of palms, between banks of flowers, while a military band holds forth. Still another attraction is the fact that Melilla is an open port. There are excellent bargains, provided one is not pressed for time. That is essential, for otherwise the shopper will pay twenty-five pesetas where a Melillan pays but ten. It is a safe rule in Melilla when the price asked is fifty pesetas to tarry and by un hurried stages offer a final price of thirty. Failing in this one turns to leave and the smiling shopkeeper is at your heels, bowing with Castilian grace. "You may have it, señor, at your price. I do this for you only!"

Melilla's position on the promontory of Ras Wark is a striking one. The bold promontory ends in the Cape of Tres Forcas with its three separate tongues thrusting out into the blue Mediterranean directly opposite Malaga. The city itself lies in a great bight nine miles to the southward. City and fortifications are on a small peninsula five hundred yards in length, whose height and width are about one hundred yards each. Behind are rings of high cliffs, dominated by Mount Gurugu, the scene of sanguinary battles. Beyond the range of the Little Atlas climbs up to a height of 7,000 feet in parallel and formidable ridges.

Outstanding in the scant economic possibilities of the Melilla area is a Spanish-owned iron mine that was developed at the hands of American engineers. Two hours by motor car, this deposit of almost virgin ore, high in the mountains, is known as the Compania de Minas del Rif. A one-meter gauge railway carries the ore to the company's huge loading dock in Melilla, ready for transport to Germany. Few iron mines in the world are potentially richer.

THOSE ALLURING AZORES

(Continued from page 32)

stage. But, as we have pointed out before, Britain is not likely to object to American acquisition of the islands. Britain needs our good will, and as long as they have bases in this hemisphere athwart our own lines, it would lie ill in their mouths to object to our being at the Azores.

There was an interesting revelation of recent American interest in the Azores in the course of the fleet exercises of the American battle force in February, 1939, which were personally observed by President Roosevelt himself. Those exercises were to test the defenses of the Atlantic approaches to the Western Hemisphere against a fleet which began operations in the neighborhood of the Azores.

While it is true that British fleet exercises too have taken place, and regularly, in the area between Gibraltar and the Azores, that area is conceded by British experts to be subsidiary to the other danger areas to British and French seapower, and the North Sea and Mediterranean. For no threat to England can develop in the subsidiary area unless it comes from the North Sea or Mediterranean and breaks through. As stated by Commander Edwards, RN ("Uneasy Oceans," p. 185):

"There can be no question of a threat coming eastwards across the Atlantic Ocean (in the Azores Area), and at present, no threat can come up from the South Atlantic. The situation and the degree of danger in this area may, however, change abruptly if Germany is given back her West African colonies, or if either Germany or Italy secure bases in Spanish territory."

But whereas the Azores area is of secondary importance to British and French seapower, it is of prime significance to American seapower.

Finally, the proposal that America acquire Portuguese islands is nothing novel. It was discussed quite openly in a book by A. J. Drexel Biddle in 1909 ("The Madeira Island") that was commented upon widely in Europe, more particularly in an article by Angel Marvaud (Le Portugal Insulaire—Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales, v. 27, at p. 802).

III

CONCLUSION

While the islands lack industrial war potential, economically they are as suitable to serve as a naval base as Hawaii, Singapore, Gibraltar, or Port Louis. That they can be developed with suitable anchorages, enclosed harbors, dry-docks, repair facilities, landing fields, and coast defense works, is without doubt, though at considerable cost. That they are in a position to serve our defense against a conceivable coalition or distant blockade, or to help prevent the creation of a trans-Atlantic hegemony to our peril, is clear. That we cannot afford them to be in the hands of any other seapower is already recognized. The conclusion is irresistible that an effort should be made to acquire them if we can do so with the consent of the Portuguese Government, and of the inhabitants of the islands themselves.

LANDING BOATS

(Continued from page 40)

personnel in an emergency mobilization must be thought of, but outboard motors are a familiar problem to most young men of this age. This boat could not carry heavy arms such as artillery to the beach, but as stated before, it is not intended that it be used for any purpose except that of placing the first subwaves of infantry on the beach in a hurry.

The use of some boat of this kind might revise some of our estimates of what constitutes a possible approach to a landing beach, or what constitutes a practicable beach. If a boat of this type can be hurdled over a ramp, why can it not also be hurdled over a boat boom? If it draws only a few inches of water, why cannot experienced personnel take it safely over a reef which presents a formidable obstacle to ship's boats or those of several feet of draft? The principle of tactical integrity would not necessarily be violated, as headquarters units could be carried in these boats. It would be interesting to see what a coral shore would do to the bottom of a boat like this, but few officers would contemplate a landing on an all-coral beach with any type of boat, due to the difficulty of movement on foot after landing.

This article is not intended as an argument in favor of this particular design of boat, but it is the fervent hope of the author that it might be a stimulus to other officers with greater knowledge and more experience to devise a boat utilizing some of the principles set forth here. Grateful acknowledgment is here made to those officers who have graciously applied their knowledge and experience to the criticism of this article and whose help has made possible its completion.

BOOK REVIEW

(Continued from page 21)

to accomplish such a mission, Germany would lose. Maybe the Germans are hesitating to take the chance in the present war, as the number of planes and the continuity of attack necessary to destroy London, the plane bases, and the naval bases, would require a great many more planes than Germany is believed to have. The employment of aviation in the present war will be interesting to observe. Will Germany, France, or England be willing to make the great gamble?

In the second part the author will make the timid American feel much better as he points out the almost impossibility of attack on the United States. He admits that it could be done under certain circumstances, but the probabilities are small and with the proper military and naval preparedness by this country, can make the possibility almost nil. The author clearly indicates the outlying bases necessary to our proper defense, with the types and numbers of planes. As has been pointed out by others, Major Eliot points out that numbers of planes are not the deciding factor, but that quality is probably the more important factor. We must keep abreast of development, if not ahead.

It is believed that "Bombs Bursting in Air" will be of interest to all, naval, military, and civilian, particularly since the great European powers will be testing this new weapon in the immediate future.

R. MCC. PATE.

RESERVE RIFLE TEAM

(Continued from page 14)

and 1 team coach and in which there were 112 teams entered, was won by the U. S. Marine Corps. This was an "Any Rifle" match and the Marines used Magnum rifles equipped with telescopic sights, with which they set a new world's record with a possible score of 800 with 123 shots in the "V" ring. In this match the reserve team won the Critchfield Trophy for the second consecutive time which is awarded to the team making the high score using service rifles as issued; each member of the team was awarded a silver medal.

The culminating event of the National Matches was the National Team Match in which 127 teams representing every state and possession of the United States, including the Armed Services, competed. Course fired consisted of ten shots at the following ranges: 200s, 200r, 300r, 600s and 20 shots at 1,000 yards. Teams were composed of 10 firing members, 2 alternates, 1 team captain and 1 team coach. Match won by the U. S. Infantry for the second consecutive year. In this match the No. 1 reserve team took 6th place among the 127 teams entered, being beaten only by 4 regular service teams and one National Guard team. The reserve team won the Rattlesnake Trophy for the second consecutive year for high team in its class.

The system used in training the reserve team is exactly the same as that employed in marksmanship training throughout the Marine Corps Reserve as well as the regular service. This proves conclusively that, given a short period of intensive training, the reserve will be capable of upholding the finest traditions of the Corps.

THE WAKEFIELD MATCHES

(Continued from page 12)

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 2

The 241st Coast Artillery Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots at 1000 yds. Won by Sgt. T. E. Barrier, USMC—score 50-6Vs.

The Wood Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots, 200 and 300 yds., RF. Won by Pfc. A. L. Wolters, USMC—score 99.

The Curry Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course: 10 shots, 600 yds. Won by Sgt. V. F. Brown, USMC—score 50-9Vs.

The Military Order of the World War Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course 10 shots 600 and 1000 yds. Won by Pfc. P. K. Bird, USMC—score 100-15Vs.

The Cummings Match (Rifle Ind.)—Course 10 shots at 600 yds., time limit 10 minutes. Won by Capt. M. A. Fawcett, USMC—score 50-10Vs.

Individual Pistol or Revolver Match—Course: 20 shots, 50 yds. Won by 2nd Lt. P. C. Metzger, USMC—score 186.

The Jaswell Match (Pistol Ind.)—Course: 10 shots 50 yds., TF; 10 shots 25 yds., TF; 10 shots 25 yds., RF. Won by Sgt. R. E. Schneeman, USMC—289.

The Artillery Pistol Match (4-man team)—Course: Same as for Jaswell Match. Won by Marine Corps Team—score 1131.

(Marines won all rifle and pistol matches fired on 2 August.)

THE MARINE'S HANDBOOK

Circular letter No. 286, dated 7 April, 1939, from Major General Commandant to All Officers reads:

In reference (a) [Let. Sec. Navy to MGC, March 8, 1939] the Secretary of the Navy has authorized "The Marine's Handbook," by Captain Luther A. Brown, U.S.M.C., published by the Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., to be sold through all post exchanges of the Marine Corps and ships' service stores of the Navy patronized by Marine Corps personnel.

The 1939 edition was necessitated by a change in the Marine Corps Manual and in Marine Corps orders which prescribe the *Landing Force Manual, U. S. Navy*, 1938, in lieu of Army publications as the principal reference for basic training of Marine Corps enlisted personnel. This edition includes all the material necessary to bring it into agreement with the above change and contains 50 pages more than the 1938 edition. The retail price is the same, 75 cents postpaid; quantity orders, 15 per cent discount on 10 to 99 copies, and 20 per cent on 100 or more.

Send all orders and make remittances payable to

U. S. Naval Institute
Annapolis, Maryland.

APPLICATION FOR MEMBERSHIP

Date.....

**SECRETARY-TREASURER,
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Announcement of Association Regarding Awards for Prize Articles



First Prize	\$50.00
Second Prize	\$30.00
Third Prize	\$20.00



THE ABOVE CASH PRIZES WILL BE PAID TO THE AUTHOR
OF THE BEST ARTICLE ON A MARINE CORPS PROFESSIONAL
TOPIC. SUBJECT TO BE SELECTED BY THE AUTHOR.

Rules Governing Award of Prizes



THE competition is open to all Marine Corps officers (active, retired, reserve) who are members of the Association. Articles offered shall not exceed 5,000 words and must be typewritten, double-spaced, on 8 x 10½ paper. Illustrations, photographs or sketches may accompany the article. Each competitor will send in a sealed envelope the article plus one copy to the Editor, Marine Corps Gazette, Room 3317, Navy Building, Washington, D. C., before September 30, 1939. The article shall be signed by a *nom de plume*. By separate post in sealed envelope, the full name and rank of the writer, with the *nom de plume*, shall be sent in to the same address. In determining the standing of the articles submitted, preponderance of weight will be given to their professional value, originality of ideas and the practicability of the line of thought. Literary merit is of secondary importance.

The Board of Officers of the Association will act as the Board of Judges. Any or all articles submitted will be subject to publication, with honorable mention, in the Marine Corps Gazette at the usual rates. All manuscripts submitted will become the property of the Marine Corps Association. None will be returned.



★ The November number of
the Gazette will announce the
results of the competition.



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